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Abstract 
The dissertation investigates support by economists for the global policy shift away 
from unfunded public pension schemes towards funded private pension schemes.  
Influential economists and institutions, including the World Bank, present a suite of 
economic arguments that suggest that this shift will have positive effects on national 
economies, particularly in the context of aging.   
The arguments may be categorised according to their relation to the operation of three 
sets of institutions: capital markets, labour markets and political systems.  
In capital markets, the transition is purported to increase private and national saving, 
increase the quantity and quality of investment, and provide more efficient private 
administration.  In labour markets, it is claimed that the shift will reduce labour 
market distortions associated with public pensions, which inhibit competitiveness, 
produce unemployment and encourage early retirement.  According to the World 
Bank, public pensions systems cause these distortions without achieving their stated 
objective of reducing inequality.  In the political sphere, the shift is purported to 
insulate the pension system from political pressures, which otherwise inevitably lead 
to crisis. 
The thesis provides evidence which refutes these claims.  The best research, including 
studies by orthodox economists, indicate that the shift does not increase savings or 
investment, or improve the quality of financial investment.  The main effect of tax 
concessions associated with private pension systems is to divert to private pension 
funds savings that would occur in any case via other mechanisms.  The tax 
concessions are also regressive, even in systems with compulsory elements.  Private 
administration of pensions, particularly in a plural consumer market setting, is highly 
inefficient, with customers at a disadvantage in dealing with providers due to the 
complexity and opacity of products and pricing. 
A negative relationship is found between public pension spending and levels of 
elderly poverty, suggesting that reducing public pension spending increases levels of 
elderly inequality.  Public pensions are found not to explain differences in economic 
growth between regions.  Elements of system design which distort labour markets, 
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such as by encouraging early retirement, can easily be adjusted.  However, such 
elements are explicit government policy in several countries. 
A review of public and private pensions finds that examples of public system crisis 
are associated with instances of economic and political collapse, rather than system 
design.  Private funded systems are found to be more vulnerable, not less, to the same 
external influences.  Relatively generous universal public pension systems are found 
to be financially sustainable despite demographic change, assuming modest levels of 
economic growth. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
This dissertation is a critique of the economic arguments used by influential 
economists and institutions, including the World Bank, to support neoliberal pension 
reform.1 
This introductory chapter provides a brief description of neoliberal pension policy, 
including how it relates to the wider neoliberal economic and social policy agenda.   
It provides a summary of the economic arguments used to support neoliberal pension 
policy and the approach taken in the dissertation in respect of each argument.   
1 Neoliberal economic policy 
Neoliberals assert an unbreakable link between economic freedom – as embodied in 
free market capitalism – and political freedom.  Intervention by the state in the 
economy is said to compromise economic and political freedom.  Milton Friedman 
suggests: 
Freedom is a rare and delicate plant.  Our minds tell us, and 
history confirms, that the greatest threat to freedom is the 
concentration of power. Government is necessary to preserve our 
freedom; it is an instrument through which we can exercise our 
freedom; yet by concentrating power in political hands, it is also 
a threat to freedom.  Even though the men who wield this power 
initially be of good will and even though they be not corrupted by 
the power they exercise the power will both attract and form men 
of a different stamp. (Friedman, 1982: 2) 
As well as threatening freedom, state intervention is also said to be ineffective, 
typically resulting in unintended and negative consequences.  Accordingly, neoliberal 
economic policy is based on the notion that economic activity should, to the greatest 
extent possible, be conducted by private enterprise in free competitive markets 
(Friedman, 1962: 4).   
                                                 
1 The dissertation is concerned only with aged pensions.  In practice, disability and invalid pensions are 
usually integrated with aged pensions; however the economic analysis of these aspects of pension 
policy is separate and not dealt with in this analysis.  Throughout the dissertation the word ‘pensions’ is 
used to describe aged pensions. 
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The term neoliberalism is used to describe a range of theoretical and applied 
economic concepts.  It is closely associated with the polemical works of Friedrich von 
Hayek (1944) and Milton Friedman (1962/1982).  From the 1940s onwards, these 
economists were the ideological figureheads of a campaign in Western liberal 
democracies to overturn economic policy legitimised by the prevailing Keynesian 
orthodoxy.  This effort was realised by the early 1980s.  Governments across the 
developed world underwent a shift in policy focus, including raising control of 
inflation to a higher priority level than maintaining full employment.   
This change was combined with a raft of other policy changes which reduced the role 
of the state in managing and coordinating economic activity, including deregulation, 
reduced trade and capital controls, privatisation of public productive assets, and a 
renewed emphasis on private delivery of services such as health, education and 
welfare.  The use of transfers to equalise income has been reduced.   
The shift has occurred throughout the developed world, though the changes were and 
are strongest in the Anglo-American countries – the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and Canada – and, to a lesser extent, in 
The Netherlands and Switzerland.  The neoliberal counter-revolution2 continues today 
with emphasis on privatisation, competition reform and trade liberalisation.  The new 
orthodoxy’s foundations are a committed bureaucracy, a supportive media, and a 
newly created role for ‘financial markets’ – deregulated and enlarged early in the 
process of neoliberal reform – as guardians of ‘sound’ economic policy.   
In pension policy, as in other areas of policy, the neoliberal approach is not 
necessarily entirely coherent, comprehensive or free from contradiction.  Actual 
reforms may involve a recasting (rather than a reduction) of the state’s role in the 
economy, while couched in rhetoric asserting the strength of smaller government and 
free markets.  Erosion of public health benefit schemes, such as Australian Medicare, 
while increasing subsidies for private health insurance, is an example of such a 
 
2 The neoliberal counter-revolution responds to the Keynesian revolution.  Cockett (1995) provides a 
detailed history of the intellectual and political machinations leading to the counter-revolution with a 
focus on Europe and the UK. 
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recasting.  Such changes are complex and profound, and are yet to be effectively 
interpreted. 
Developing countries have also been affected by neoliberalism.  In development 
economics, neoliberal economists overturned, where possible, the import substitution 
development models used in the 1950s and 1960s in Asia and Latin America.   
The ideological shift in developing countries more generally was facilitated and 
expedited by the adoption and promotion of neoliberal economic ideas by the ‘Bretton 
Woods institutions’ – the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (henceforth, 
the International Financial Institutions or IFIs) – who implemented a set of economic 
and political ideas known as the ‘Washington consensus’.  By controlling access to 
development finance, these institutions exerted a powerful influence over economic 
policy in developing countries, effectively constraining the domestic political agenda.  
The role of these institutions in shaping economic policy in developing countries, 
particularly in regards to pensions, is discussed in chapter 6. 
One important example is of the transformation in a developing country is Chile.  In 
Chile, the ideological shift occurred comparatively early (1975-76), was implemented 
by a totalitarian government (a fact generally ignored by orthodox researchers), and 
represented a particularly abrupt departure from the policies of the preceding 
democratically-elected socialist government, which included nationalisation of most 
large scale industry.  The Chilean ideological transformation is also pertinent because 
the free market policies were developed by economists trained at the University of 
Chicago (home of Milton Friedman and collaborators), and at the Catolica 
Universidad de Chile.  The latter institution had a direct relationship with the 
University of Chicago sponsored by the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) (Valdes, 1995: 49).  Chile represents the first example of a complete 
abandonment of public unfunded pooled pensions in favour of a private funded 
personal account-based system.  It was the first of many dominoes to fall in Latin 
America both with regard to neoliberal economic policy generally, and pensions in 
particular.  Chile received favourable treatment from the IMF following the transition 
(Valdes, 1995: 2).   
The transformation in Chile exposes some basic contradictions in neoliberal thought.  
While neoliberal ideology is based on the concept of a dichotomy between individual 
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freedom and state oppression, the ideology was implemented in Chile by a totalitarian 
regime that systematically abused power, including denying basic human rights.  The 
‘anti-state’ philosophy provided a basis for policy which created immense fortunes for 
businesspeople close to the state, particularly via privatisation of state assets (O’Brien 
and Roddick, 1983: 72).  While an extreme example of cronyism, the Chilean case 
demonstrates how neoliberal policies – purported to improve the welfare of the 
general community – provide certain benefits for a much smaller set of interests.  The 
following analysis of the implementation of neoliberal pension policy in Australia and 
other countries suggests less extreme but otherwise similar patterns: the advantage for 
favoured groups is significant and direct, while the effects on the wider community 
are more complicated and include examples of clear disadvantage.  
2 Neoliberal pension policy 
The objective of neoliberal pension reform is to base retirement incomes to the 
greatest extent possible on privately and plurally administered, funded, personal 
account-based pension systems.  The systems are ‘funded’ in the sense that they hold 
financial assets in respect of financial obligations associated with future pensions. 
The private pension systems are supported via a mixture of mechanisms including tax 
concessions, employment conditions enforcing contribution, and, in some cases 
(including Australia), government-enforced mandatory contributions.  Public pension 
systems are seen by promoters of NPR, including the World Bank, as ideally to be set 
at a level consistent only with poverty alleviation.  In the recommended structure, the 
savings function of pensions are separated from the redistributory function (World 
Bank, 1994: xiv).  This is in contrast with structures in place in much of Europe, 
South East Asia and New Zealand, in which most citizens receive a majority of 
retirement income from public pension systems which aim to provide for a level of 
consumption consistent at least with comfort, rather than subsistence.   
Most of these systems are operated on a PAYGO (pay-as-you-go) basis.3  They may 
have only enough assets to smooth cashflow, and provide pensions directly out of 
contributions paid by workers.  These systems do not have personal accounts, as such; 
 
3 The main exception to this rule is the post-colonial ‘provident funds’, the most well-known of which 
are in South-East Asia.  These are public funded systems with personal accounts.   
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pensions are typically determined on the basis of the length and quantity of 
contributions, among other factors. 
In Averting the Old Age Crisis, the World Bank recommended a ‘three pillar model’ 
consisting of a minimalist public system to alleviate poverty, a funded private pension 
system and other voluntary savings (World Bank, 1994).  As a leading adviser of 
national governments reforming and implementing pension systems, the World Bank 
has dominated the international pension agenda through promotion of this model.  
According to some Bank researchers, Australia’s retirement income system, which 
consists of a compulsory private pension system and a means-tested public pension 
set close to the poverty line, closely matches the preferred model (Khan, 1999).   
Although the Bank favours a multi-pillar model with a basic public system, it has 
assisted in implementation of systems with no public safety net, such as in 
Kazakhstan.  In general, governments throughout the world are under pressure to 
increase the level of support for private pensions, whether through reduction in public 
pension benefits, or increases to tax concessions and contribution levels to private 
systems.  Much of this pressure is driven by those involved or potentially involved in 
private pension administration.  In effect, the multi-pillar model is a tool used to 
promote reform in systems based essentially on public provision.  Pressure to improve 
support for private pensions is constant and ubiquitous.  It is a constant factor even in 
nations with pension settings which closely match the recommended multipillar 
model, such as Australia. 
In developed countries, neoliberal pension reform takes the form of scaling back 
public pensions and encouraging private pensions.  In developing countries, where 
public pensions are often limited, it often focuses on development only of private 
pension systems.  In the transition countries, it has tended to involve termination or 
radical reduction of public schemes, and implementation of private schemes.  The 
World Bank favours radical reform over incremental reform because it is perceived as 
the best method of avoiding potentially protracted negotiations over existing pension 
rights and the details of new structures. 
The majority of the pension reforms are tinkering with an 
existing pay-as-you-go defined benefit system, rather than reform 
of the overall system of pension provision. However, while these 
reforms alleviate some of the fiscal burden, fiscal problems 
reappear in the long term. The only way to effectively solve the 
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pension system issue on a permanent basis is to move toward the 
fully-funded defined contribution reforms currently underway in 
Latin America, Australia, Poland and Kazakhstan and under 
consideration in a variety of other countries.  (Schwarz and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 1999: 18) 
Pension systems, whether private or public, are structures which require government 
intervention in the economy (such as legislation allowing tax concessions or requiring 
employers to deduct employee contributions).  This intervention is justified by the 
World Bank and other contemporary neoliberals on the grounds of paternalism and, to 
a lesser extent, redistribution; it is seen as necessary to fund retirement income for 
those who would not, or could not, provide for themselves.  This position is at odds 
with the purely libertarian position put forward by Milton Friedman, who argued that 
it was unnecessary to require all workers to make compulsory contributions to social 
security to provide for the tiny minority who would not provide for themselves (1962: 
182-190).  However, neoliberal policy in respect of pensions, as in many other areas, 
has developed to accommodate the interests of key social groups, particularly those 
associated with financial markets.  
Martin Feldstein’s (1974, 1975, 1976) major contributions to the neoliberal 
perspective on pensions focussed on economic ills associated only with public 
systems, particularly on national savings, and introduced the notion of diverting social 
security contributions to create a fund to be invested on capital markets.  While 
private pension systems do represent state intervention in the economy, following 
Feldstein, this has been regarded as ideologically acceptable.  The form of 
intervention supports personal thrift, as well as administration and fund management 
by private enterprise in a competitive market setting.  From the neoliberal point of 
view, it is therefore preferable to public pensions which are run by public 
bureaucracies, and which often involve progressive income redistribution.  Work by 
Jans Poterba and others during the 1980s and 1990s defended the role of private 
pension systems in promoting economic growth in several ways, particularly by 
increasing national saving (eg. Poterba et al, 1996).  The work of Feldstein, Poterba 
and others, focusing on savings, is examined in chapter 2. 
In most critical reviews of the emergence of neoliberalism, the transformation of 
pension policy is not considered of central importance.  In some treatments it receives 
no explicit mention (eg. Haworth, 1994; MacEwan, 1999).  A possible explanation of 
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this oversight is that important aspects of pension reform have a lagged effect, 
particularly in comparison with the immediate impacts of much neoliberal reform – 
labelled ‘shock treatment’ by both critics and supporters (O’Brien and Roddick, 1983: 
54).   
Radical reduction or removal of aged pension benefits, as occurred in Chile, has an 
immediate and obvious impact on retirement incomes, and this change has been 
analysed as part of the reduction in welfare state provisions.  However, reductions to 
public pensions via changes to indexation or benefit formulae (more common in 
developed countries) may only have a noticeable impact over a decade or more.  
Similarly, the emergence of private pension funds takes time and the impact of this 
development on the financial system has been considered only recently, though 
private pension funds (including life insurance) have represented a rapidly growing 
percentage of finance sector assets since the 1970s.  The trends in the impact of these 
systems on elderly income distribution are discernible (these are discussed in chapter 
5) though the full effect will not be observable for another generation. 
Although lagged, the impacts of the reform on workers and pensioners are highly 
significant.  The long term nature of pension policy is key to its importance.  While 
monetary policy can easily be reversed, pension systems develop momentum – 
financial assets and liabilities managed by large institutions with many stakeholders – 
that make them resistant to change.  Pension reform also has a role in the wider 
advancement of neoliberal policy.  It is typically undertaken in developing and 
transition economies as part of sweeping neoliberal reforms, especially privatisation.  
Contributions flowing into private pension funds can be used to purchase public assets.  
Understanding the economic impact of pension reform is therefore of critical 
importance. 
3 Economic arguments supporting neoliberal pension policy 
The arguments used to support neoliberal pension reform are based on assertions 
concerning the nature and effects of market forces at work in three areas of society, 
each described as subject to market forces by proponents of neoliberal pension reform.  
They are finance (capital markets), employment (labour markets) and government 
(political markets).  A shift in emphasis towards privately and plurally administered 
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funded pensions based on personal accounts is said to provide benefits in each of 
these areas, resulting in a higher trajectory of economic growth.   
In respect of capital markets, reform is purported to result in higher national savings, 
an improved quality and quantity of investment, and more efficient administration.  
For neoliberal pension reform to generate higher savings, it is necessary that public 
pension contributions displace more voluntary savings than do private pensions.  
Theory and evidence associated with this issue are examined in chapter 2.   
The impact of neoliberal pension reform on investment is considered in chapter 3.  
Returns and risks associated with public and private systems are compared.  The 
impacts on returns of demographic change and redistribution within public systems 
are considered.  Pension fund investment is analysed in the context of its role in 
boosting the capital stock and productivity. 
The efficiency of private pension administration organised around a competitive 
market is discussed in chapter 4.  This chapter focuses on the complexity of pension 
products and pricing, the effect of this complexity on competition in this market, and 
consequent price and quality outcomes. 
In labour markets, replacement of public pensions with private pensions is said to 
remove labour market distortions which reduce demand for, and supply of, labour, 
thereby increasing employment (e.g. Holzmann, 1999; Nöcker, 2000).  This argument 
is examined in chapter 5 in the context of the role of pensions as mechanisms to 
reduce poverty among the elderly – a role which intentionally allows older workers to 
exit labour markets.   
Private pensions are also said to be insulated from the machinations of elected leaders 
driven by political imperatives, which, it is claimed, lead to public pension system 
mismanagement including the promise of unsustainable benefits (e.g. Palmer and Fox, 
1999).  A related advantage is that state finances are thought to be insulated from 
pension finances.  These issues are discussed in chapter 6 with reference to the 
instances of pension system crisis in a variety of countries, including Argentina and 
the United States. 
A theme present in respect of all of these arguments is the impact of demographic 
change on public PAYGO pension systems.  These systems consist of a direct transfer 
of income from workers to pensioners.  The level of contributions from workers 
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required to fund pensions is a direct function of the ratio of workers to pensioners.  
Aging results in the ratio of workers to pensioners falling.  This is usually described 
as an increase in the ‘dependency ratio’ – the ratio of pensioners to workers – and 
requires an increase in the level of contributions from workers necessary to fund a 
given level of pensions.4  Public PAYGO pensions, particularly more generous 
pensions, are said to eventually require an unsustainable level of contributions due to 
aging.  The sustainability of moderately generous public pensions is considered in 
chapter 7.  Some basic modelling is performed to estimate the level of economic 
growth necessary to maintain or improve worker after-tax incomes given changes in 
dependency. 
Chapter 8 summarises the conclusions of the dissertation. 
4 Methods and data 
The analysis relies on a range of types and sources of data.  It employs a mixed 
methodology, utilising the wealth of literature available on pensions in consideration 
of each of the arguments listed above.   
A massive quantity of research is conducted on pensions, reflecting the fact that 
pension assets (and liabilities) represent a significant and increasing proportion of 
private and public financial assets.  Much of this research is produced or funded by 
dedicated pension research bodies, or research institutes which treat pensions as a 
major focus. These include the Pension Research Council, the Employee Benefit 
Research Institute and the National Bureau of Economic Research in the US, the 
Pensions Institute in the UK and the Centre for Economic Policy Research in Italy. 
 
4 It is more accurate to talk about the impact of aging on ‘people of working age’ and ‘people of 
pensionable age’ rather than workers and pensioners.  The number of workers and pensioners are 
affected by other factors, including levels of work participation, employment and the average age of 
retirement.  All of these factors have changed dramatically in recent decades, due to falling retirement 
ages, higher female labour participation at all ages, and higher average levels of unemployment in 
developed countries.  Nonetheless, all things equal, increased dependency caused by aging results in 
workers being required to contribute at a higher level of income in order to provide the same level of 
pensions. 
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Another important source of data and analysis is the World Bank itself, along with 
other international organisations including the OECD and the UN.  National 
regulatory bodies are another source of data and analysis.  Among these, the British 
regulator, the Financial Services Authority, has a notable research focus. 
The general and financial media are also an important source of information and 
opinion.  The media are an important resource because the subject matter is changing 
so rapidly and also because public opinion is a factor in determining the sustainability 
of pension policy.  The role of the media (and vested interests using the media) in 
shaping public opinion in relation to pensions is itself an issue worthy of thorough 
analysis. 
The dissertation makes occasional use of quantitative data analysis, including 
regression.  This is used particularly in relation to pension structures and saving, and 
pension structures and elderly inequality.  For each issue, acceptable international data 
sets were available for most OECD countries.  This tool is used to support the 
argument, rather than as the central focus of the analysis.  
Finally, modelling is used to analyse potential future outcomes in relation both to 
public and private pensions.  The use of modelling is provisional – comprehensive 
analyses are beyond the scope of the work.  It is used essentially to illustrate the 
importance of the interactivity between different variables, and the sensitivity of 
outcomes to them.  In effect, modelling is used not to predict specific outcomes but to 
emphasise the wide range of likely outcomes, given interrelations, sensitivity and the 
long timeframe necessary for analysis of pension policy. 
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Chapter 2 Saving 
The duty of ‘saving’ became nine-tenths of virtue and the growth 
of the cake the object of  true religion.  There grew round the 
non-consumption of the cake all those instincts of puritanism 
which in other ages has withdrawn itself from the world and has 
neglected the arts of production as well as those of enjoyment.  
And so the cake increased;  but to what end was not clearly 
contemplated.  Individuals would be exhorted not so much to 
abstain as to defer, and to cultivate the pleasures of security and 
anticipation.  Saving was for old age or for your children; but this 
was only in theory -- the virtue of the cake was that it was never 
to be consumed, neither by you nor by your children after you. 
(Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1919: 17-18) 
1 Introduction 
Neoliberal pension reform (NPR) involves increased reliance on self-provision in 
retirement via concessionally-taxed saving in private funded pension systems and 
reduced reliance on public PAYGO (pay-as-you-go) pension schemes.  Key 
arguments raised in support of neoliberal pension reform relate to the operation of 
capital markets.  These arguments are discussed here in three chapters.  The current 
chapter deals with saving, chapter 3 considers investment and rates of return, and 
chapter 4 discusses financial administration.  The subject matter of these chapters are 
closely inter-related.  For example, levels of saving and returns are determined in part 
by the efficiency of financial administration.  Loss to accumulation due to 
administrative leakage, which is relevant to both savings and investment, is not 
considered before chapter 4. 
The current chapter addresses four goals.  Section two explores the assertion by 
policy-makers and researchers of a relationship between neoliberal pension reform, 
saving and economic growth.  This section is relevant to chapters two, three and four, 
all of which relate to capital markets.  The section draws on evidence from the period 
of rapid neoliberal reform in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, and on similar reform 
in other countries.  The section provides a brief historical summary of the 
development of the current Australian retirement income system.   
Section three articulates the economic mechanisms by which the first part of this 
relationship – that neoliberal pension reform increases saving – is purported to operate.  
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This section includes an explanation of the neoclassical life cycle theory (LCT) of 
saving, and applications of it to pension systems.  The LCT asserts that individuals 
save above all to smooth consumption, particularly by saving while working to 
finance retirement.  In relation to pension systems, proponents of NPR assert that 
public pensions displace total saving, whereas private pensions increase total saving.  
Section four reviews a number of apparent weaknesses with the LCT and its 
application to pension systems.  These include that individuals may have a variety of 
objectives for saving besides retirement, that individuals may not have the financial 
skills to predict retirement income needs, that many individuals cannot afford to save 
for retirement, that a significant proportion of ‘savings’ are actually inherited, and that 
the asserted effects of public and private pensions on voluntary saving are 
contradictory.  Empirical evidence that conflicts with the LCT is also reviewed, 
including that the ‘hump-shaped demographic asset profile’, once thought to show 
asset run-down during retirement, is actually the result of ‘vintage effects’ due to 
successive cohorts having higher incomes and therefore greater wealth.  National 
savings rates are shown not to correspond to pension system type, nor to demographic 
factors, as would be predicted by the LCT. 
2 Pension reform and saving: the official policy position 
2.1 Australia 
2.1.1 Background: Neoliberal pension reform in Australia 
Despite being an early adopter of public pensions, Australia is unusual among 
developed countries in not having a contributory public pension system.  By 
Federation in 1900, public age pensions had already been instituted in New South 
Wales and Victoria.  The Constitution of the newly formed Australia included 
provision for a national pension system, and this was implemented in 1906, replacing 
the state systems.  These pension systems were paid for out of general revenue, were 
means-tested, and were explicitly focussed on poverty alleviation (Edey and Simon, 
1996: 4).  These are all characteristics shared with the public Aged Pension in 
Australia today. 
Serious efforts to create a contributory system like those common in continental 
Europe and North America occurred at various times.  These efforts reached the stage 
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of enacting legislation being introduced to parliament on three occasions – 1913, 1928, 
and 1938 – and being passed in the last case.  However, these efforts were stymied by 
a number of factors including lack of bi-partisan support, resistance from friendly 
societies (cooperative voluntary savings institutions) and the life insurance industry, 
division in the union movement over the issue, and the intervention of both World 
War I and World War II (Kewley, 1965: 140, 143).  Kewley describes the period from 
1913 to 1939 in the field of social services in Australia as being one of 'endeavour 
rather than achievement' (Kewley, 1965: 165). 
As a consequence, and more by historical accident than design, the Australian public 
pension offered neoliberal reformers of the 1980s very little room to move.  At around 
25 per cent of average male weekly earnings since the early 1970s, the aged pension 
leaves recipients close to or under the poverty line.5  The level of elderly deprivation 
in Australia during retirement is largely determined by living arrangements – i.e., 
whether or not retirees own their homes outright.  It is the lowest cost public aged 
pension in the OECD and closely matches the public element of the World Bank's 
recommended three pillar model (Khan, 1999; Treasury, 2001).    Means-testing has 
become more stringent since the 1970s; however, due to generous treatment of owner-
occupied housing and annuities, more than 60 per cent of those of pensionable age in 
Australia still receive full or partial benefits. 
As a consequence, neoliberal pension reform efforts in Australia focussed not on 
reducing public benefits but on boosting private provision.  The essentially private 
'pillar' of the Australian retirement income system is Australian Superannuation 
(“super”), a system of retirement savings based on personal accounts. Super is 
concessionally taxed, mostly funded, mostly privately administered6, and has minimal 
 
5 The relationship between public pension cost and elderly poverty is considered in chapter 5. 
6 Funded pension systems have assets to match the liabilities associated with the claims of members to 
future pensions.  Unfunded pensions or ‘nominally funded’ pension systems have lower assets than 
liabilities, and, in the case of most public pension systems, only have enough assets to cover a potential 
interruption of cashflow.  Pensions are financed by contributions or taxes from new members or by 
borrowing.  In Australia, at June 30, 2000, unfunded superannuation claims (essentially pension claims 
on public sector employers) represented $129 billion and funded superannuation claims represented 
$511 billion in household assets, out of a total financial assets of $1,182 billion (ABS, 2000a: 52).   
Chapter 2 Saving 22 
 
investment restrictions.  Fiduciary responsibility for each fund rests with a board of 
trustees, and the law governing super funds is closely related to laws covering trusts.  
Since the early 1980s, government policy has moulded super out of a pre-existing 
system which catered largely to senior executives and professionals into a system that 
is compulsory for almost all employees and accessible for all workers and dependent 
spouses.   
The system existing before 1985 had three distinct sectors.  The public sector 
consisted of employer-sponsored schemes for public sector employees.  Private sector 
executives and professional employees were covered by a private employer-sponsored 
corporate sector.  A retail sector, operated by the life insurance industry, offered tax 
effective saving for the self-employed and other independent savers.  The first wave 
of reform in the mid-1980s included super in the Award system of arbitrated worker 
pay and conditions.  Workers in unionised industries (in exchange for a reduced pay 
rise) were gradually provided with a 3 per cent employer contribution to personal 
accounts in existing corporate funds or in the newly formed industry sector of the 
super industry (Edey and Simon, 1996: 5).  The boards of trustees of the newly 
created funds included employer and employee (labour union) representatives. 
Coverage of employees rose to 55 per cent of full-time employees by 1986 (see 
Figure 2.1 below). 
A second wave of reform occurred in the early 1990s, after the Industrial Relations 
Commission rejected a further 3 per cent employer contribution.  In 1992, the Labor 
Government announced phased introduction of a compulsory 9 per cent 
'Superannuation Guarantee'.  The Super Guarantee Charge (SGC) created a system of 
penalties for employers who did not make contributions to super funds on behalf of 
employees.  Super Guarantee employer contributions were set initially at 3 per cent, 
reaching the full 9 per cent only in July 2002.  By 1995, coverage had reached 90 per 
cent of full-time employees. 
In broad terms, tax treatment is currently as follows: mandatory and voluntary 
contributions (to which a ceiling applies) are concessionally taxed, as are fund 
earnings, with an additional tax (a ‘surcharge’) for high income earners.  Benefits may 
be taken tax free up to a generous ceiling, if taken as an annuity, or receive 
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concessional tax treatment if taken as a lump sum.7  Contributions are also 
concessionally taxed for the self-employed and can be made on behalf of dependent 
spouses.   
The period of super's recent evolution saw only one change of government when the 
conservative Liberal-National Coalition won power from Labor in 1996, but 
retirement income policy is largely bi-partisan and has been altered only marginally.  
The Coalition Government introduced legislation to encourage more choice and 
competition (Costello, 1997).  Choice is also favoured in principle by the Labor 
Opposition but recent reform attempts have been opposed by Labor, seemingly for 
other reasons.8  The Coalition introduced the Superannuation Surcharge to reduce the 
tax benefit for higher income earners, but has since announced plans for its 
withdrawal. 
 
Figure 2.1 Superannuation coverage by type of employee 
Year Full-time Part-time All 
1986 46.5 7.0 39.4 
1989 55.1 17.8 48.1 
1992 88.0 54.1 80.3 
1995 94.4 71.6 89.4 
1999 96.9 76.3 91.0 
Source: Insurance and Superannuation Commission, Superannuation Bulletin; Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority, Superannuation Trends. Cited in Treasury, 2001: 84. 
                                                 
7 'Grandfathering' of contributions made under the very generous tax provisions up until 1983 has 
added substantially to the cost and complexity of tax treatment.  Contributions up to that date continue 
to be treated under the old tax rules in which contributions and earnings were subject to a 5 per cent 
tax.  Superannuation accounts established before 1983 (including both early and late contributions) also 
benefit from unique and more generous tax treatment, regardless of when contributions are made. 
8 The approach of the major parties to super choice is different in practice because a structure which 
makes membership of the relevant ‘industry fund’ compulsory in certain industries provides a direct 
role for unions in financial management and a possible source of funds for investment activities 
favoured by unions.  This is supported by Labor and opposed by the Coalition for party-political 
reasons. 
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2.1.2 Superannuation and macroeconomic goals 
In 1992, Ian Robinson of the Commonwealth Treasury wrote: 
"the government's retirement incomes policy objective is to 
ensure retirement income security for all Australians in the face 
of a marked increase in the aged-dependency ratio; and to 
achieve this without placing unsustainable burdens on future 
taxpayers. … There are, of course, broader macro-economic 
reasons for encouraging increased domestic saving in Australia, 
but that is a separate debate" (Robinson, 1992: 8).  
However, this claim of separation is at odds with the majority of policy statements 
and reports issued by politicians and the bureaucracy, and also with the weight of 
economic media commentary and academic output during the 1980s and 1990s.  The 
development of the Australian superannuation system during this period has always 
been conceived in terms of contributing to the achievement of both retirement income 
provision and macroeconomic goals, especially in the context of an aging population.  
The new system was expected to increase personal, private and national saving, which 
in turn was expected to increase investment, productivity and economic growth, as is 
expressed in a series of government policy statements on retirement income between 
1989 and 1997. 
The policy framework detailed in this statement recognises the 
very close links between retirement income policy…and 
macroeconomic and microeconomic reforms. Increased saving 
for retirement not only improves retirement income adequacy but 
also improves investment and future economic growth and hence 
our capacity to finance retirement income outlays. (Howe, 1989: 
iv) 
This package reflects the importance with which the Government 
views long term financial security and stability in retirement.  
Over the long term, our measures will also generate a large pool 
of investible funds - Australian funds for investing for Australia.  
It will diminish our need for foreign borrowings and enhance 
Australia's capacity to develop industry and create employment.  
(Dawkins, 1992: iii)   
That commitment to the national interest in greater self-provision 
for retirement, and to the individual interest in living better in 
retirement, will be even more manageable the higher the rate of 
sustainable economic growth we can achieve. (Dawkins, 1992: 
17)   
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There is a clear need to increase private saving and household 
saving in particular, if we are to achieve a better balance between 
domestic saving and investment and allow the economy to grow 
faster (Costello, 1997: 1).  
The need to boost national saving is inherently linked with the 
need for effective retirement income policy. (Costello, 1997: 9) 
The Australian Federal Government bureaucracy has an expert taskforce, the RIM 
(Retirement Income Modelling) Taskforce, dedicated to econometric research on the 
implications of our aging population and the government's policy responses.  RIM 
describes the intended economics effects of the retirement income policy as follows: 
An important objective of Australia's retirement incomes policy 
is to increase the level of national savings.  Increased national 
savings will play an important part in maintaining living 
standards in the face of an aging population. Increased aged 
dependency will mean that Australia will have a potentially 
diminishing labour force with which to produce the goods and 
services necessary to maintain its living standards. Maintaining 
Australia's living standards will therefore require a combination 
of  
- a substantial change in workforce participation patterns, for 
instance a movement to later retiring ages or further 
increases in the workforce participation of women; 
- substantial increases in labour productivity; or 
- substantial earnings from foreign investments.  
Increased national savings through superannuation provides an 
avenue for financing the investment in Australia and to reduce 
our reliance on foreign savings to finance such investments.  
Investment is an important means of raising the productivity of 
Australian industry, thereby compensating for a diminishing 
proportion of the population of working age." (Gallagher et al, 
1993: 16). 
Historical reviews of the development of compulsory superannuation by the Treasury 
and Malcolm Edey and John Simon of the Reserve Bank accord exactly with this 
view: 
Sustained government support for employee superannuation was 
motivated not only by a desire to enhance the retirement incomes 
of the general workforce, but also by macroeconomic pressures. 
By 1985, the government was battling inflationary pressures, 
relatively high real interest rates, an increasing current account 
deficit, foreign debt and a decline in the value of the Australian 
dollar.  Employee superannuation was attractive to the 
government in this economic climate because it offered scope for 
deferred wage increases and improvements in national saving 
(Treasury, 2001: 78). 
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The move [Award super] was advocated as a means of making 
superannuation more widely available, and it was also seen as 
furthering macroeconomic goals by promoting private saving 
(Edey and Simon, 1996: 5). 
A review of the contemporary output of academic economists shows that the 
government was in step with the consensus view.  Fitzgerald and Harper write that 
'the government's attempts to promote super both via inducement and compulsion are 
intended ultimately to increase long-term private saving' (Fitzgerald and Harper, 1992: 
40).  Fitzgerald recommended a 5 per cent increase in national saving, partly to meet 
the increased pressure on resources from the prospective aging of the Australian 
population, and was confident super would contribute to this goal.   
"if we do not save more, then the investment necessary to ensure 
higher growth and more employment will only be funded by even 
greater recourse to foreign savings and further build up of foreign 
debt.  We also need to save more because of the major 
demographic transition (rapid aging) we face ahead." (Fitzgerald, 
1993: 1) 
The RIM Taskforce note Fitzgerald's emphasis on the importance of saving:  
The Fitzgerald Report on National Saving stated that the 
expected increases in savings are 'not simply a "by-product" but 
is crucial to its effectiveness as retirement incomes policy. 
(Gallagher et al, 1993: 23) 
A recent article by Guest and MacDonald suggests that the orthodox perspective has 
not developed over the intervening years.  They write:  
"Higher saving in the near term will add to the consumption 
potential of Australia in the future through enhancing the 
accumulation of capital stock and of overseas assets.  […and 
footnoted…] A larger capital stock will increase labour 
productivity and thus output, enabling more consumption" (2000: 
1). 
Guest and McDonald recommend an increase in the rate of compulsory 
superannuation contributions. 
The expectation expressed in these documents is that superannuation will boost 
private and national saving, and that increased saving is good for the economy 
because it is a domestic source of funds for investment which will boost the capital 
stock, productivity and output.  The need to stimulate these effects through retirement 
saving is seen to be particularly urgent due to population aging. 
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2.2 Overseas 
This set of ideas is not unique to Australia.   Similar economic expectations have 
driven pension reform in other countries, and form an important part of the rationale 
for continuing pressure for reform.   
The US pension system has three elements: a contributory public pension system, 
private concessionally taxed retirement savings vehicles (voluntary and employment 
based) and other voluntary saving.  The series of initiatives to create new and more 
flexible tax-advantaged savings vehicles were initiated explicitly in response to 
concern over falling saving rates (Engen et al, 1996).  The list of such vehicles now 
includes occupational pensions, three kinds of Independent Retirement Account (IRA), 
and employer-based '401k' pension schemes.  For those on middle-to-high incomes, 
the US retirement income system is substantially oriented towards self-provision in 
private funded pension systems.   
The public pension system benefit formula was amended in the late 1970s and early 
1980s in response to concern over aging to systematically generate surpluses, creating 
asset reserves (Weaver, 2003a: 9).  Reserves currently total $US 1 trillion, and are 
expected to reach $US 5 trillion by 2020 (Aaron et al, 2001: 8, 15). 
Pressure for ongoing reform continues to be based on supposed effects on national 
saving:  
Much of the current debate on pension policies in the US is 
dominated by two important facts. The first is the decline of 
household saving rates, as measured in the National Income and 
Product Accounts as well as in the Flow of Funds figures. 
Household saving rates went from being close to double figures 
at the beginning of the 1980s, to being negative last year. The 
other is the fact that the current Pay-As-You-Go social security 
system (OASDI) is unsustainable in the medium run, given its 
current parameters. (Attanasio and Paiella, 2001: 27).   
Both the Clinton and Bush Jr Administrations have mooted reforms to the public 
Social Security system aimed at increasing private and national savings, along with 
addressing perceived fiscal unsustainability and improving retirement incomes.  
President Bush Jr's Social Security reform commission argues that increasing national 
saving is the only sure way to improve retirement security for current workers while 
also lessening the burden on future generations (Aaron et al, 2001).   
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Neoliberal academics with preconceived notions of appropriate outcomes for social 
security are having direct input to the administration’s policy formulation process: 
Recently we were asked to serve on the President's Commission 
to Strengthen Social Security (CSSS) along with 14 other 
members drawn equally from both major political parties. The 
Commission's charge was to provide recommendations to 
modernize the Social Security system, restore its fiscal soundness, 
and develop a workable system of Personal Retirement Accounts. 
(Cogan and Mitchell, 2002: ii [italics added]) 
The mooted reforms include the investment of public system surpluses in assets other 
than government bonds (Riley, 7/11/2000: 1), and the creation of fully-funded 
individual retirement accounts to hold part of the contributions (Aaron et al, 2001: 9).  
The suggested reforms are referred to as Social Security 'privatisation', and have 
strong support from certain academic economists due to their supposed impact on 
national savings. Modigliani et al suggest: 
The funded system in contrast to PAYGO results in a large 
accumulation of assets and thus makes a valuable contribution to 
national saving, the stock of productive capital and national 
income. This rise in saving is especially valuable at a time when 
private saving is unusually low, creating worrisome problems 
about the level of foreign indebtedness. (Modigliani et al, 2001: 6) 
Canada, with the most pronounced aging of the Anglo-American countries, has 
followed a similar course to the USA.  The national contributory public system is 
creating a reserve fund (Diamond, 2000a: 7) and private savings are encouraged via 
tax-favoured schemes to which 60 per cent of workers contribute (Banting and 
Boadway, 1997: 3).  Plans to privatise social security are more advanced in Canada 
than in the US.  A framework for investment of public system reserves in private 
assets (such as corporate bonds and equities) was implemented in 1998 (Iglecias and 
Palacios, 2000: 4, Palacios and Pallarès-Miralles, 2000: 17). 
The UK was committed by the Thatcher Government in 1981 to shift emphasis from 
public to private provision to increase both public and private savings.  Changes to 
indexing of public benefits have resulted in the value of public pensions as a 
proportion of wages falling by 37 per cent between 1981 and 1998 (Whitehouse, 1998: 
5).  Reforms in the early 1990s allowed individuals to 'opt-out' of the public pension 
system entirely in exchange for assets in private pension funds paid for by the 
government.  Currently more than 25 per cent of all net wealth and 50 per cent of 
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financial assets in the UK are held in the form of pensions or life insurance (Banks 
and Rohwedder, 2000: 2). 
The countries of continental Western Europe have public pension systems that 
provide high replacement rate pensions for all but the wealthiest members of society.   
Neoliberal academics (many from the UK), including Gordon Clark (2001a, 2001b), 
David Miles (1998, 1999) and Jan Mantel (2001)9, are critical of these structures, 
emphasising the positive effect of private pension provision on accumulation.  
Curiously, these critics ignore the very high rates of savings and investment in 
European countries relative to Anglo-American countries.   
Influential commentators such as Axel Börsch-Supan, recently appointed head of a 
European Union pension research group (ENEPRI, 2001), argue that the high 
replacement rate PAYGO systems of Western Europe have a negative impact on 
savings (Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 1998).  A number of other European 
researchers share this view, including Hans Siebert (1997: 29), Agar Brugiavini et al 
(2000: 3), and Dirk Fach (2000: 8), who writes: 
A fully funded pension scheme does have various advantages 
over a PAYG system; the biggest - and the one repeatedly 
emphasized in theory - lies in higher aggregate saving.  In 
contrast to the PAYG model, under the fully-funded scheme a 
stock of capital is accumulated to provide retirement income 
from the returns on it and from consumption of the capital itself.  
This higher capital stock enables higher growth, since higher 
saving tends to keep the interest rate lower and encourage 
investment.  Consequently,  a larger "economic pie" is available 
for distribution than under the PAYG system. 
The increasing prevalence of these ideas in policy circles in Europe, including in EU 
think tanks, corresponds with the emergence in recent years of policies which, for the 
first time, offer concessional tax treatment to private retirement savings.  These 
include the pension reform in Italy in 1999 (Diamond, 2000b), Sweden in 1999 
(Palmer, 2000) and Germany in 2001 (Bonin, 2001: 15; Nöcker, 2001). 
The idea that increased savings due to pension reform will drive investment and 
economic growth also features in the arguments put forward by international financial 
 
9 Besides holding academic posts, Miles and Mantel are also representatives of major merchant banks. 
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institutions (IFIs), particularly the World Bank and the IMF, in support of funded 
pension systems.  Jan Walliser, of the IMF, summarises the logic: 
Raising national saving would help to prepare the economy for 
future pressures arising from the aging of the population, because 
higher national saving today would increase the future capital 
stock and thus the productive capacity of the economy.  Higher 
national savings would also improve the long-run sustainability 
of fiscal policy and indicate that current generations participate in 
defraying the cost of their retirement by forgoing consumption. 
(Walliser, 1999: 3) 
In a document which summarises the OECD's major research program into aging and 
pension reform, Maintaining Prosperity in an Aging Society, the OECD suggests that: 
Higher national saving, if used productively, will result in higher 
capital stock and thus more output over the long term…. While 
[aging requires that] an increasing proportion of national output 
will need to be transferred to retirees, the higher economic 
growth is, the easier it will be to ensure that making one group 
better off does not entail making another group worse off. 
(OECD, 1998a: 5) 
The objective to increase national savings is apparent in the promotion of neoliberal 
reform in developing and transition countries in which the IFIs have been directly 
involved in policy development.  These statements regarding pension reform in 
Poland and Brazil provide an indication of the underlying macroeconomic 
expectations: 
We understand social security reform is aimed at improving long-
term economic growth prospects in Poland.  Our proposed 
solutions make it possible to accelerate that growth due to 
increased long term personal and business savings.  These 
savings will fuel investment and economic growth, as well as 
improve efficiency of the financial markets and lower labor costs 
through gradually decreasing social security contributions. 
(OGPSSR, 1997: iii)  
Funded private pensions may aid in the development of capital 
markets.  They create a demand for financial assets as well as for 
financial market regulations that protect investors.   They provide 
a source of long term savings for investors. (Turner, forthcoming) 
Rogerio Studart notes that in Brazil, ‘as in many other developing countries, the 
political arguments favoring such reforms’ included: 
The dominant view that private pension funds would increase 
aggregate private saving, improve savings mobilization and thus 
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allow for a rise of aggregate investment and growth. (Studart, 
2000: 11) 
Increased national saving was also an explicit aim of the Mexican pension reform 
(Grandolini and Cerda, 1998: 31), the Kazakhstan pension reform (Andrews, 2000: 1), 
and the Hungarian pension reform (Tóth, 2000: 26).  Reformers have claimed 
throughout Latin America that neoliberal pension systems would boost aggregate 
savings (Barrientos, 1998).  IFI policy intervention in developing and transition 
economies is discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
Policy-makers in government and international financial institutions, as well as 
orthodox academic economists, provide strong evidence that neoliberal pension 
reform was intended to, and is still expected to contribute to macroeconomic goals, 
particularly national saving, in Australia and overseas. 
3 Pension reform and saving: orthodox theory 
Neoliberal policy is based largely on selective use of ideas from orthodox 
(neoclassical) economics.  The notion that pension reform can lead to increased 
national savings is based on an application of orthodox notions of saving.  The 
orthodox approach is called the neoclassical life-cycle theory of saving. 
3.1 The neoclassical life-cycle theory of saving 
The neoclassical life-cycle theory of saving (LCT) is often attributed to Franco 
Modigliani and Richard Brumberg (1954), though it followed work by Irving Fisher 
and others in the 1930s that asserted that individuals would need to vary their saving 
to smooth consumption because productivity and income varied over the course of life 
(Lee and Mason, 1998: 2).  The LCT is the departure point for a large post-war 
orthodox literature on saving which ignores J.M. Keynes' emphasis on income 
inequality between social classes (as opposed to over the life-cycle) as a powerful 
determinant of saving behaviour.10 
 
10 For important statements of, and challenges to, the LCT see Samuelson (1958), Davies (1981), 
Kotlikoff and Lawrence (1981), and White (1978).  For examples of application of the theory to 
pension reform and saving see Feldstein (1974, 1975, 1976), Whitehouse (1998), Johnson (1999), 
Bacon (1999), Baillu and Reisen (1998), Disney (1999), Poterba (1998), Guest and McDonald (1999), 
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In practice, 'consumption smoothing' is generally taken to mean saving during 
working life for retirement.  Retirement is seen to be a period of life in which it may 
be expected that earned income will be insufficient for consumption needs, and in 
which the individual will be expected to run down assets, or 'dissave'.  To optimise 
lifetime utility, the individual must calculate retirement consumption needs, calculate 
lifetime earnings including investment returns, and base saving behaviour on those 
calculations.  This individual is a rational utility maximiser, has perfect knowledge, 
and has access to perfect labour and capital markets.  The assumptions and 
implications of the theory are summarised in Figure 2.2. 
An important empirical basis for the theory, at least initially, was that the asset-age 
profile of a representative individual was thought to be hump-shaped.11  Data 
available early in the post-war period appeared to show that the assets of the typical 
household rose throughout working life, and were then substantially dissipated during 
retirement.  As is detailed in the critique of the LCT in section 4, below, this 
conclusion was found by Miller (1965) to be based on a fundamental interpretive error.  
Nonetheless, its role in supporting the neoliberal attack on the welfare state has 
proven quite unshakable.   
Figure 2.2 Assumptions and implications of the life-cycle theory of saving 
Assumptions: 
• Individual is rational, maximising and optimising. 
• Individual has perfect knowledge, including knowledge of lifetime income, lifespan, length 
of retirement, and lifetime consumption needs. 
• Individual has access to perfect labour and capital markets. 
Implications: 
• The individual is a target saver: s/he has a notion of how much income is required during 
retirement, and aims to accumulate that amount, and only that amount, by retirement. 
• Workers save; retirees dissave. 
• The individual does not distinguish between different assets and different sources of 
income; what is necessary is to achieve the required level of income throughout the 
                                                                                                                                            
Börsch-Supan et al (2000), Booth et al (2000), Kohl and O’Brien (1998), Lusardi (2001), Baldini and 
Mazzaferro (2000). 
11 The theory and empirical evidence is discussed by Bacon (1995) and Banks and Rohwedder (2000).  
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individual's life.  This capacity is known as substitutability. 
• The individual faces no obstacles to employment (at market wage) or borrowing/investing 
(at market interest), including for human capital (education). 
• The individual has effective knowledge of investment strategy, products and pricing, and 
has the skills, resources and motivation to calculate personal wealth, including wealth in 
public and private pension plans. 
• The individual does not value or expect inheritance. 
• These factors operate irrespective of an individual's level of wealth, and portfolio of 
assets. 
 
The LCT is used by neoliberal reformers to support three claims: public pension 
systems reduce saving, private pension systems increase saving, and transition from 
public to private increases saving. 
3.2 The LCT and public PAYGO  pension systems 
Martin Feldstein12 is a central figure in the application of the LCT to pension systems. 
In a series of articles, notably 1974, 1975 and 1976, he rapidly advanced the 
neoliberal intellectual agenda in this area.  His 1974 article in the Journal of 
Economics argued that the American social security system (the OASDI or Old Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance) reduced private saving by 50 per cent.  Feldstein 
identified three causative mechanisms: a 'tax' effect, in that social security 
contributions reduce disposable income; a 'wealth' effect, in that income streams from 
public pensions represent wealth that substitutes for saved wealth; and encouragement 
for earlier retirement, which reduces lifetime labourforce participation and therefore 
income (1974: 920-22).  Feldstein's tax and wealth effects are discussed here.  The 
early retirement argument is that social security creates an incentive to retire at the 
age when benefits are first available (62 years in the US case).  This argument is 
discussed in chapter 5, which considers the sources of incentive effects from pension 
systems on age of retirement. 
The assertion of a negative public pension 'wealth effect' on saving assumes 
substitutability between sources of wealth and income in retirement.  This assumption 
                                                 
12 In 2001, Martin Feldstein was Professor of Economics at Harvard University and President of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (Feldstein and Samwick, 2001). 
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is plausible under the neoclassical LCT because individuals are target savers seeking a 
given level of consumption in retirement.  According to Feldstein, the existence of 
public pension income during retirement - equivalent in some respects to a form of 
wealth - reduces the need for income from other sources, particularly private saving.  
The concept of 'substitutability' is central to the assertion of a relationship between the 
LCT and pension systems - both public and private.  In both cases, the issue is 
whether or not pension income is a substitute for private accumulation.  The 
relationship between pension wealth (or saving) and other wealth (or saving) is often 
described as an 'offset'.  An offset of zero implies zero substitutability and zero impact.  
An offset of 50 per cent suggests that pension wealth of x reduces other saving by 50 
per cent of x.  An offset of 100 per cent implies total substitutability, in which case 
there is no increase in total saving. 
The existence of a negative public pension 'tax effect' on saving is related to the lower 
disposable incomes of people after they have made social security contributions.  The 
transfer in public pensions occurs from workers, who are presumed to save, to retirees, 
who are presumed to consume.  The transfer is therefore from savers to dissavers, 
resulting in a straight loss of savings.  An alternative perspective is that retirees 
continue to save, in some cases at an increasing rate.  The impact of public pensions 
on total saving would therefore be much lower, or even positive.  According to 
Feldstein, however, the tax effect reinforces the wealth effect: workers save less than 
they otherwise would because future pension benefits mean they do not need to, and 
contributions mean they cannot afford to. 
In (1975), Feldstein suggested moving social security away from its public PAYGO 
basis by changing benefit formulas within the existing system to create a reserve of 
assets.  This would be achieved by paying less in benefits than is received in 
contributions.  Feldstein recommended that this be done without public announcement 
to avoid political backlash. 
How then should the current social security program be reformed 
to reduce the harmful effects on capital accumulation? And can 
this be done without the public hostility and political opposition 
that might be aroused by a major restructuring of the benefits? 
Fortunately, it is possible to alleviate the problem without making 
any changes in the structure of the program that would be noticed 
by the general public. (Feldstein, 1975 in Seidmann, 1999: 27).   
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The policy of creating a reserve was adopted by OASDI in the early 1980s, though 
not without public debate.  The reserve is currently held exclusively in the form of US 
Treasury bonds, although Feldstein and Samwick (eg. 2001), among others, 
recommend investment of the reserve in other assets, including corporate bonds and 
equities.   
This recommendation rests in large measure on thinking introduced in Feldstein (1976, 
in Seidmann, 1999: 27) - the 'higher returns from private savings' argument.  The 
article suggests that the transition from a public to a private pension system would be 
a savings winner because private investments earn higher rates of return than public 
assets such as government bonds.  This 'partial equilibrium' argument, discussed in 
more detail in section 4 on transitional macroeconomic effects, contravenes orthodox 
methodology by selectively using different discount rates without allowing for 
opportunity costs and crowding-out (Holzmann, 1998a and 1998b).   
Despite shaky foundations, the argument has political appeal, especially during bull 
markets when stock market returns are high.  This appeal is used cynically by 
reforming governments, IFIs, and pension-providing institutions.  This example is 
from a World Bank report on the Hungarian reform: 
Finally, the promise of higher returns in the private scheme, even 
after taking into account higher administrative costs, helped 
offset the benefit reductions in the PAYG scheme and 
simultaneously diversified the workers’ risk in the long-run. This 
positive aspect of the overall package was instrumental in 
generating support, especially among younger voters.  (Palacios 
and Rocha, 1997: 32) 
One might wonder how these young Hungarians consider their new pension system 
following the dramatic reversal on international stock markets since March 2000. 
Feldstein remains influential, as Cogan and Mitchell (on the President's Commission 
to Strengthen Social Security) make clear: 
If a Social Security reform is to reduce the tax burden imposed on 
future generations, the system must move toward a prefunded 
program, a point made forcefully in Martin Feldstein’s 
Presidential address before the Allied Social Sciences meeting. 
Indeed, he and many other economists have concluded that baby-
boomers’ retirement would impose no additional burden on 
future workers, had Social Security been maintained as an 
investment-based retirement program with assets built up to 
cover future liabilities.  The issue, today, however, is how to 
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move from what is a mainly pay-as-you- go unfunded transfer 
program, to an investment-based Social Security program for the 
future. (Cogan and Mitchell, 2002: 3) 
In summary, proponents of NPR claim that public pensions reduce saving by reducing 
disposable income, providing retirement benefits which reduce the need for personal 
provision, encouraging early retirement, and by providing lower investment returns 
(typical of public pension reserve investment). 
3.3 The LCT and private funded pension systems 
Proponents of NPR also argue that funded pension systems increase savings.  Assets 
in private pension systems have grown explosively in the last three decades wherever 
they have been encouraged by favourable tax policies and mandates.  The assets of 
dedicated retirement savings vehicles, including pension funds, retirement savings in 
mutual funds13, and life insurance, are estimated to be over $US 20 trillion.  Assets 
are over 75 per cent of GDP in Switzerland, The Netherlands, the US, the UK, Iceland 
and Australia, and over 50 per cent of GDP in South Africa, Canada, Chile, Ireland, 
Japan, and Finland (World Bank, 2000a). 
The rapid increase in pension fund assets is easily portrayed as increased saving to the 
public by policy makers, especially when economists in the media and academia 
repeatedly make this error.  The extent to which a build-up in one asset (e.g. pension 
funds) can be legitimately described as an increase in saving depends on the extent to 
which it is offset by reductions in other assets (and increases in liabilities).  This 
includes reductions in other forms of private saving, such as personal equity in 
housing or bank accounts, increases in borrowing, or decreases in public saving.   
Modelling by promoters of private pension systems, including the Australian 
Treasury's RIM Taskforce, suggests that private and national saving will rapidly 
increase following implementation of such systems.  RIM's modelling has been cited 
in articles by Australian authors with global distribution (e.g. Edey and Simon, 1996: 
21; Bateman and Piggott, 2001: 22) and have been cited in overseas studies (e.g. Fach 
 
13 In the UK, USA and Canada, voluntary independent contributions to mutual funds are tax deductible 
as part of some retirement savings vehicles.  The Investment Company Institute (ICI) in the US 
estimates that 36 per cent of mutual fund assets are sourced from retirement savings vehicles (ICI, 
2000: 49). 
Chapter 2 Saving 37 
 
                                                
2000: 23-4; Mitchell and O’Quinn, 1997: 8).  Even RIM's predictive charts have been 
reproduced in articles overseas and, in at least one case, portrayed as historical fact 
(Mitchell and O’Quinn, 1997: 8).  This misrepresentation clearly has disturbing 
implications for public perceptions of the effect of these policies. 
As saving in one form increases, saving in another form may decrease.  This is called 
an offset.  The suggestion that an increase in private pension saving causes an increase 
in total private saving requires an offset of less than 1 or 100 per cent.  The RIM 
Taskforce, for example, initially used a private savings offset of 50 per cent in its 
modelling.  This number was inherited from Fitzgerald and Harper, two respected 
academic economists (Gallagher et al, 1993).  However, Fitzgerald and Harper had 
not conducted empirical research on the issue.  They instead supposed that offsets of 0 
and 1 were unlikely results and took the average (Gallagher et al, 1993)!  In more 
recent work RIM has shifted to a more bullish offset factor of 30 per cent (suggesting 
that 70 per cent of superannuation saving is new and additional), on the grounds that 
compulsory superannuation encourages saving by many people who would have 
never saved in the past (Gallagher and Preston, 1997: 4).14  Again, the conclusion is 
not based on empirical research.  According to RIM predictions, current policies 
should have translated into an increase in personal saving (from a base case scenario 
without the policy) of more than 1.6 per cent of GDP by 2001 rising to 3.6 per cent of 
GDP in 2020 (Gallagher and Preston, 1997:15).  Private saving in Australia has 
instead fallen.15 
Ironically, a pure application of the lifecycle theory of saving predicts that private 
pensions will have no impact on private savings.  This is because individuals will 
reduce other saving to compensate for the build up of pension wealth (Baillu and 
 
14 It is important to note that RIM modellers also use an offset to reduce the negative impact of super 
tax concessions on public saving by half.  Gallagher and Preston (1997: 3-4) argue that this is 
appropriate because half of the possible saving (generated by cancelling the concessions) would be lost 
as part of the budget process.  It is unclear whether the same factor is used to reduce future public 
saving benefits from reduced welfare outlays.  This extraordinary approach reduces the opportunity 
cost of public expenditure (and taxation) by 50 per cent.  It essentially means the benefit of cancelling a 
$100 million program would only be $50 million because half of it would be wasted somewhere else. 
15 See page 52 for discussion. 
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Reisen, 1996: 11).  Indeed, the theory predicts an offset of greater than 100 per cent – 
that is, a reduction in total private saving.  This outcome is predicted because rational 
savers would calculate the benefit from superior rates of return on private pensions 
and the additional positive effect of tax advantages on after-tax returns.  As a result, 
they would reduce saving from current income because a smaller amount of 
contributions would reach the same savings target over the same period.  The impact 
of concessionally-taxed savings programs in this circumstance is reduced government 
revenue due to tax concessions.  This is equivalent to a fall in public saving. 
However, researchers in the US have mounted a case that private pension funds do 
increase private saving based on empirical evidence.  Poterba et al (1996) found that 
private pension systems have low offsets, resulting in substantial increases in total 
private saving.  They compared the savings habits of households that participate in 
voluntary retirement savings schemes in America, with households that do not.  Their 
conservative estimate for the private pension offset was 50 per cent.  This implies that 
50 per cent of contributions to concessionally-taxed retirement savings vehicles 
represent savings additional to saving previously conducted by the household.  
Important questions related to their research methods raised by Engen et al (1996) are 
discussed below in section 4.  Notwithstanding such issues, Poterba et al have 
informed the consensus view among American and international policy makers. 
3.4 Putting it together: the LCT and neoliberal pension reform 
Feldstein's argument that public pensions reduce private saving sits uneasily with the 
finding of Poterba et al that private pensions increase private saving.  In the former 
case, it is necessary that pensions are highly substitutable for other saving; in the latter 
case, substitutability must be low.  To convincingly assert that neoliberal pension 
reform increases saving, it has been necessary to relax certain neoclassical 
assumptions, particularly in relation to rationality.  This is achieved through the 
introduction of concepts known as 'myopia' and 'moral hazard'.  Both behaviours help 
to explain why many people do not save enough during working life for retirement 
although a rational individual would.  Myopia is a failure to correctly estimate the 
value of future consumption, and moral hazard is manipulation of societal goodwill to 
take care of people, despite their apparent unwillingness to care for themselves 
(Banting and Boadway, 1997: 12).  The World Bank describes the issue as follows: 
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Shortsighted behaviour becomes a social problem for two reasons.  
First, as people age they may change their preferences and wish 
that they had saved more - but then it is too late.  Second, if 
people don't save enough for their old age, the rest of society may 
fell obliged to support them. (This obligation may even deter 
people from saving when young, a problem known as free riding 
and moral hazard.) (World Bank, 1994: 36) 
These behavioural traits create a rationale for government retirement income policy.  
In effect, the lower than rational average level of savings reduces the savings offset 
from government intervention.  From the neoliberal perspective, the danger with 
public pensions is that they increase the risk of moral hazard if people can avoid 
making contributions by, for example, conducting informal work outside the social 
security system or avoiding work altogether.  Moreover, public pensions do not 
represent actual savings: they typically operate on a PAYGO basis and do not hold 
assets.  According to proponents, private pension systems are a desirable alternative 
because they force or encourage genuine private saving, much of which would not 
otherwise occur. 
The 'enhanced' neoclassical LCT and its implications for pension policy may be 
summarised as follows:  
• It is rational for people to save during working life for retirement in order 
to smooth consumption. 
• Many people do not do so due to moral hazard and myopia. 
• Government intervention of some kind is necessary to prevent dependence 
on the community and state. 
• Concessionally taxed and/or mandated private funded schemes are 
preferred because  
o contributions to such schemes represent actual savings and actual 
accumulation of assets, rather than transfers of consumption as in 
PAYGO systems,  
o government cannot be trusted with investment functions, as in 
public funded pension schemes (government influence on 
investment is discussed in chapter 4, section 2), and   
o personal account systems present no danger of moral hazard.   
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• Private saving offsets will be limited. 
The argument is not presented so clearly by neoliberal authors.  The more common 
approach is to report the findings of authors on public pensions together with the 
findings of other authors on private pensions without dealing with the intellectual 
acrobatics required to simultaneously justify both positions.   
4 Theoretical and empirical challenges 
4.1 Retirement saving 
The notion that saving is especially and only for retirement is new to the post-war 
period.  While it was recognised before WWII that people might save for retirement, 
analysis of saving and accumulation certainly predates analysis of retirement, and 
indeed, the widespread existence of retirement.  The classical economist Adam Smith, 
for example, discussed saving without mentioning retirement.  To Smith, saving was 
an instinctive behaviour, which existed without limit: 
"The principle which prompts to save is the desire of bettering 
our condition, a desire which, though generally calm and 
dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us 
till we go into the grave.  In the whole interval which separates 
those two moments, there is scarce perhaps a single instant in 
which any man is so perfectly and completely satisfied with his 
situation as to be without any wish of alteration or improvement 
of any kind. An augmentation of fortune is the means by which 
the greater part of men propose and wish to better their 
condition." (Smith, 1937: 324-5) 
Keynes included the smoothing of household consumption as a legitimate motivation 
for saving, but only among eight "subjective" reasons, in addition to three "objective" 
determinants (1936: 107).   The other seven subjective reasons are preparation for 
unforeseen events, to enjoy interest and appreciation, to enjoy increasing expenditure, 
to enjoy independence and economic freedom, to facilitate speculative or strategic 
investment, to bequeath a fortune, and to satisfy miserliness.  The three objective 
determinants are income, liquidity preference and interest, of which income was the 
most important: 
…a higher absolute level of income will tend, as a rule, to widen 
the gap between income and consumption. For the satisfaction of 
the immediate primary needs of a man and his family is usually a 
stronger motive than the motives towards accumulation, which 
only acquire effective sway when a margin of comfort has been 
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attained. These reasons will lead, as a rule, to a greater proportion 
of income being saved as real income increases. (Keynes, 1936: 
97) 
The point of this brief excursion is to emphasise that the neoclassical LCT is based on 
a highly particular notion of motivation for saving.  Other, more plausible, concepts of 
saving would suggest entirely different policy responses.  Smith's belief that the 
instinct to accumulate lasts 'until the grave', implies that people project the objective 
of betterment of condition onto their descendents, for there would be no other point to 
continue to save until death.  This suggests that part of the objective of saving is to 
accumulate wealth to pass on, and for this aim, one must imagine that 'the more - the 
better' would be an appropriate rule.  Such a motivation for saving is inconsistent with 
a target, and therefore with direct substitutability.  It also questions the notion that 
workers save whereas retirees dissave.  An individual who wants to pass on wealth 
may strive to save during retirement, regardless of income.  
Keynes' analysis differs from the neoclassical in many important respects; I discuss 
only two here.  First, it is multi-faceted. According to Keynes, people save for a 
variety of subjective reasons.  He makes no attempt to distinguish between them or to 
apply relative weights to them.  People want to save and that is enough.  One 
implication of such an approach is that the notion of any clear target must be 
disregarded.  Using Keynes' approach, it does not follow that an increase in wealth 
from public pensions  would encourage less private saving.  The implication for 
substitutability is similar to that for Smith's notion of ongoing personal betterment.  
Second, Keynes' emphasis on income as the key objective influence takes the focus 
away from the notion of motivation altogether, and on to ability.  The ability to save 
differs between people due to income inequality.  According to the neoclassical LCT, 
undersaving is a sign of irrationality.  To Keynes, it is a sign of poverty. 
4.2 Empirical evidence 
The neoclassical LCT predicts that individuals save during working life and dissave 
during retirement. This theory has several implications.  First, the asset holdings of 
individuals will follow a predictable path during their lifetimes: steadily upwards to a 
peak at retirement, and then down towards zero at death.  Second, individual age-
based savings profiles can be aggregated.  This implies that aggregate saving over 
time can be predicted with demographic data, which tell us, for a reasonable period 
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into the future, what proportion of the population will be net savers and what 
proportion will be net dissavers.  Third, to the extent that national social security 
programs and other tax effects distort saving decisions, these distortions should be 
reflected in national savings rates: generous public systems should be associated with 
low private saving, and vice versa. 
4.2.1 Retirement decumulation and the 'hump-shaped' age-asset profile 
An important empirical source of support for the LCT was the discovery of a humped-
shaped age-asset profile.  When assets are aggregated by age-group (see Figure 2.3), 
the chart produces a hump-shape: the youngest people, as a group, have the least; the 
next youngest have greater wealth; those towards the end of working life have the 
most; and retirees have less than the group immediately younger.  This age-asset 
profile suggests a life-time savings pattern consistent with accumulation before 
retirement, and decumulation after retirement.   
 
Figure 2.3 The Hump-Shaped Age-Asset Profile 
Assets 
Retirement 
Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From a relatively early stage, however, it was realised that the explanation for the 
hump based on asset decumulation during retirement was false.  Miller (1965) 
observed that younger generations earn higher wages due to productivity increase and 
economic growth.  Moreover, the benefits of productivity increase were not 
distributed evenly among the cohorts.  Younger cohorts get most of the wage 
increases associated with economic growth.  The implication is that younger 
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generations earn substantially more over their lifetimes than older generations.  They 
earn more, save more and accumulate more than the previous generations, eventually 
becoming the wealthiest cohort.  This occurs despite older generations continuing to 
save during retirement.  Shorrocks (1975) and Irvine (1981) have developed this line 
of research.   
Figure 2.4 Age-asset profile of a single cohort 
Assets 
Retirement 
Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These authors argued that it would only be possible to learn about life-cycle saving 
using longitudinal studies that observe the behaviour of each cohort over its lifetime.  
Using the hump-shaped profile to support the LCT confused life-cycle effects with 
cohort effects.  These problems are known as 'vintage problems' in LCT savings 
theory (Kohl and O'Brien, 1998: 15).  In aggregate terms, there is no evidence of 
dissaving in retirement.  Erosion of assets is very rare, occurring only among the very 
oldest and poorest.  Longitudinal studies in many countries have shown that the 
majority hold assets, and continue to save, right up to death, consistent with Figure 
2.4, above.16 
Dogmatic supporters of the LCT, such as Börsch-Supan (Börsch-Supan et al, 2000: 
26), recognise the lack of decumulation during retirement but attempt to explain it by 
other means.  These include a possible statistical oversight: the failure of asset data to 
                                                 
16 See for Japan (Kitamura et al, 2000: 4), Italy (Baldini and Mazzaferro, 2000: 20), New Zealand 
(Booth et al, 2000: 4), Germany (Börsch-Supan et al, 2000: 26), and Australia (Bacon, 1995: 25) 
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incorporate much pension wealth, particularly public pension wealth.  Other plausible 
explanations which raise important questions about the LCT include: a reduction in 
consumption related to the end of work or coinciding with it (e.g. children becoming 
financially independent); the desire of most people to provide inheritance; and the 
overrepresentation in aggregate figures of the wealthiest in society, who, in some 
countries, have been found to save at an increasing rate in old age (Kitamura et al, 
2000: 4).   
Whatever the explanation, the unavoidable reality is that cohorts do not decumulate 
assets during retirement.   One important implication of this is that it is inaccurate to 
describe saving as deferred consumption.  This is because many families provide 
inheritance, and reciprocally, much wealth is received as inheritance and held 
permanently, rather than 'saved' at all.  This assertion is supported by a cursory 
consideration of the distribution and transfer of wealth in modern capitalist societies.  
A recent Australian NATSEM study suggests that 5 per cent of Australian families 
hold 75 per cent of equity in listed companies (Gittins, 17/4/2002).   
In the UK, over four-fifths of directly held shares are held by households in the top 
income decile (Hussain, 2000: 9).  Research in the USA recognises the empirically 
established tendency of wealthy households receiving large inheritances (Engen et al, 
2000: 8), while a New Zealand study estimates that a substantial part of wealth - 30 to 
60 per cent - comes from inheritance (Booth et al, 2000: 7).  In Italy, Barca et al (1994: 
361) estimate that 35 to 50 per cent of real estate is received as inheritance or gifts.   
Researchers in the US note that bequests are related to the elderly being reluctant to 
spend accumulated wealth, and find a direct relationship between the growth in 
defined contribution private pensions and the growth in bequests during the 1990s 
(Munnell et al, 2002a: 1).  According to this research, retirement saving tax 
concessions are increasing the level and concentration of inherited wealth, not average 
retirement incomes. 
In Australia, recent amendments to the regulations governing contributions to 
superannuation reflect the reality that retirees continue to save, and, in doing so, 
reduce the extent to which the policy is a ‘retirement’ saving scheme.  Changes which 
took effect in July 2002 allow people aged 65 to 75 to continue making 
concessionally-taxed contributions.  Contributions can also be made on behalf of 
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children by relatives (including grandparents) (ATO, 2002).  These changes make 
superannuation a more flexible form of tax-effective accumulation for high income 
families. 
American research also shows that neoclassical assumptions relating to perfect 
knowledge and perfect labour and capital markets are incompatible with actual 
experience.  Research has found that 30 per cent of American families experienced a 
complete inability to borrow (Booth et al, 2000: 9), and that approximately 20 percent 
of households, including 45 percent of black households, do not have access to basic 
bank accounts (Engen et al, 2000: 66).  Other American research suggests that only 36 
per cent of people conduct long-term financial planning (Lusardi, 2001: 9).  Even 
amongst those who had, most had very little knowledge of key aspects of their own 
financial situation, particularly wealth held in various types of pension schemes.  
Reasons cited included the distance to retirement making the calculation too difficult, 
a lack of time and being afraid of the results.  Survey responses suggested that 
obtaining and evaluating relevant information can be an unpleasant task for 
consumers with little financial literacy (Lusardi, 2001: 10).  The implications of low 
financial literacy to the competitive dynamics of markets for private pension products 
are discussed in chapter 4. 
The evidence on both inequality and access to financial markets suggests that 
retirement saving plays a much less significant role in aggregate asset accumulation 
than the LCT would suggest.  An equally important finding is that there is no 
evidence of asset run-down in retirement consistent with a lifetime savings pattern.  
These issues directly undermine the case that NPR will increase savings. 
4.2.2 LCT aggregate saving predictions over time 
Predictions of aggregate savings rates over time based on the LCT have not been 
realised.  It was expected by experts in several countries that private saving would 
increase as the baby-boomers reached the prime earning and prime saving years just 
before retirement.  For example, Fitzgerald (1993: 8) predicted an increase in savings 
in Australia during the 1990s due to these demographic changes.  Instead, private 
saving has fallen to record lows.  Similar effects were expected in the USA, where 
private saving has recently become negative for the first time.  These recent findings 
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support American research conducted immediately following Feldstein's 1974-76 
articles which found no econometric evidence for the LCT (White, 1978). 
The failure of the expected 'demographic savings boost' to materialise points to the 
absurdity of using simplistic theories to predict complicated economic phenomena.  
However, recent empirical evidence of theoretical failure has not diminished a global 
trend towards demographic determinism in political discourse.  An important example 
is the expected economic downturn and fiscal imbalance associated with the 
retirement of the baby-boomer generation, exemplified by this discussion of 
modelling conducted by the Group of Ten. 
The estimated negative effects of aging on the annual rate of 
growth of output per capita range from 0.25 to 0.6 percentage 
points. Thus, given the assumptions, by 2030 the level of output 
per capita would be 8-20% lower as a result of aging than would 
otherwise be the case, unless offsetting productivity growth was 
achieved, other things being equal. It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that the estimated impacts shown in the chart are 
averages over a period of slightly more than three decades. 
During the early part of this period, demographics (through the 
age-productivity effect) will continue to have positive effects on 
growth. But as the baby boom generation begins to retire, the net 
effect of aging will turn negative, in some cases by enough to 
more than offset trend productivity. (Group of Ten, 1998: 15) 
In Australia, Treasury produced a set of 'official' intergenerational accounts stretching 
40 years into the future in the Budget for financial year 2002/2003 (Costello, 2002).  
The accounts are intended to emphasise the need for fiscal restraint in current policy 
formulation.  However, like all long-term modelling, the work is subject to high rates 
of error, and sensitive to small changes to the levels of variables such as productivity, 
workplace participation by age and gender, and unemployment.  Historically, these 
variables have fluctuated substantially, and seemingly without a clear trend. 
4.2.3 LCT aggregate saving predictions by nation 
Proponents of NPR claim that a public pension provision reduces saving and private 
pension provision increases saving.  Such a claim would be supported by a finding of 
high saving in countries with low public provision and high private provision, and low 
saving in countries with high public provision and low private provision.   
Neither relationship is observable in cross-country data.  Figure 2.5 shows national 
savings data against private pension assets for selected OECD countries.  The 
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countries are distributed with no clear pattern, although one group of countries 
(circled) has both very high savings rates and very low private pension assets, and 
several countries (including Australia) have relatively high private pension assets but 
very low levels of saving.  
Figure 2.6 shows national savings data against public pension spending for selected 
OECD countries.  Again, there is no strong pattern, although a group of countries 
(circled) have both very high savings rates and very high rates of public pension 
spending.  The top right corner (high private pension assets and high savings), where 
we would expect nations to appear if NPR did increase savings, is populated only by 
The Netherlands. 
 
Figure 2.5 National saving versus private pension assets 
Source: Pension data World Bank (2000a); savings data World Bank (2001) 
 
The measure of national saving used in the above figures incorporates both private 
and public saving.  In the continental European countries with high public pension 
spending, the public sector is typically in structural deficit.  The very high levels of 
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national saving shown for most of these countries occur notwithstanding significant 
public dissaving.  This indicates that private saving, in particular, is a great deal 
higher in these countries than in the Anglo-American countries, which have relatively 
low public pension spending and high levels of private pension assets.  These findings 
are consistent with those of Bovin (1997: 10) 'that there is no cross-country 
correlation between the importance of funded pension assets and the level of domestic 
savings rates.' 
Figure 2.6 National saving versus public pension spending 
 
Source: Pension data World Bank (2000a); savings data World Bank (2001) 
 
Finally, there is no relationship between national savings rates and the level of aging 
in the population.  Many of the 'oldest' OECD countries, such as Japan, Germany and 
Italy, have the highest savings rates, and many of the ‘youngest’ countries, such as the 
US and Australia have very low savings rates, in direct contradiction of the prediction 
of the LCT that higher dependency rates would cause lower levels of saving.  
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4.3 Saving offsets 
Saving offsets quantify the interdependence of different forms of saving.  For example, 
if an Australian family on the middle quintile of income (this group spends on average 
around a quarter of disposable income on housing) (ABS, 2000b) borrows to purchase 
a house, ongoing mortgage payments represent an increase in housing equity, and 
therefore saving, but will have a substantial impact on other forms of saving.  
Similarly, compulsory and voluntary contributions to private and public pension 
schemes presumably have some impact on savings levels, both private and public.  
NPR may have an impact on savings levels by shifting emphasis to private provision.  
The questions are 'how?' and 'to what extent?'  This section explores these questions in 
two distinct circumstances: the case where a country did not have a generous public 
system before the reform (and there is no reform of the public system), and the case 
where a country did have a generous public system and this system is amended while 
the private system is created or expanded.  The second case is more complex because 
public saving will be affected by the arrangements for financing existing public 
pension obligations, and because private saving will be affected by the difference in 
relative offsets between contributions previously made to the public system which are 
now transferred to the private system. 
4.3.1 One-way transition 
As has been discussed above, the shift to a three-pillar retirement income system in 
Australia has not required a reduction in public benefits.  The policy initiative that 
drove the change was the introduction of mandatory concessionally taxed retirement 
savings in authorised vehicles: superannuation funds.  The official analysis of how 
these reforms were going to affect private and national saving has been conducted 
since the early 1990s by Treasury's Retirement Income Modelling (RIM) Taskforce.  
RIM has used a model developed by a large local life insurance and superannuation 
provider, National Mutual (now AXA Australia) (Gallagher and Preston, 1993).  
As noted above, RIM in 1997 predicted an increase in the national saving rate of 1.6 
per cent of GDP by 2001 by using a private saving offset of 30 per cent (70 per cent 
new saving) and a public saving offset which reduces the impact of tax revenue 
foregone by 50 per cent.  The 30 per cent private offset was a refinement of the 50 per 
cent rate provided by Fitzgerald and Harper "chosen because it is half way between 0 
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and 1 which they saw as the least likely values for the offset" (Gallagher and Preston, 
1993: 20).  The 30 per cent private offset was seen to reflect overseas research (as 
summarised in an unpublished Treasury seminar paper) and the belief of the RIM 
Steering Committee that the SGC included income-constrained workers whose 
marginal rates of saving would be low (Gallagher and Preston, 1997: 4). 
The rate of private offset estimated by Poterba et al (1996) when considering the 
impact on saving of households who use voluntary retirement saving vehicles in the 
US was 50 per cent.  Their work has been questioned by Engen et al (1996), who 
argue that this finding is the result of poor methodology.  Those households who 
participate in savings programs have an obvious predilection for saving and cannot be 
compared to families not participating in the program.   
The main problem is simple to explain and typical of the 
evaluation of program participation. While it is true that IRA or 
401(k) participants save more than non-participants, the fact that 
they participate in a program is likely to be correlated with a high 
‘taste for saving’. Therefore, the comparison between the two 
groups is not informative about whether program participants 
would have saved less in the absence of the program. (Engen et al, 
1996: 32) 
Engen et al conclude that the offset for private pension funds is 100 per cent, meaning 
that no new saving results (1996: 132).  Gale (1995), similarly, found private offsets 
of 100 per cent.  These researchers have found that private pension schemes 
effectively provide tax shelters for accumulation that would have occurred regardless.  
The impact on national saving – that is, private plus public saving – is probably 
negative in these cases, because of the cost of tax concessions to public revenue. 
The perspective of Engen et al and Gale is supported by detailed observations in the 
US that most saving is done by a small proportion of the population on relatively high 
incomes with high levels of education, and this group has access to good legal and 
accounting advice and the flexibility to respond to tax incentives.  Orszag and Orszag 
(2000: 2) cite US Treasury data indicating that two-thirds of tax subsidies for 
retirement saving accrue to the top 20 percent of income earners, whereas only 12 
percent accrue to the bottom 60 percent.  Moreover, private pension coverage of 
around 50 per cent belies a much more limited effective coverage.  Data from the 
Investment Company Institute (ICI) gives an indication of pension fund account 
balance distribution in the US: 44 percent of participants have account balances of 
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less than $10,000, whereas 13 percent of participants have account balances greater 
than $100,000 (Holden and VanDerhei, 2001: 16).  Similarly, in Canada, the top 
decile of income earners make 35 per cent of deductible private pension contributions 
(Wolfson and Murphy, 1997: 76).   
Given the US estimates of between 50 and 100 per cent for voluntary schemes, RIM's 
use of a significantly lower offset - 30 per cent - for Australian superannuation is 
heavily dependent on much of superannuation saving being by relatively poor workers 
with relatively low saving propensity.  RIM provide statistics on asset inequality to 
support this assertion: 
Considering the wealth of those at retiring age, the poorest 10% 
of Australians had not accumulated any significant financial 
assets or housing. At least 50% had accumulated less than 
$80,000 and the top 10% held almost 75% of the these forms of 
wealth. (Bacon, 1995: 18) 
This is a strong statement of wealth inequality at retirement.  However, no research is 
presented concerning the distribution of superannuation holdings by income group.  In 
fact, there is a variety of statistical and anecdotal evidence to suggest that much 
saving within the superannuation system matches the US model of voluntary saving – 
that is, saving that would occur otherwise and is directed to the retirement saving 
system in order to minimise exposure to taxation.   
In Australia, concessional tax treatment applies to both compulsory contributions and 
voluntary contributions (up to certain ceilings).  Compulsory contributions represent 
less than 40 per cent of superannuation contributions (Bateman and Piggott, 2001: 10).  
Moreover, the fastest growing area of the super industry are small super funds created 
as tax effective investment vehicles for wealthy families.  At December 2002, this 
sector represented only 1.8 per cent of accounts but held 20.8 per cent of assets, with 
an average account balance of $230,000, assets having more than doubled in size 
since December 1999 (APRA, 2003: Tables 1b and 2a).  APRA's research into the 
issue of 'replacement' savings concludes that 'the growth in member contributions is 
clearly associated in large part with the drawing in of assets previously lying outside 
the superannuation system', though they are unable to quantify this effect (APRA, 
1999: 5).   
More generally, consumers of retirement saving and income products appear 
increasingly sensitive to tax-based incentives.  ARISA, the industry group 
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representing providers of income stream products (annuities) reported a jump in sales 
following the implementation of more favourable tax treatment for certain products, 
particularly as financial planners became aware of the benefits and began reorganising 
clients' assets accordingly (ARISA, 1998). 
There are rational explanations why a significant proportion of compulsory 
superannuation contributions would also have a higher offset than the 30 per cent 
suggested by RIM.  First, there is a wide distribution of income within the SGC 
population, and those on higher incomes are responsible for most of the saving.  
Compulsory contributions from high income families will represent a disproportionate 
share of contributions.  Second, RIM have not investigated the extent to which 
families on relatively low incomes save via housing equity, or the impact of 
compulsory superannuation on this saving.  Forced private pension contributions 
reduce disposable income which may result in lower loan repayments or lower rates 
of housing ownership - a clear savings offset.  This assertion is supported by the 
strategies of many retirees who receive superannuation lump sums.   A common 
strategy for retirees with mortgages is to take benefits in the form of a lump-sum and 
use it to pay off outstanding housing debt.  In this situation, super, a financial asset, is 
used to clear a mortgage, a financial liability, suggesting a direct offset.  Finally, 
saving in private pensions can be offset by new borrowing, including consumer 
vendor credit such as loans on consumer durables.  A major New Zealand study 
suggests that the fall in savings rates in New Zealand and Australia in recent decades 
is associated with rising consumer debt levels (OTRC, 2000: 13).  No effort was made 
by RIM to investigate the implications of these factors on private saving offsets.   
Before proceeding, it is worth considering the course of Australian private saving 
during the 1990s.  In 2000, household saving reached the historic low of 1.5 per cent 
of GDP (ABS, 2000a: 5).17  Contrary to expectations that a new domestic source of 
funds to finance investment would be provided, the household sector has for the first 
time been a net borrower in most years since the implementation of the SGC in 1992.  
 
17 The traditional method of calculating savings as a residual of current income and expenditure 
excludes capital gains on housing and equities from income and therefore saving.  I have used the 
traditional measure as it is consistent with the intention of proponents of NPR when making arguments 
related to saving – that is, positive net contributions to financial assets from current income. 
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Australia's reliance on foreign capital is undiminished.  Borrowing from overseas 
averages around 5 per cent of GDP annually (ABS, 2000a: 6).  As a consequence, the 
ratio of national net liabilities to net worth has increased steadily from 11.8 per cent at 
June 1991 to a peak of 16.6 per cent at 30 June 2000.  This represents an increase as a 
proportion of GDP from 48.4 per cent at 30 June 1991 to 63.9 per cent at 30 June 
2000 (ABS, 2000a: 7). 
The effect of a build-up of private pension assets on national saving is also offset by 
associated reductions in public saving.  These reductions are related to the cost of the 
policy in terms of tax revenue foregone. In Australia, government saving has 
increased rapidly during the 1990s, but this has occurred notwithstanding the impact 
of super.  Treasury estimates indicate that the cost of superannuation tax expenditures 
averaged 1.5 per cent of GDP and 4.5 per cent of the general government budget 
between 1995 and 1998 (Treasury, 2000; ABS, 2000a).  The data is similar for other 
countries with concessionally-taxed private retirement savings.  In the USA, annual 
revenue loss from retirement saving incentives is estimated at $85 billion US (Orszag 
and Greenstein, 2000: 4).  In Canada, in 1992, the cost was estimated at $CA 13.6 
billion - 40 per cent of the budget deficit at that time - and the cost increased to $CA 
35 billion by 1995 (Mintz and Wilson, 1997: 210).  An interesting feature of 
neoliberal pension policy is that it is very expensive.   
Arguably, however, future government expenditure may be reduced if public pensions 
are organised appropriately.  For example, the Australian public pension is means-
tested, and it is anticipated that concessionally-taxed retirement savings will push 
some people over the means-test limit, thereby reducing pension eligibility and 
expenditure.  However, such an outcome could only arise after the policy had been in 
effect for at least a generation, when workers who would not otherwise have had 
super have had an opportunity to accumulate substantial assets.  In Australia, a 
majority of those who have recently retired receive very modest lump sums of less 
than $20,000 (ASFA, 2001a).  This would have little or no impact on means-tests and 
therefore public expenditures, nor incidentally on retirement income.  In fact, RIM 
does not expect a positive net effect on public finances until well beyond 2020 
(Gallagher and Preston, 1997: 9).  This remote prediction of benefit is despite RIM's 
decision to divide estimates of the cost of public tax expenditures in half based on the 
assumption that half the potential savings from removing the program would be lost in 
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the budget process (see Footnote 13).  Likewise, in the UK, Curry and O’Connell 
argue that ‘the future cost to the state of current pension policy is not clear. … The 
right balance between the cost to the state of paying state pensions and the cost to the 
state of encouraging private pensions should be debated’ (Curry and O’Connell, 2003: 
3). 
In summary, after combining private and public offsets to saving in private funded 
pension systems, it appears likely that the net effect on national saving of a one-way 
transition is negative.  There is evidence of substantial private offsets even in the case 
of mandated savings, as in Australian superannuation.  The impact on public saving is 
substantially negative in the short-term, with possible positive impacts after (at least) 
a generation. 
4.3.2 Two-way transition 
In a two-way transition, the public PAYGO scheme is reduced while a new private 
funded scheme is created. The first of two additional complications is the reaction of 
individuals to having a portion of their pension contributions diverted from the 
previously existing public system to the new private system.  One plausible reaction is 
that it has no effect.  This assumes identical savings offsets from public and private 
pension schemes. 
Another plausible reaction is that people treat private pension accumulations as a 
closer substitute for savings other than public pension contributions, leading to a 
higher relative offset, and therefore reducing total savings.  A number of 
characteristics of private pensions are similar or identical to other savings vehicles: 
contributions to private pensions are either completely or partly voluntary; assets are 
held in mutual fund-style personal accounts; assets and rates of return are reported on 
at regular intervals; and individuals have a choice of investment options.  Except for 
difficulty in accessing savings until retirement, private pensions would appear to be a 
reasonable substitute for ordinary private financial savings.   
By contrast, rights to public pensions are substantially different from private savings.  
They are not held in personal accounts; precise information on the quantity of rights 
or the level of 'return' is not easy to access; in unfunded systems pension claims are 
not 'assets' as such; and benefits are paid according to complicated formula which few 
people understand.  In pure economic terms, risk-return is very difficult to calculate 
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because the state is ultimately liable, but returns are subject to political intervention.  
It is plausible that public pension benefits are a very poor substitute for private 
savings.  This approach is supported by empirical research by Gale (1995), who found 
a 100 per cent offset for private pension funds and only a 12 per cent offset for public 
pension funds.  This research suggests public pension funds had very little impact on 
other saving, but the transition from an emphasis on public to private pensions may 
reduce total private saving.  Burtless (2001: 5) has similar expectations and is 
concerned that plans in the US to privatise social security will actually lead to a fall in 
national saving. 
The second complication relates to the funding of existing public pension obligations, 
and operates at the macroeconomic level.  Public PAYGO pension systems fund 
member benefits out of member contributions.  If member contributions are diverted 
to a new private scheme, the government is left with the problem of how to treat the 
obligation to pay benefits accrued by retired and soon to retire members who have 
been contributing to the public scheme for up to 40 years.  These obligations are often 
described in neoliberal research as 'implicit government debt' (e.g. Holzmann et al, 
2000) as part of the attempt to describe public pension systems as facing inevitable 
crisis.  According to neoliberal commentators, a true calculation of the financial 
obligations facing government would include this 'implicit government debt'.  Pension 
liabilities equal or exceed existing government debt in several European countries, 
and would dramatically affect public perceptions of financial viability.  However, 
there is a strong case for continuing to treat pension liabilities as different from 
explicit government debt.  Diamond (2000c: 4) argues convincingly that pension 
obligations are not equivalent to formal debt because (despite probable political 
difficulty in reform) pension obligations are conditional on the government's ability to 
pay.  This debate is discussed in chapter 6. 
The way in which these obligations are treated during neoliberal pension reform has 
implications for public and national saving.  Two main options are available to 
governments: funding the obligations in full (either out of general revenue or by 
borrowing), or reducing benefits.  Increasing the retirement age is sometimes 
presented as a third option, but this is really a way of reducing implicit returns - by 
increasing lifetime contributions and reducing lifetime benefits (Diamond, 2000c: 10).  
The first method reduces public and national saving by the value of the pension 
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obligations.  The government must either allocate a greater proportion of ordinary tax 
revenue to pensions (increase spending) or fund the pensions by borrowing (negative 
saving).  The contributions which were to flow into the public system and are now 
flowing into the private system create a reserve of assets in the private system, but 
leave a hole in the public system.  Inevitably, much of the contributions to new private 
systems buy government securities issued to pay for pension obligations.  Differences 
between this and a PAYGO public system may be relatively superficial. 
Reducing current or future benefits (for example by changing benefit index rules) 
presents the only possibility for a gain in public savings from the transition.  Clearly, 
however, this can only occur at the expense of current or future pensioners.  There is 
no painless savings win during transition.  That does not stop several proponents of 
NPR claiming that there is.  Authors such as Feldstein and Samwick (2001), 
Modigliani et al (2001) and, more tentatively, Miles (1998; 1999) and Diamond (1999) 
continue to suggest that transition will produce welfare benefits, translating into 
increased national saving.  These benefits arise supposedly from the benefits of the 
higher rates of return for contributors on private assets over the implicit rate of return 
on public pension benefits.   
The absence of such benefits in a general equilibrium setting was explored by Breyer 
(1989, 2001).  The impact of moving pension contributions onto capital markets, and 
simultaneously issuing debt to cover public pension liabilities generates no net benefit.  
Rates of return on equities markets would fall, while the cost of government financing 
would go up.  Private benefits would be offset by public costs.  The validity of the 
position is recognised – at least in technical papers – by several orthodox pension 
economists including Robert Holzmann (1998a and 1998b) and Hans-Werner Sinn 
(1999).  Holzmann, Director of Social Programs at the World Bank, writes:  
Deviating from a general equilibrium framework without 
compensation, results sometimes in estimations which suggest 
high future benefits bought by only a small transitory burden (see, 
for example, Feldstein and Samwick, 1996). Yet these results 
need to be treated with a grain of salt both with regard to their 
assumptions (such as the assumed very high rate of return from 
funded provisions) as well as their partial equilibrium nature. 
(1998a: 24) 
He concludes elsewhere that: 
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Summing up, under a traditional neoclassic setting, the financing 
of a UF-FF [unfunded to funded] shift becomes technically 
feasible but difficult to justify in economic terms.  The small 
long-term welfare gains can occur only at the expense of the 
transition generation unless net efficiency gains come from a 
corresponding shift in the mode of taxation; the likelihood of 
such gains is small. Thus additional positive economic effects are 
required to justify such a shift in welfare terms and provide the 
necessary fiscal financing. (Holzmann, 1998b: 42 [italics added]). 
Rigorous economic analysis does not support the notion, despite the wealth of 'pop 
economic' output to the contrary (World Bank, 1994; OECD, 1998), that a transition 
from an unfunded to a funded pension system generates additional saving, except ‘at 
the expense of the transition generation’.   
5 Summary 
There is no effective theoretical or empirical support for the dominant view that 
neoliberal pension reform (NPR) increases savings.  In terms of private saving, the 
best research indicates an offset approaching 100 per cent in private voluntary 
schemes, with little reason to justify lower offsets for compulsory schemes.  Private 
pension systems essentially provide a tax effective avenue for saving, the majority of 
which would occur in the absence of the program. 
In terms of public saving, the effect of NPR is negative and pronounced for the short 
to medium term, with tax concessions costing Anglo-American governments up to 1.5 
per cent of GDP annually.  Possible benefits from reduced welfare payments occur 
only after a whole generation. The NPR transition generates no additional public 
saving without painful reductions in benefits (or double contributions) from at least 
one generation. 
There is no relationship in OECD countries between national savings and type of 
pension system.  Indeed, many of the highest saving countries in the OECD have 
relatively generous public PAYGO pension systems, minimal private pension assets, 
massive public debt, and the oldest populations.  These findings contradict all the 
main predictions of the neoclassical LCT, which forms the basis of the notion that 
NPR will increase savings.  The reverse is true in every respect for the Anglo-
American OECD countries.  Moreover, in the countries with established private 
pension systems, trend savings rates have fallen since the 1970s as the systems have 
developed.  This is not conclusive proof that pension systems lower saving (as it is 
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impossible to say what would have happened in the absence of pension reform), but it 
provides no evidence for the opposite position that NPR will increase savings.   
An interesting finding from the research underlying this chapter is that the relevant 
theoretical and empirical work is known to institutions that promote NPR, such as the 
World Bank.  There is a gap between the official line and any reasonable conclusion 
supportable by available research.  Certain techniques for managing this gap have 
appeared often enough in IFI literature to give the impression of a systematic white-
wash.  These include:  
• asserting current research is at an early stage and more data is necessary;  
• citing dubious economic theories with the leader "some economists 
believe…"; and 
• printing a list of possible but improbable effects of reform, including 
increased saving.   
These techniques are, at the very least, misleading.  The best available knowledge 
concerning economic effects are buried in technical papers that even a dedicated 
journalist or bureaucrat would be unlikely to discover.  Meanwhile, the thrust of more 
accessible documentation and courses offered by the IFIs to coach bureaucrats in 
‘transition management’ continue to assert macroeconomic benefits, particularly 
related to increased saving.   
The level of ignorance in which the policy community, and the wider community, 
remains, allows promoters of NPR, including those employed by financial institutions 
which stand to gain direct benefit, to assert macroeconomic benefits unchallenged. 
NPR continues to enjoy widespread public support, partly related to the popular 
opinion that it represents increased private savings and deferred consumption – 
thereby reducing the burden of retirement income provision on the state, public 
financing and tax.  The reality is that savings would be largely unaffected, and tax 
rates could be substantially lower and more progressive if tax concessions for private 
pensions were removed. 
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The consumption for which we can profitably provide in advance 
cannot be pushed indefinitely into the future. We cannot, as a 
community, provide for future consumption by financial 
expedients but only by current physical output. In so far as our 
social and business organisation separates financial provision for 
the future from physical provision for the future so that efforts to 
secure the former do not necessarily carry the latter with them, 
financial prudence will be liable to diminish aggregate demand 
and thus impair well-being, as there are many examples to testify 
(Keynes, 1936: 104-5). 
Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely, is more anti-
social than the fetish of liquidity, the doctrine that it is a positive 
virtue on the part of investment institutions to concentrate their 
resources upon the holding of 'liquid' securities. It forgets that 
there is no such thing as liquidity of investment for the 
community as a whole. The social object of skilled investment 
should be to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance which 
envelop our future. The actual, private object of the most skilled 
investment to-day is 'to beat the gun', as the Americans so well 
express it, to outwit the crowd, and to pass the bad, or 
depreciating, half-crown to the other fellow (Keynes, 1936: 155).  
1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 examined the impact of NPR on saving.  This chapter considers investment 
and rates of return in private pension systems. 
Section 2 provides a description of the private pension system that is recommended by 
NPR proponents.  This system bears five important features of those operating in 
several Anglo-American countries (USA, UK, Canada and Australia).  It is: capital 
funded; concessionally taxed; minimally and non-proscriptively regulated; personal 
account-based; and market-based, with most providers being private companies 
operating in a competitive retail/wholesale environment.   
Section 3 considers the argument that private systems provide higher rates of return 
than public systems.  The assets of private systems are invested on global financial 
markets by investment professionals.  According to the proponents of NPR, returns in 
private systems are therefore superior to returns in public systems, which are 
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generally equal to economic growth, and may also be adversely affected by 
demographic change and politically-motivated redistributive policies.   
Several weaknesses in this argument are considered.  These include: apparent 
selection bias in market return data, which overestimate future returns and 
underestimate associated risks; a consequent tendency to discount the benefits of risk 
mitigation associated with public systems; exaggeration of the level of inter-
generational transfer; and a failure to recognise mitigating factors associated with 
aging, particularly that younger generations benefit from higher incomes and wealth. 
Section 4 considers the impact of new investment flows from pension funds.  
Proponents of NPR argue that these investment flows represent additions to the 
capital stock that will increase productivity and economic growth.  Private systems are 
said to provide qualitative boosts for capital markets, for example by encouraging 
financial innovation and filling identified funding gaps (including risk capital).  Some 
authors also claim improvements in corporate governance, resulting from the 
influence of fund managers on firm management.    
The section presents evidence on pension fund investment that contradicts these 
arguments.  Pension fund investment is essentially risk-averse.  It is biased towards 
securities issued by large corporations that are heavily weighted in leading stock 
market indices.  Evidence is presented that a small fraction of capital that moves 
through capital markets from pension funds finances actual investment, with a 
relatively trivial quantity made available for venture capital.  The concentrated 
demand for specific securities by pension funds appears to contribute to asset inflation, 
rather than capital stock expansion.   
Notwithstanding this bias, within the group of desirable stocks, pension fund 
investment is highly diversified.  It is consequently impractical for fund managers to 
add strategic value to management, or even provide an effective role in governance.   
Section 5 summarises the chapter and draws out the implications of current research 
on pension investment for pension system policy. 
2 The recommended private pension system 
Pension schemes take many forms.  Neoliberal reformists, including international 
financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, IMF and OECD, recommend 
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implementation of a multipillar structure which separates the goals of redistribution 
and saving.   
…financial security for the old and economic growth would be 
better served if governments develop three systems: a publicly 
managed system with mandatory participation and the limited 
goal of reducing poverty among the old; a privately managed, 
mandatory savings system; and voluntary savings. …  
By separating the redistributive function from the savings 
function, the public pillar … can be kept relatively small, thus 
avoiding many of the growth-inhibiting problems associated with 
a dominant public pillar. (World Bank, 1994: xiv) 
According to the World Bank, the 'savings function' - provision for retirement income 
beyond poverty alleviation - should be achieved in a private system.  Private pension 
schemes also come in a variety of forms.  The IFIs, however, favour implementation 
of a system similar to the private systems of the Anglo-American countries.  This 
preference is articulated in publications such as Averting (World Bank, 1994), the 
World Bank pensions website (www.worldbank.org/pensions), training courses for 
national government bureaucrats, and in policy implementation with developing and 
transition countries.   
The Anglo-American pension systems are not identical.  Australia is the only country 
in this group to have a compulsory private element, and the UK is the only country in 
this group to allow complete avoidance of the public system.  However, the systems 
have several important characteristics in common that have been adopted by the IFIs 
as favoured elements.  They are: 
• capital funding;  
• concessional taxation; 
• minimal investment regulation; 
• personal account-based - defined contribution (DC); and 
• provision organised in a competitive market. 
The recommended private system is funded.  This is in contrast to the PAYGO 
financing typical of public pension schemes.  This may appear tautological for private 
systems; however, there are private PAYGO systems in operation in several OECD 
countries, including Norway and Ireland (Laboul, 1998: 46).  All the aspects of 
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private pension systems discussed in this chapter relate to investment of pension 
assets on capital markets.  This is a feature only of funded schemes.   
A second feature of the recommended system is that it is concessionally taxed.  The 
method employed in the UK, Canada and the US is for contributions and earnings to 
be tax-free up to a ceiling, and benefits to be taxed at the usual marginal rate.  The 
Australian system is unusual, in that it taxes at all three stages, albeit concessionally.  
The Australian government is under constant pressure from industry bodies, such as 
ASFA (2001b), to reform the taxation of super to bring it into line with 'standard' 
overseas practice.  Taxing only pension benefits allows the most rapid accumulation, 
due to a higher initial investment, and a higher after tax rate of compounding returns.  
The present value of tax taken early in an individual's retirement saving program is 
much higher than tax taken at the end.  The system is based on the notion that 
retirement saving is deferred consumption.  If, however, retirement accumulations are 
preserved for bequest, this form of taxation allows the accumulation (over generations) 
of property income with a greatly reduced tax burden. 
A third feature is that the private systems operate in a minimalist investment 
regulation regime.  In the Anglo-American countries, investment regulation is largely 
governed by the Common Law as it applies to trusts.  The Common Law emphasises 
the fiduciary responsibility to 'yield the best return for the beneficiaries, judged in 
relation to the risks of the investment in question’ (Davis, 2001: 19).  The legal 
authority which gave the common name to the minimalist regulatory regime - the 
prudent man concept - is an 1886 case, 'Re Whiteley', in which it was stated that 
trustees must ‘take such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he were 
minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom he felt 
morally obliged to provide’ (in Davis, 2001: 19).  
This fiduciary responsibility is generally interpreted in strict and restrictive terms.  It 
is, for example, seen as precluding potentially competing investment priorities, 
including those which actual beneficiaries of the trust may hold dear, such as 
investment in particular regions or industries.  A ‘pro-prudent man' literature 
emphasises the risk of objectives creeping into investment policy which are not 
supportable on strictly financial grounds (Minns, 2001: 115-6).  These include 
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'economically-targeted-investments' (ETI) and 'socially responsible investing' (SRI).18  
The perceived dangers of ETI are discussed in more detail in chapter 6, section 3, in 
the context of the perceived threat to investment performance posed by government. 
The prudent man concept does not suggest an absence of regulation.  However, 
regulations in a prudent man setting relate to the function of the market - proper 
governance and open and fair market dealings - as opposed to quantitative restrictions 
on fund investments restricting investment in equities or foreign assets.  This allows 
the fund manager access to all the tools of modern statistical investment, aimed at 
maximising risk-adjusted returns, where risk is defined as volatility in returns over a 
given period.  The emphasis of these investment techniques is liquid competitive 
capital markets which are assumed to provide an objective method of determining fair 
value.19   
A substantial literature, especially featuring Hans Bloomestein of the OECD (2001a; 
2001b),20 details the superior performance of private pension systems operating the 
prudent man concept over systems operating so-called 'Draconian' quantitative 
investment regulations.  Bloomestein reports that, in the Anglo-American countries 
with prudent man investment regulation (UK, USA, Canada, Australia and Ireland), 
equity holdings are more than 3 times as large on average and foreign holdings are 
twice as high on average as those countries operating quantitative investment 
restrictions (Japan, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Portugal, Belgium) (2001a: 11).  
According to Bloomestein, the result is higher returns: average real annual returns in 
prudent man countries between 1984 and 1998 were 4.7 per cent higher than average 
 
18 Representatives of the latter group invented the category to differentiate themselves from the 
economically targeted investments group, which had been effectively demonised by neoliberals in the 
USA and UK.  They argue that investment in SRI does not conflict with fiduciary responsibility 
(Yunus, 2002). 
19 Fluctuations in value are divided by modern investment theory into systematic and non-systematic.  
Systematic risk – fluctuation which affects the whole market – is largely perceived as outside the scope 
of analysis, though it does, of course, have a profound effect on retirement accumulation.  The aim of 
modern risk minimisation is to achieve returns which match the market.  The possibility for the market 
to provide incorrect valuation over substantial periods contradicts the theory. 
20 See also OECD, 1998b: 93; Srinivas & Yermo, 2000: 1; World Bank, 2000; Vittas, 1998a: 22 
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real annual returns in countries with quantitative restrictions (2001a: 19-20).  The 
validity of this sample is questioned below. 
Some pragmatic exceptions to the prudent man rule are evident in the Anglo-
American countries.  In Australia, for example, investment by a fund in the entity 
which sponsors the fund (e.g. an employer) is limited to 10 per cent of fund assets.  
This regulation is not in place in the US, where ICI (Investment Company Institute) 
research reveals that an extraordinary 39 per cent of 401k assets are held in own-
company stock (Holden and VanDerhei, 2001: 12).  The related risk, as in the Enron 
case, is that, in the event of employer bankruptcy, employees lose both employment 
and retirement benefits.21 
Enron employees, whose pension scheme - or 401(k) plan, as 
they are sometimes called - consisted mainly of Enron stock, 
have lost as much as $1bn (£700m) in funds.  
Under the scheme employees' retirement plans, 62% of the 
contributions consisted of Enron stock, which traded as high as 
$83 a year ago but have since fallen to below 70 cents a share. 
(David Schepp, 10/1/2002) 
A fourth preferred characteristic is that the system is based on the principle of 'defined 
contribution' (DC) as opposed to 'defined benefit' (DB).  Most occupational pensions 
up until the 1980s, including in the Anglo-American countries, were of the DB type.  
In DB systems, benefits are calculated using a formula based on length of service and 
earnings history.  These systems often include reward for long service and are notable 
in that the investment risk is borne by the pension sponsor.  DB programs tend to 
redistribute income by averaging out good and bad periods of investment, as well as 
transferring income from short-term workers to long-term workers.  Criticisms of DB 
pensions include that the pension value is difficult to calculate during an individual's 
career and accrued benefits are difficult or impossible to transfer to another pension 
program.   
 
21 Reform in this area is underway, though it appears that a soft reform option supported by President 
George W. Bush is gaining bipartisan support.  Under the proposal, employees would be allowed to sell 
own-company stock three years after they are received within 401k schemes in order to diversify 
holdings.  Direct restrictions on 401k investments would be limited to a phased diversification plan - 20 
per cent diversified in year 1, with an additional 20 per cent diversified each year for 4 years (Boehner, 
2002). 
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By contrast, DC or 'accumulation' schemes usually do not have vesting rules and 
assets are consequently more portable.  Investment returns are not smoothed over time 
and there is no redistribution between groups; in other words, risk-pooling does not 
apply.  An individual receives only what is contributed by themselves or employers 
on their behalf, plus market returns net of administration.  Asset value should be 
communicable to members in an account-equivalent format, and members may have a 
choice as to which provider they use and how assets are invested.  Almost all new 
funds in the Anglo-American countries are of the defined contribution type, and the 
percentage of assets in these funds is now in the majority.  In Australia at 30 June 
2000, 87 per cent of superannuation members were in DC style funds (Clare and 
Connor, 2000: 6).  In the US, membership of DC funds more than doubled between 
1975 and 1997 (Munnell et al, 2002b: 6). 
Fifth, the Anglo-American private systems, and most of the systems implemented 
with the involvement of the IFIs, are organised around a plural consumer market.  In 
this structure, multiple providers compete to sell services directly to individuals, in 
addition to employers.  Alternatives include systems in which fund licenses are 
strictly limited to prevent inefficient provider proliferation, funds can only market to 
employers, or administration is handled by the state which purchases funds 
management services from the finance sector in a centralised tender process. 
The rationales for a plural consumer market relate both to expectations concerning the 
benefits of competition in the market and perceived benefits from additional 
administrative and investment diversification.  It is also seen as the pragmatic solution 
in countries with an existing market for related financial services, such as life 
insurance.  Robinson describes these factors in the Australian case: 
Calls to move to a centralised national superannuation scheme 
have been rejected, primarily on the basis of the disruption this 
would cause to existing superannuation arrangements (including 
the possibly perverse effect of reducing total superannuation 
cover) but also on what might be called 'risk diversification' 
grounds.  With respect to the latter, there are cogent arguments in 
favour of a system whereby savings are channelled into a 
diversified range of independent funds and invested by a large 
number of independent decision makers on the basis of individual 
commercial judgments. (Robinson, 1992: 13) 
The effectiveness of administrative plurality in achieving diversified investment is 
discussed below in section 4.1.2.  Chapter 4 also deals with the dynamics of the plural 
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consumer market in detail, demonstrating that it is an unambiguously disastrous 
element of the private pension policy.  Neoliberal researchers have spent two decades 
recognising problems but resisting solutions which involve direct regulation or public 
administration (Vittas, 1998a; Whitehouse, 2000a).  While the stance of IFI research 
in defence of consumer markets is appearing to soften (James et al, 2001), there is no 
consideration in the Anglo-American countries of retreat from market plurality.  
Indeed, current reform options, supported aggressively by the finance sector, 
emphasise increased consumer choice (Costello, 1997). 
In summary, the preferred private pension system is funded, concessionally taxed, 
minimally regulated, defined contribution, and market-based.  The following sections 
consider the interaction of private pension funds and capital markets, and whether or 
not this is desirable for individual fund members and society. 
3 Pension rates of return 
Proponents of NPR argue that private systems earn higher rates of return for members 
than public systems.  They argue that while private system assets are invested by 
professional fund managers on international capital markets, public system returns are 
limited to the domestic rate of economic growth, and may be adversely affected by 
demographic change and other forms of redistribution.  This section considers rates of 
return and risks associated with public and private pension systems. 
3.1 Comparative historical returns 
The rate of return on public PAYGO pension schemes is not zero.  Even though 
PAYGO systems may have no assets earning interest, under normal economic 
conditions, a member with average lifetime earnings and average lifespan will receive 
more in benefits than they provide in contributions.  The economics of PAYGO 
pensions were described by Paul Samuelson (1958), whose 'overlapping generations' 
accounting model predicts that the implicit rate of return is equal to the rate of growth 
of the aggregate wage bill.  If the wage share of output is constant, the PAYGO rate of 
return will equal the rate of real economic growth, which should be the sum of the real 
rate of growth of labour productivity and the real rate of growth of the labour force.   
Samuelson was a strong advocate of the public PAYGO pension system, both in the 
academic context and in public debate, arguing that it was a permanently welfare-
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improving method of retirement income provision.  The World Bank appear to 
attribute personal responsibility to Samuelson for the spread and growth of public 
PAYGO pensions during the post-war period, quoting him in a 1967 Newsweek 
editorial:  
"… The beauty of social insurance is that it is actuarially unsound.  
Everyone who reaches retirement age is given benefit privileges 
that far exceed anything he has paid in. … A growing nation is 
the greatest Ponzi scheme ever contrived." 22  
The result was the creation of new social insurance schemes or 
tiers in Switzerland (1949), the Netherlands (1957), Sweden 
(1960), Norway (1966) and Canada (1966) and the dramatic 
expansion of schemes in the rest of Europe, Japan, and the United 
States. (World Bank, 1994: 105) 
The public PAYGO implicit rate of return was positive in developed countries during 
the decades following World War II due to strong economic growth and labour force 
growth.   
Proponents of NPR suggest, however, that the rate of return would have been higher 
for funded private pensions, even during this favourable period.  This argument is 
based on two assertions: that capital market rates of return are generally superior to 
economic growth, and that private pension funds can access those returns. 
Beginning with the second part of the argument, proponents of NPR argue that 
pension funds stand to get the best that capital markets have to offer because pension 
funds have advantages over ordinary private investors.  Pension fund investment is 
run by trained professionals, and benefits from preferential access to information and 
economies of scale.  In investment analysis, pension funds can conduct thorough 
analysis of a large number of assets, and get access, via closed briefings, to insights to 
company performance and strategic issues.  As large buyers of investment services, 
pension funds can also get better rates and quality on services such as broking and 
asset consulting.  These costs can also be spread over larger transactions, depending 
on fund size.  Pension funds are pooled investors.  This implies that pension funds 
should be able to maximise the benefits of modern statistical investment analysis 
related primarily to diversification.  By spreading assets carefully over a range of 
 
22 A Ponzi scheme is a financial scam in which payments move from new members to old members in a 
pyramid structure. 
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countries, asset types and industry classifications, pension funds should be able to 
maximise risk-adjusted returns (Bloomestein, 2001a: 19).   
Pension funds also have long time horizons.  In contrast to ordinary investors, pension 
funds should not be risk averse.  Pension funds should be able to take advantage of 
pricing errors caused by risk aversion, including the so-called 'equity premium'.  This 
is the name given to the tendency of the risk-adjusted return on equities to be higher 
than the return for less volatile assets.  In addition to being long-term, pooled 
investors, pension funds are flexible.  According to Bloomestein, pension funds are 
able to exercise rapid portfolio adjustment to take advantage of poor asset pricing 
(2001b: 7).  This is expected to improve the allocative efficiency of investment. 
Professionalism, economies of scale, pooling, long time frame and flexibility are 
important benefits in investment management.  However, professional investment 
management does involve an additional layer of costs.  It also introduces a set of risks 
related to agency, as it is unclear in the private pension marketplace, given serious 
gaps in accountability, to what extent managers are serving their members or 
themselves.  The impact on private pensions of administrative cost and negligent or 
fraudulent management are discussed in chapter 4. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, most mainstream authors assert that private funded 
systems receive higher returns than public systems.  David Miles (1998), for example, 
compares GDP growth (equal to public pension returns) to the rate of return on a 
mixture of government bonds, corporate bonds and equities.  He compares these data 
in a series of ten year periods since WWII for a number of OECD countries.  In most 
periods, for most countries, the average rate of return on the mixture of marketable 
securities has been higher than economic growth.  Miles argues that the finding of 
higher capital market returns is generally applicable, and explains the relevance for 
pension reform: 
[I]n dynamically efficient economies the average rate of return on 
assets will exceed GDP growth. Since the tax base for unfunded 
state pensions is likely to move closely in line with GDP a funded 
system will tend to generate higher returns so that in the long run 
funded systems can pay higher pensions for a given level of 
contributions (or generate the same level of pensions for lower 
contributions). (1999: 2) 
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Similarly, Feldstein and Samwick (2001: 8) argue that private pensions (invested 60 
per cent in equities and 40 per cent in corporate bonds) will pay 6.9 per cent, based on 
1945-95 returns in US capital markets.  By contrast, they expect public pension 
returns to decline to 3 per cent over coming years. 
Likewise, Palacios and Pallarès-Miralles, World Bank researchers, provide data on 
private pension system annual returns between 1984 and 1999 in a selection of 
countries, mostly in the OECD.  Their data suggests that annual average private 
pension system returns have exceeded annual per capita growth by between 1.5 per 
cent and 8 per cent, with an average of around 4 per cent (Palacios and Pallarès-
Miralles, 2000: 18).  This is perceived to be the differential between public and 
private system returns. 
Claims of superior returns on capital markets must be examined closely.  Capital 
market returns are potentially volatile, with numerous examples of market collapse, 
stagnation, termination and suspension.  Indeed, capital market failure partly explains 
the development of PAYGO pension systems.  Early experience in Europe and the US 
with funded pensions was not positive.  Munnell et al write:  
Private pension plans in the United States date from 1875, but the 
early plans were financially vulnerable and most were bankrupted 
in the 1930s by the Great Depression.  Contemporary US pension 
plans, both private and public, are rooted in the search for greater 
financial security that became part of the national psychology 
after the onset of the Depression. (Munnell et al, 2002b: 2) 
Similarly, Clark (2001b) relates that part of the rationale for creation of public 
PAYGO pension systems in France, Italy and Germany, was the annihilation of 
savings held by households due to inflation, industrial collapse and war.   In several 
developed countries, the public's faith in financial institutions as a mechanism for 
holding long-term savings was shaken. 
The ‘search for greater financial security’ in the early post war period seems to have 
given way to complacency, following decades of high capital market performance 
interrupted only by stagnation from 1973-1983.  Complacency is encouraged by 
authors asserting strong historical performance.  However, retrospective investment 
analysis offers substantial scope for selection bias to affect results.  Possible sources 
of bias include choosing certain countries or periods with superior returns, or not 
adjusting for firm survival bias. 
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The three pro-NPR studies referred to above focus on high growth periods: Feldstein 
and Samwick (2001) use 1945 to 95, Bloomestein (2001a) uses 1984 to 1998, and 
Palacios and Pallarès-Miralles (2000) use 1984 to 1999. 
Dimson et al have analysed the 'de Zoete' study' (regarded as a benchmark) of returns 
in the UK for the period 1919-1954, which estimates annual real returns at 8.79 per 
cent.  After adjusting for a series of biases, including surviving company and large 
company biases, and beginning the sample at the beginning of the century instead of 
after WWI, Dimson et al found real annual returns of only 3.83 per cent (2002: 37). 
Use of returns from relatively successful markets, such as the UK or US, may not be 
representative of general circumstances.  Dimson et al show that half of a sample 
group of 16 OECD countries have had average real annual equity returns of below 5 
per cent during the 20th century, even after excluding the years for which certain 
countries in Europe were affected by hyperinflation (2002: 50).  Real bond returns 
across the sample group averaged 0.9 per cent (Dimson et al, 2002: 53).   
Similarly, Larry Willmore (1998a: 5) argues that data drawn from US markets cited in 
most pro-NPR research is not applicable to other economies.  His argument is 
particularly pertinent to World Bank promotion of private pensions in developing 
countries with weak trade positions and vulnerable currencies.  Financial turmoil has 
been widespread in developing countries in recent years.  In the last decade, transition 
economies such as Russia and the Ukraine, Latin American economies including 
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, and South-East Asian economies including Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia, have all suffered crises involving currency devaluation and 
rapid inflation.  People in these countries experienced collapses in the value of their 
savings, whether held in banks, or in pension funds, as in Argentina. 
Given the added risks associated with investment on capital markets as opposed to 
public PAYGO systems, a number of commentators question whether differentials in 
return compensate for the volatility associated with investment on capital markets 
(Aaron et al, 2001; Laboul, 1998; Burtless, 2000; Willmore, 1998).  Miles suggests 
statistical parameters under which capital market returns do adequately compensate 
for volatility. 
If average rates of return on funds are as high as 8% then even if 
volatility in returns is high (17.5% annual standard deviation) and 
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annuity markets highly imperfect there is no useful role for 
unfunded pensions. (Miles, 1999: 25) 
During the 1980s and 1990s – the period of rapid growth for private pension systems 
– average market returns in most developed countries were in excess of 8 per cent, 
indicating that compensation may be adequate.  However, this has not always been the 
case.  The distribution of annual returns on US equities between 1900 and 2000 
suggests that returns were negative more than 30 per cent of the time, and, with a 
standard deviation of over 20 per cent, showed a high degree of volatility (Dimson et 
al, 2002: 55).  A histogram of annual returns over the last century approximates a 
standard bell curve, except that there are far more outliers than would be expected in a 
normal distribution.  Even in the US, extreme results occur far more frequently than 
are predicted by a normal distribution.  
These analyses also ignore the tendency for good and bad years to be grouped in bull 
and bear runs.  Miles recognises that this omission may be pertinent: 
We have assumed that rates of return are independently (and 
identically) distributed over time. This means that investment risk 
can, to a significant extent, be smoothed over time.  …  An 
important area for future work is the modelling of optimal 
pension arrangements when asset markets are subject to sustained 
periods of above or below average returns; if there are bull and 
bear markets funded pensions are likely to be riskier than if 
returns come from the same distribution each period. (1999: 25) 
The impact of bull and bear runs on historical capital market returns is significant.  
Gary Burtless has considered the impact on hypothetical private pensions invested on 
US stock markets over the last 70 years.   
Assuming workers deposit 6 percent of their annual pay into a 
retirement account that is invested in common stocks, historical 
experience suggests their initial pensions can range from less 
than 20 percent of their peak career earnings to more than 100 
percent of peak earnings. Averaged over their full retirements and 
taking account of the effects of inflation, workers’ real pensions 
ranged between 15 percent and 70 percent of peak career 
earnings. (Burtless, 2000: 23). 
Historical stock market returns in the US would offer private system members widely 
varying returns, depending on investment strategy and the timing of retirement.  
Retirement at the end of a bull period would result in very high returns, but retirement 
at the end of a bear period would produce very low returns. 
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Wide disparity in returns are particularly relevant to current (2002/03) market 
conditions. Stock markets around the world reached record levels in early 2000.  
Following very strong growth during the 1980s, the leading Australian index, the All 
Ordinaries, doubled in value between 1990 and 2000, from around 1600 to around 
3200.  In the USA, the Dow Jones Industrial Index (top 22 stocks) rose from around 
2500 to 11000 (a multiple of 4.4), while the S&P 500 (top 500 stocks) rose from 
around 350 to around 1500 (a multiple of 4.3).  The leading index in the U.K., the 
FTSE, rose from around 2200 to a peak of 6800 (a multiple of 3.1). 
Corporate earnings also rose during this period, but not to the same extent.  Price-
earnings (PE) ratios have risen to historically high levels in all these countries.  A PE 
ratio of 15 is the historical average in the US and Australia.  The Reserve Bank's 
Australian stock exchange PE series shows a rise from around 10.5 in 1990 to a high 
of 29 in early 2000, falling slightly to around 25 in April 2002 (RBA, 2002a).  In the 
USA, the PE ratio on the S&P500 rose from a low of 7 in 1980 to a peak of 37 in 
March 2000 (Walker, 2002).  It has fallen substantially since then to around 25 in 
December 2001, but remains well above historical averages.   
It is also likely that published market data underestimate PEs by overestimating 
aggregate earnings.  Firms with negative earnings are excluded, and the earnings of 
many companies in recent years have been manipulated upwards with a range of 
fraudulent and misleading accounting practices (Krugman, 29/6/2002).  There were 
more earnings restatements in 2001 on the NY Stock Exchange than in any year 
previously, and the year 2002 produced more still, indicating that earnings projections 
were too aggressive and accounting methods were re-evaluated.  A range of unethical 
practices that impact on pension funds are discussed in section 4.4 of chapter 4. 
The peak market conditions during 1999-2000 encouraged NPR with the prospect of 
stellar returns on capital markets.  However, leading experts were circumspect about 
NPR proposals.  In considering a Clinton proposal for social security privatisation, 
Peter Diamond questioned assumptions that the market would provide 7 per cent real 
returns, the long-term historical average.  A key issue for Diamond was the then very 
high asset prices.  Diamond notes that high PE ratios and low dividend ratios signal a 
probable lower future rate of return on equities (2000d: 42-44).  Diamond argues that 
to achieve historical rates of return, it would be necessary for markets to provide zero 
capital gains for the next ten years (2001a: 1).   
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Concern over future levels of returns is not restricted to academic commentators. 
Garth Rossler, a director of analyst/broker Maple-Brown Abbott, is one of many 
Australian practitioners talking down future returns: 
People have got used to double-digit returns, and really that has 
only been on the back of bull markets of historic proportions … 
We think that, going forward, average industry returns will be 
much lower than they have been. (Todd, 10/1/2) 
Later in 2002, little appeared to have changed.  Kerr Neilson of Platinum Asset 
Management said: 
"We don't think we're going to make people much money going 
forward," he laments. "We're in a bear market and what happens 
in a bear market is that everything falls. The few stocks that hold 
up through the selling then get nailed because they stand out and 
don't represent the value that they did before. 
"There's no way of escaping widespread market falls and what 
happens is people then lose the residue of their commitment to 
long-term investing. They start making losses and skipping out of 
their investments." (SMH, 20/6/2002) 
Vanguard, an international index fund retailer and a leading beneficiary of the stock 
market boom and stock market enthusiasm, has gone to lengths to warn investors 
about the likelihood of lower short-to-medium term returns due to the boom which 
lasted until early 2000 (Vanguard, 2000). 
In line with the expectations of Diamond, the bear run beginning in March 2000 
removed much of the apparent gains of the previous years.  At October 2002, levels 
on most indices had returned to 1998 levels.  Capital losses have flowed through to 
pension funds.  Australian funds provided low or negative quarterly returns between 
2000 and 2003 (APRA, 2003).  Between September 2000 and September 2002, 
despite net contributions of $A 59 billion, total assets increased only $A 10 billion, 
implying investment losses after administration of almost $A 50 billion (APRA, 
2003). 
Pension funds have been devastated by market performance in the US.  US pension 
funds have fallen an estimated $US 1 trillion in value (Sanders, 28/2/2003).  Defined 
benefit pensions are doubly affected because, in addition to being impacted by the 
reversal in equities, the fall in interest rates has reduced the discount rate used to 
calculate future pension liabilities.  The New York Times reports that as a 
consequences of these dynamics, private DB pension funds in the US have shifted 
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from being $US 220 billion over-funded to being $US 220 billion under-funded in the 
three years from 1999 to 2002 (Walsh, 13/1/2003). 
Hopes that markets will turn around rapidly are not necessarily well founded.  Even in 
economically and politically dominant nations such as the US, recovery from crashes 
may take a full generation.  The Dow Jones Index did not reach its 1929 peak again 
until 1958 after adjusting for inflation.  Japanese markets have been falling since the 
late 1980s, despite the apparent industrial strength of the country reflected in 
continued trade surpluses.  Between 1993 and 1996, the Japanese social security trust 
fund lost 6 percent of its value due to falling markets (Turner, 2001: 25).  The 
Japanese market in early 2003 reached lows not seen since the early 1980s.  The 
implicit claim of the pension fund industry that a slow and steady approach to 
investment – ‘dollar-averaging’ is the current jargon – is hollow in this context.  A 
significant portion of money invested at the peaks of speculative booms is effectively 
wasted.  Asset prices may only recover as much as a generation later, if at all. 
The assertion that private pension funds offer superior returns to public PAYGO 
pension systems is based on selective data that ignores the profound risks associated 
with capital market investment. 
3.2 Intergenerational and intragenerational redistribution 
In private funded DC systems, an individual's benefits are equal to his or her  
contributions, plus market returns.  In public PAYGO systems, benefits are paid out 
of worker contributions and taxes based on formulae which generally reflect the 
length and quantity of contributions.  Critics of public PAYGO systems describe two 
sources of generational inequity related to financing: windfall benefits for the first 
retiring generation and decreasing returns for younger generations caused by 
demographic change.  However, several factors mitigate intergenerational inequity: 
economic growth results in younger generations being wealthier over their lifetimes; 
increased longevity means younger generations draw pension benefits for longer 
periods; and inheritance connects the interests of socio-economic groups across 
generations, and is more lucrative as fertility falls.  The ability of the public PAYGO 
systems to provide immediate pensions allows windfall gains, but whether or not 
systems provided these gains depended on design.  In practice, such gains were 
generally limited. 
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Neoliberal critics argue that the combination of aging-related decreases in rates of 
return and windfalls provided to the first retiring generation lead to systemic 
generational inequity. As a community ages due to falling fertility and greater 
longevity, the aged dependency ratio (the ratio of elderly people to working people, or 
the population as a whole) rises.  Assuming labour participation by age and gender 
stays constant, the pension system dependency ratio (the ratio of beneficiaries to 
contributors) will also rise.  Assuming the pension system is kept revenue neutral 
(benefits equal contributions) and benefits are set as a proportion of average wages, 
contributions must rise as a proportion of wages.  Alternatively, benefits may be 
reduced, reducing implicit rates of return.  An increase in the retirement age - 
sometimes suggested as a third solution - is actually a combination of both the 
previous solutions, as it represents both an increase in contributions and a decrease in 
benefits (on a lifetime rather than annual basis). 
Figure 3.1 provides some illustrative accounting for a hypothetical pension system 
experiencing an extreme jump in system dependency.  It initially has 1 retiree for 
every 10 workers, but this ratio rises to 2:10, or only 5 workers per retiree.  In the first 
instance, each worker need only contribute 5 per cent of pay to provide the retiree 
with a pension equal to 50 per cent of gross wages.  In the second instance, each 
worker must contribute 10 per cent of wages to provide a pension equal to 50 per cent 
of wages.  The increase in taxation (double) is exactly the same as the increase in 
dependency.  Alternately, if taxes are kept constant, the pension would fall from 50 
per cent to 25 per cent of gross wages.  The later generation of retirees would only 
receive half the rate of return of the first generation. 
Falling present value from public PAYGO pensions is described by neoliberals as a 
source of intergenerational inequity.  Axel Börsch-Supan et al (2001) attempt to build 
a case that workers in high replacement rate European PAYGO schemes are highly 
dissatisfied as they are facing high social security contributions with little hope of 
gaining a pension as valuable as those currently retired.  In an aging society, the later 
a cohort enters the PAYGO pension system, the worse their rate of return will be.   
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Figure 3.1 System dependency and public PAYGO accounting 
 
Time 0 1 
Contributors 10 5 
Beneficiaries 1 1 
System Dependency   10% 20% 
Wages 100 100 
Replacement rate (Pension / Wages) 50% 50% 
Pension 50 50 
Contribution  
(Pensioners * Pension / Contributors) 
= 1 * 50 / 10 
= 5
= 1 * 50 / 5 
= 10 
Contribution rate 
(Contribution / Wages) 
= 5 / 100 
= 5%
= 10 / 100 
= 10% 
 
Hans-Werner Sinn (1999) compares public pension returns to capital market returns in 
Germany.  The approach is similar to that of Miles (1998), mentioned above, but also 
takes demographic effects into account.  Sinn provides data on the growth rate of real 
wages, the real implicit rate of return on the German public pension system, and the 
real market rate of interest (Sinn, 1999: 10).  The comparison shows real wage growth 
and the public pension rate of return falling from around 3 per cent p.a. in 1957 to 1.5 
per cent in 2000 (projected).  The real market rate of interest is consistently between 4 
and 4.5 per cent for the whole period.  The case is that private pension funds would 
always have been a superior option, and that the margin of superiority is increasing 
with demographic change. 
Neoliberals argue that windfall benefits provided to the first generation of retirees is 
another source of intergenerational inequity.  A PAYGO system can pay benefits to 
the first generation of retirees although they may not themselves have contributed to 
the system at all.  The World Bank presents measures of public pension rates of return 
over time for Switzerland, the United States and Sweden which show very high 
returns for the first cohort of retirees, reasonable return for the second cohort of 
retirees, and then progressively worse returns for subsequent cohorts (World Bank, 
1994: 136).  This type of analysis has led national governments, including Australia's 
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(Costello, 2002), and supranational organisations such as the EU (European Union, 
1999) to create estimated generational accounts to estimate intergenerational transfers. 
Returns in public pensions are also affected by redistributory policies.  These may 
operate via progressive benefit formulae, as in the US, and/or as system add-ons, as in 
Germany, where the government makes contributions on behalf of the unemployed 
and those on parental leave.  The result is that 'returns' within public PAYGO pension 
systems are generally higher for those with lower and broken incomes than for those 
on higher constant incomes.  The integration of redistributory programs and 
retirement savings programs is strongly opposed by neoliberal commentators, who 
claim pricing distortions caused by non-transparent 'implicit' taxes reduce incentives 
to work and save. 
If poverty reduction and income redistribution toward the lifetime 
poor are the objectives, countries should be wary of earnings-
related pay-as-you-go pension systems that produce large 
intergenerational transfers for later to earlier cohorts but few 
equalizing intragenerational transfers.  They should also be wary 
of nontransparent systems that make it difficult to figure out who 
is gaining and losing. (World Bank, 1994: 137) 
The World Bank argues that there are redistributory elements to public pension 
systems which are unintended, and others which are intended but not explicit.  The 
implication is that income is redistributed by social security systems in unexpected 
and potentially regressive ways.  The World Bank notes that social security is 
available only to those on relatively high incomes, especially in developing countries 
(1994: 132) and that PAYGO systems have a 'built-in' regressive redistribution due to 
the correlation between wealth and longevity (World Bank, 1994: 133).  Preferential 
pensions for powerful client groups, including the military, civil service and 
politicians, were noted in several Latin American countries during the 1970s and 
1980s (Barrientos, 1998: 19).  
It seems clear, however, that manipulation of pension systems by non-democratic 
regimes in developing countries is a function of political failure rather than an 
inherent weakness of PAYGO financing, as the World Bank implies.  Claims of 
regressive redistribution are not accurate in relation to systems in developed countries.  
As Peter Diamond describes in relation to the US, the central political problem 
neoliberals have with public PAYGO pensions is progressive redistribution. 
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The main issue in the US is the within cohort or 
'intragenerational' redistribution. Republicans opposed the 
creation of social security and have opposed it at every step - 
claiming it would destroy the economy and freedom. (Diamond, 
2000e: 15) 
American social security does compensate those on lower incomes for shorter 
longevity.  This is not the case for private annuity products.  Where those on lower 
incomes are pooled with those on higher incomes, these private products will have 
regressive redistribution (Willmore and St John, 2001: 1298).   
The World Bank believes public pensions should target those in most need and 
provide benefits limited only to poverty alleviation.  However, the approach of the 
founders of American social security to combine redistribution and universality 
appears to be a more practical and lasting solution.  Franklin Roosevelt created 
earmarked payroll taxes to finance pensions to give all Americans a "legal, moral and 
political right" to a pension.  Wilbur Cohen, a bureaucrat involved in designing 
American social security, remarked that "programs for poor people end up being poor 
programs" (Seidmann, 1999: 152).  Despite the claims of the World Bank that much 
redistribution in social security is regressive, there is strong evidence that public 
PAYGO pensions have a strong positive impact on the rate and severity of elderly 
poverty.  This evidence is discussed in chapter 5. 
Other neoliberal claims in regards to system redistribution appear to be exaggerated.  
A Canadian study found no evidence of a windfall by early system retirees, despite 
assertions by critics of the public system in that country (Wolfson and Murphy, 1997: 
72). A recent study in the US, has found only a slight decline in average rates of 
return on social security over time.  Implicit rates of return averaged 2.9 per cent for 
the cohort retiring in 1941, 2.6 per cent for the 1970 cohort and 2.6 per cent for the 
1999 cohort (Anderson et al, 2001: 14).  The authors found that the near equivalence 
of returns was partly explained by increasing life expectancy, which resulted in later 
younger generations receiving pensions for more of their life (Anderson et al, 2001: 
10).   
The Canadian study emphasises that the degree to which early retirees gained at the 
expense of others is dependent on system design.  The US study suggests that the 
interaction between demographic change and pension systems is more complex than 
is suggested by neoliberals. 
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Diamond notes that generational accounting does not take into account different wage 
levels for each generation (2000e: 9). As average wage levels rise with technological 
progress and economic growth, later younger generations enjoy a higher standard of 
living.  There is no moral basis for not sharing the benefits of increasing wealth with 
the elderly.  Their contribution to society was as much responsible for progress as that 
of succeeding generations. 
Generational accounting also ignores the effect of pension systems on transfers 
between generations within families.  One important effect on younger working 
families is the easing of financial pressure on them to provide for their retired and 
invalid parents.  Willmore and St John (2001: 1303) note that this frees up family 
disposable income, particularly important for households with children.  The 
implication is that some of the benefits from public pension programs accrue 
indirectly to workers and their children.  A second effect is that inheritance 
substantially reverses intergenerational transfers within public PAYGO systems 
(Booth et al, 2000: 8).  To the extent that pensioners do not have to run down assets 
including housing equity during retirement, their gain is also a benefit for their 
children who receive increased inheritance.  An interesting factor in relation to 
inheritance is that the level of benefit increases with lower fertility.  As families have 
less children, inheritance is divided fewer ways, resulting in a concentration of 
inherited wealth.  Intergenerational accounts assume that income gained by the older 
generation is entirely consumed.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, however, it 
is the norm for the retired to continue to save. 
Private pension funds are suggested as a solution for retirement income provision for 
countries with aging populations because they are not transparently sensitive to 
demographic change.  However, the consumption needs of the retired must be 
provided for out of current production,23 irrespective of the financial arrangements for 
provision of income.  In private funded schemes - superficially, at least - individuals 
provide for their own retirement by 'deferring consumption'.  However, retirement 
income in funded schemes is drawn from interest income and asset sales.  Asset sales 
 
23 Only limited direct personal provision for retirement consumption needs can be made ahead of 
retirement.  For example, consumer durables and housing purchased before retirement can be 
'consumed' for some period into retirement. 
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are dependent on a flow of capital (demand for capital assets) from working 
generations.  The flow of capital into markets from working generations is necessary 
to enable the flow of capital out of markets to retired generations.  The quality of 
living standard achieved by the retired in a funded pension system is highly sensitive 
to this flow of capital.  Strong demand for assets leads to price rises which constitute 
capital gain.  Weak demand for assets would lead to falls in prices causing capital loss.   
Several prominent pension researchers, including Schieber and Shoven (1994), 
Poterba (1998), Group of Ten (1998), Bloomestein (2001a) and Jan Mantel (2001) 
argue that changing demand for capital assets due to demographic change will result 
in low asset prices in the medium to long term, undermining the capacity of private 
funded systems to provide adequate retirement income.  Li and Davis summarise the 
concern: 
Whilst there are benefits from funded pension schemes, … the 
forecasts highlight market risks associated with a move towards 
funding, notably through defined contribution funds. Our analysis 
suggests that ageing could put downward pressure on expected 
returns. In effect, adverse movements in stock prices and bond 
yields as pension funds become net sellers while the high saving 
cohort is small would have repercussions for retirement wealth, 
leaving retirees with smaller than expected net assets. Funding 
finds it difficult to allow for the risk of extreme market volatility 
when expectations and investors’ asset allocations change. 
(Davis and Li, 2002: 33 [Italics added]) 
This concern is based on the lifecycle theory of saving (refuted in chapter 2, section 3), 
in which the retired are assumed to decumulate assets.  This theory predicts a long 
term bear market as the baby-boomers move into retirement and begin to liquidate 
their non-liquid capital market assets.  As chapter 2 described, predictions of savings 
levels over time and across nations based on demography and the LCT have not been 
accurate.  As such, these predictions can only be treated as speculative.   
However, the concern is notable for two reasons.  First, it is important to recognise 
that the retirement income policy proposed by neoliberals as a solution for aging also 
requires income flow from working to retired generations.  The primary difference is 
that it does so via asset markets instead of direct transfer.  The transfer is therefore 
dependent on asset prices which, as we have seen, are subject to substantial and rapid 
fluctuation.  Samuelson saw unfunded pension systems as benign pyramid schemes.  
Minns notes that funded pension systems are also grand pyramid schemes (Minns, 
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2001: 120-4).  The market mechanism through which the scheme operates obscures 
the underlying transfers and adds both complexity and instability.  
Second, the concern of some pension researchers with demographic change and asset 
prices emphasises the lack of rigour employed by most orthodox economists who 
support NPR based on demographic determinism and the life cycle theory of saving 
but fail to recognise profound risks predicted by these approaches.  Supporters of 
NPR have their cake and eat it, by using the LCT and demography to insist that self-
provision via private personal accounts is a necessary solution, while ignoring the 
long-term asset depreciation that would result if the LCT did actually predict savings 
behaviour. 
3.3 Summary 
Claims that returns from private funded pensions are superior to those of public 
PAYGO systems often overestimate market returns by ignoring data from failed 
markets and from periods of low returns.  Annual volatility in returns is significant 
and is amplified by bull and bear runs rather than smoothed over the medium term.  
These characteristics of market performance will lead to significant disparity in 
returns to private pension members.  The failure of financial markets between the 
World Wars was one factor that encouraged the development of public PAYGO 
pension systems in the USA and several European countries.  Although private funded 
systems are suggested as a solution for aging populations, they are also dependent on 
a flow of capital from working to retired generations - via the exchange of assets on 
capital markets.  If demand for capital assets falls caused by a fall in net saving (as 
predicted by the LCT), asset prices will fall also, resulting in a drop in the standard of 
living for retirees reliant on funded pensions. 
Critics of public PAYGO systems argue that windfall gains to the first retiring 
generation and falling rates of return related to aging cause intergenerational inequity.  
However, there is empirical evidence that rates of return on public PAYGO systems 
have decreased only marginally since formation. A number of factors mitigate against 
the impact of demographic change on intergenerational transfers, including higher 
income levels for younger generations, increased longevity, and the implications of 
public pensions on transfers within families, including inheritance.  Immigration will 
also generally slow the impact of aging.  Public systems in developed countries are 
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demonstrably progressive.  I concur with Diamond, who suggests it is the progressive 
redistribution of public pensions which explains why they are the target of neoliberal 
reformers. 
4 Pension fund investment  
In chapter 2, I argued that NPR does not cause an increase in private or national 
saving.  The build up of assets in private pension funds results not from an increase in 
net saving, but from a redirection of household savings from other savings 
mechanisms to take advantage of tax benefits.  These mechanisms include bank 
accounts and home equity.24  Proponents of NPR argue that increased pension fund 
investment is positive for the financial system and the economy – even without any 
net increase in saving or investment – due to qualitative improvement in investment.  
For example, Catalan et al of the World Bank suggest that: 
The introduction of a funded pension system in the economy will 
increase the demand for risky assets and will develop the stock 
market even when total savings are unchanged (Catalan et al, 
2000: 6). 
The development [of the private pension system] is usually 
accompanied by improvements in financial innovation and 
regulations (including minority shareholders’ protection), 
corporate governance, and overall improvement in financial 
market efficiency (including reduction in transaction costs), 
transparency, and competition. All these effects add depth and 
liquidity to the market and they are extensively discussed in the 
literature. Ultimately, these effects will result in high rates of 
long-term growth. (Catalan et al, 2000: 7) 
The fact that the portfolio weight of long-term bonds is high for 
contractual savings institutions means that the corporate sector 
 
24 The US is unique in this regard due to the level of development of the stock market.  While bank 
accounts and home equity are also the main assets in the US, a relatively high proportion of household 
assets were held in direct shares before the surge in private pension funds that began in the 1970s.  
These holdings are relatively concentrated.  In the US, direct share holding has decreased since the 
mid-1980s, replaced by indirect holdings in mutual funds and pension funds (BGFRS, 2002).  In the 
other Anglo-American countries, the growth of indirect holdings via mutual and pension funds has 
grown in parallel with the increased popularity and profile of the stock market, which in the UK and 
Australia, is closely related to privatisation of government assets.  In these countries, the proportion of 
directly held shares has not fallen, despite the massive increase in the flow of capital to pension funds. 
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will have additional long-term funds to finance their long-term 
production plans. As a consequence, the profit opportunities in 
the corporate sector will induce the entry of new firms that will 
issue both equity and debt, increasing the market capitalization of 
the economy, and thus, the market will become more liquid and 
the value traded in stocks will increase (Catalan et al, 2000: 18). 
Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt (1999), also of the World Bank, place a similar stress on 
financial system development: 
Fully-funded, defined contribution pension systems can lead to 
capital market development by providing a supply of long term 
investible funds.  Institutional investors have contributed heavily 
to the deepening and strengthening of capital markets in 
developed countries. Evidence of this deepening has been noted 
in countries which have undertaken these reforms. (Schwarz and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 1999: 17) 
This section considers the role of pension fund investment in terms of its contribution 
to improvement in the capital stock, boosting economic growth and its impact on 
corporate governance.  Relevant issues include: duplication by pension funds of the 
role of other financial institutions such as banks in debt markets; the level of risk 
aversion and herding in equity markets; the limited extent to which stock markets 
function as a conduit for finance to fund capital investment; and the limited impact on 
governance due to highly diversified holdings. 
4.1 Pension fund investment and economic development 
4.1.1 Financial duplication 
Pension funds are active participants in debt markets, having a significant proportion 
of assets in deposits and negotiable debt securities, such as bonds.  In Australia and 
the US, around 40 per cent of pension fund assets are held in interest bearing 
securities; in the UK slightly less and in Canada slightly more.  However, having 
pension funds as large players in bond markets does not materially affect the 
operation of these markets.  The role of these entities in these markets is essentially 
identical to that of banks and other financial institutions.  The effect on society of 
funds being channelled to these markets via pension funds instead of via banks is 
effectively neutral.  However, pension funds add extra costs in the form of tax 
revenue foregone (see chapter 2) and administration (see chapter 4).  In Australia, 
each is slightly over 1 per cent of GDP. 
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The displacement of bank assets by pension fund assets is obvious in the market for 
mortgage-backed securities.  The securitisation market reached $110 billion in 
Australia in June 2002, 70 per cent of which are mortgage-based issues (RBA, 2002b).  
In Australia, before widespread securitisation, the primary method of saving for most 
families was via equity in the family home and in bank accounts.  Surplus households 
saved at banks which lent to mortgagees.  Now a substantial proportion of saving is 
via superannuation funds, which invest in (among other securities) mortgage-backed 
securities, which provide finance for bank or non-bank lenders, enabling them to 
provide mortgages.  The flow of capital from saving households to deficit households 
is no different, but involves an additional level of intermediation.   
This displacement effect can also be observed in developing countries with private 
pension funds.  In Chile, for example, pension funds hold 95 per cent of mortgage 
backed securities (Vittas, 1998b: 10). 
4.1.2 Herding  
A major area of differentiation between pension funds and other major financial 
institutions such as banks is the relatively high holdings of corporate equities by 
pension funds.  In June 2000, the ABA Financial Accounts record that Australian 
banks held only $A 44 billion out of total assets of $731 billion, or 6 per cent, in 
equities.  By contrast, superannuation funds and life offices held $245 billion out of 
total assets of $482 billion, or 51 per cent in equities (ABS, 2001a).  A shift in 
household saving from banks to pension funds will result in more household savings 
moving through the stock market, rather than debt markets.  This change raises a 
series of important questions: How do pension funds invest in equity markets?  Does 
the flow of funds from pension funds into equity markets represent addition to the 
capital stock?  Does this flow of funds correct a market failure, increase the national 
'growth trajectory' or provide some benefit that justifies the cost of administration, tax 
concessions and compulsion? 
Listed equity markets hold shares issued by enterprises varying greatly in size and 
stage of development.  In the Anglo-American countries, private pension assets are 
held in a plethora of funds, and invested either directly or via a number of 
organisations which specialise in fund management.  Claims have been made that the 
plurality of pension fund management leads to greater investment diversification 
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(Robinson, 1992).  However, the reality is that fund managers respond to similar 
incentives, operate in similar organisational cultures, are evaluated using similar 
techniques, and have similar investment imperatives.  As a result, pension funds 
generally invest in the same manner.  This process is known as 'herding', and is 
recognised by proponents of NPR (Clark, 1998: 24; Vittas, 1998a: 22). 
A Swedish fund manager interviewed by Kent Weaver describes the issues: 
There are drawbacks and positives to this [competition].  The 
positives are that you are much more on your toes to perform 
better.  The risk is that we don’t differentiate ourselves enough, 
that we tend to look at one another and copy each other.  Of 
course that’s part of competition: you look at each other and copy 
the best ideas from competitors… But when it comes to pension 
fund management maybe it’s a good idea if we tried to seek 
different solutions.  The idea of having four separate funds was 
not only to have competition but to have separate solutions, and if 
you look at us, the separateness might be small. (Weaver, 2003b: 
24) 
Pension fund investment is focused on the big end of town.  In a survey of US fund 
managers in April 2000, more than half reported having more than 50 per cent of 
assets in large-cap stocks, while more than 95 percent reported having less than one 
quarter of their shares in mid-cap and small-cap stocks (IIM, 2000). 
Gompers and Metrick (1999) note that, in the USA between 1980 and 1996, the group 
of fund managers with at least $100 million under management nearly doubled their 
share of the common stock market from 1980 to 1996.  By December 1996, these 
institutions held control over more than half of the US equity market.  The largest 100 
alone held 37.1 per cent of the market (Gompers and Metrick, 1999: 4).  Gompers and 
Metrick found that these institutions consistently favoured liquid shares issued by 
larger corporations. 
Maarten Nederlof, Managing Director of Pension Strategies Group, Deutsche Bank, 
estimates that globally, a typical pension fund equity allocation is 70 per cent, and 80 
per cent of that is in large cap stocks.  The implication is that 56 per cent of assets 
held by pension funds is in a 'difficult-to-add value' category (Nederlof, 2000: 9).  
This is another way of saying that investment in these companies does not represent 
addition to the capital stock. 
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Gordon Clark (1998: 22) estimates that pension funds and other institutional investors 
control the majority of stock of the world's 1000 largest corporations.  Richard Minns 
(2001: 170-1) notes that, in the UK, pension funds hold 70 per cent of equity assets in 
the 100 largest companies, which account for two-thirds of total market capitalisation.  
Minns also discusses geographical concentration and industry concentration in 
pension fund holdings in the UK.  Minns notes that the extent to which pension funds 
are invested in banks and other fund managers, raising serious questions in relation to 
governance and accountability in these industries (2001: 172).   
Two important investment imperatives which drive the preference for shares issued by 
large firms are liquidity and diversification.  Pension funds generally aim to have 
relatively low exposure to any stock or sector.  This imperative would tend to spread 
pension fund investment around widely.  However, it is also desirable that pension 
funds not be in an investment position which is difficult to readily liquidate.  This 
restricts investment to popular shares which are traded heavily, and to issues by very 
large firms, in which the relatively large investments made by pension funds do not 
represent significant share holdings.  Pension funds are restricted to investment in 
large firms to avoid the situation where a pension fund must liquidate a significant 
holding, say, 20 or 30 per cent of a stock; a move which would adversely affect 
market price and the value of the investment. 
A major trend in pension fund equity investment which encourages herding is index 
fund or passive (as opposed to active) investment.  The passive investment manager 
attempts to match holdings to the weightings in a major market index in order that 
performance will closely match the index.  Advantages for consumers include 
diversification, low transaction costs and lower cost fund management, as passive 
investment does not require analysis-intensive 'stock-picking'.  Most leading market 
indices are weighted according to market capitalisation, so very large entities such as, 
in Australia, News Corporation or the National Australian Bank, will have a heavy 
weighting and will feature heavily in the holdings of passive investors.  There is, 
therefore, an automatic bias in passive investing towards very large companies.  In the 
UK, around 25 per cent of funds under management are passively invested (Phillips 
and Drew, 1999: 1).  In the USA, passive investing is at around 15 per cent of pension 
fund assets and growing (Institutional Investor, 2000).  In Australia, the level of 
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passive investing is similar to that in the USA and also rising, with some major fund 
managers holding around 50 per cent in passive investment (Hely, 1999: 33). 
Much index fund investment has a bias towards shares issued by the largest 
corporations, as most indices start at the top of the market (in terms of market 
capitalisation) and work down.  For example, in the Australian stock market, the 
leading indices are the ASX/S&P20, ASX/S&P50, ASX/S&P200 and ASX/S&P300, 
holding, respectively, the top 20, 50, 200 and 300 firms listed in Australia.  Capital 
invested against all of these indices focuses on the largest firms due to weighting.  
The combined effect is a still stronger bias, however, as the top two indices exclude 
mid-cap firms altogether.  The effect is yet stronger when international passive 
investing is taken into account.  There are a number of high profile international 
indices which direct investment towards globally dominant firms wherever they are 
based.  Figure 3.2 (below) illustrates the combined impact of domestic and 
international indices on the direction of passive investment.  It is important to note 
that there are also medium and small-cap indices in major markets, although the major 
indices focusing on larger firms attract more capital, particularly of institutional 
investors. 
The effect of passive investment on investment flows is demonstrable in the relative 
pricing of shares moving in and out of leading indices. American research shows 
Price-Earnings ratios are directly effected by inclusion, exclusion or weighting 
revision within major indices (Goetzmann and Massa, 1999: 2). 
 
Figure 3.2 Passive investment and herding 
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The line between passive and active investment is also blurring due to developments 
in both active and passive management.  All investment managers, whether active or 
passive, are judged against the performance of leading market indices.  An 'active' 
investment strategy will therefore begin with a weighting matching the index, and 
then identify areas of improvement, say, sectors or stocks that are over-valued or 
undervalued in the main index.  Much 'active' institutional investment could more 
appropriately be termed 'enhanced passive'.    
The other trend is the development of market indices as commercial products for the 
passive fund investment market.  The main global indices companies – Standard & 
Poor's and Morgan Stanley Capital International – market the indices to passive fund 
managers.  The rules under which firms are weighted in the indices are claimed to be 
increasingly sophisticated, filtered for appropriate size, liquidity, foreign ownership 
constraints, and even strategic and growth potential. 
MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International), producer of the globally recognised 
'MSCI World', recently completed a review of its methodology (MSCI, 2000).  The 
changes to its MSCI weightings formulae, phased in between November 2001 and 
May 2002, had direct implications for the pricing of major firms, and even whole 
national markets.  A Sydney-based broking firm estimated that half of the world's 
index funds changed to the new MSCI weightings, implying $1.4 billion of buying 
and $600 million in selling in Australia alone (SMH, 22/5/2002).   
The notion that pension fund investment in equities could in any respect be correcting 
a market failure in those markets does seem absurd, given that much pension fund 
investment is herded to match the weighting of major indices, thereby replicating and 
amplifying existing patterns of investment. 
4.1.3 As a source of capital investment 
Most OECD countries have a relatively high replacement rate public pension system.  
However, proponents of neoliberal pension reform (NPR), including the World Bank, 
argue that a multipillar system emphasising concessionally taxed private provision is 
more appropriate.  An important argument raised in support of private pension 
systems is that they facilitate increased investment.  It is argued that increased 
investment adds to the capital stock, generating higher rates of return for members 
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and higher productivity and economic growth for society.  This chapter explores these 
arguments. 
There were high expectations in Australia during the 1980s and 1990s that pension 
funds would provide support for the country's lagging venture capital industry, based 
on the observations that pension funds have long-term liabilities and are pooled 
investors, and are therefore ‘uniquely suited to high risk investment’ (Jones, 1992: 85).  
In the late-1990s, the dot.com stock boom lent credence to academic and media 
commentators claiming pension funds were a source of venture finance.  Both Clark 
(2001a) and Bloomestein (2001a) tie pension fund investment to the dot.com boom 
and the stock market. 
Whereas the new economy could be seen as a technological 
phenomenon, it is also a financial phenomenon being driven by 
venture capital, stock-options, and IPOs.  Behind the new 
economy are financial intermediaries, institutional investors and 
pension funds (Clark, 2001a: 7). 
As a consequence of the increased demand for long-term assets 
by institutional asset managers and households, the increased 
institutionalisation of savings has, in turn, led to an increased 
supply of long-term funds, including risk capital.  This increase 
in the supply of risk capital has stimulated new businesses and 
job growth. Increasingly pension funds have been investing in 
blue-chips and small caps.  In addition, a part of their huge 
portfolios has been allocated to so-called "alternative" investment 
projects such as venture capital operations, including dot.com 
projects.  (Bloomestein, 2001a: 13) 
Evidence of pension fund support for venture capital is largely anecdotal.  Empirical 
studies suggest a trivial level of support.  Even in the US, the original home of venture 
capital, institutional investors (including but not limited to pension funds) are only the 
eighth largest source of finance for formal venture capital (Heard and Sibert, 2000: 
15).25  Sources of funding for formal venture capital that rank ahead of institutional 
investors include foundations, allocated state funds, dedicated state revenues, 
investment tax credits, credit enhanced notes (state mediated debt instruments), 
individual investors, and banks (Heard and Sibert, 2000: 15).  The list is evidence of 
 
25 The formal VC sector excludes 'business angel'-type VC investment by wealthy individuals, which is 
equal to or greater than the formal sector. 
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substantial government support for what is portrayed as a triumph of entrepreneurship 
and private risk capital. 
SME equity finance, being high risk, long-term and illiquid, is at odds with the 
pension fund investment philosophy.  Investments can usually only be realised after 
several years, and most individual investments fail.  The management of investments 
in this area, particularly in early-stage and technology-based companies, is highly 
labour intensive.  The fact that the requirements of VC investing and the capabilities 
of pension funds were incompatible was known to industry practitioners by the early 
1990s.  Thom observed that pension funds simply do not have the credit skills held by 
banks needed to provide risk capital to small businesses (Thom, 1992: 60).  In 1997, 
the banking sector was still the main provider of finance (in the form of debt) to small 
business (RBA, 1997a). 
Pension funds in Australia (Jones, 1992: 92) and in the UK (Wheelan, 2000) made 
small commitments to venture capital in the 1980s, but were generally disappointed 
with results relative to other assets, such as the stock market, which provided 
spectacular returns during that period. The conservatism of pension funds and life 
insurance was well recognised in other countries.  Susan St John explains that part of 
the reason for private pension funds not receiving concessional tax treatment in New 
Zealand was related to the strong public perception of conservatism in investment (St. 
John, 2001).   
Frustration with the tendency of pension funds to be more willing to invest in global 
equities than in local industry is expressed even by the Swedish Prime Minister Göran 
Persson who argues that a pensioner depends not only on “the yield in state pension 
funds, but also that Sweden has a functioning industry that pays taxes in Sweden.  
That is the crucial security for me as a pensioner.” (Svenson, 2001, cited in Weaver, 
2003b) 
Current commitment to venture capital in Australia is very low.  At the end of 
financial year 2001, the VC industry had raised less than $A 1.5 billion (AVCAL, 
2001).  This figure represents around one quarter of one per cent of total pension 
assets.  The level of commitment to genuine high-risk VC would be substantially 
lower than this, as VC funds have other sources of finance, and the AVCAL data 
includes much medium-risk investment such as leveraged management buy-outs.  
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Notwithstanding the low level of actual commitment to venture capital, the pension 
fund industry has long recognised the public relations value of risk finance.  In the 
1980s, the Life Insurance Federation of Australia (LIFA) estimated total investment 
by life insurance offices and superannuation funds in venture capital of $A 850 
million (Jones, 1992: 85), at a time when investment in the entire venture capital 
industry was estimated to be as low as $A 150 million. 
On listed equity markets, as noted above, herding is observed in pension fund 
investment that directs capital flows towards issues by large firms.  Large companies 
are a major source of innovation and economic expansion.   If these large firms issued 
new stock to finance commercial expansion, pension fund capital would be used to 
increase the value of the capital stock.  However, as I argue below, large companies 
may not need new equity to finance innovation and expansion programs.  In the US, a 
relatively mature equity market, net equity issues on stock markets are negative.  In 
countries with growing equities markets, including Australia, the UK and the 
developing world, issues are positive, but include large transactions that are disguised 
corporate restructures, including privatisations and demutualisations. 
Large, innovative, market leading firms may not require equity finance to fund 
expansion.  If well managed, they may be able to fund these programs out of 
operational cashflow.  Large companies also have better access to debt markets, 
including junk bond markets.  Pension fund capital does also acquire these securities.  
However, in so doing, as discussed above, they are competing directly against banks 
and other financial institutions which are established sources of demand in these 
markets.  Finally, large firms systematically buy back shares, partly as a tax-effective 
method of returning capital to investors, and partly in order to manipulate share prices 
upwards to boost executive stock option remuneration.  Buy-backs create an 
additional source of demand for the stock, and are recognised by markets as a vote of 
confidence by executives in the stock (Innis, 19/6/2002). 
Johnson & Johnson (J&J), the large US pharmaceutical company, illustrates each 
point.  The company is highly innovative, with an R&D budget representing 10 per 
cent of sales and 60 per cent of net earnings (J&J, 2001: 6).  Sales revenue is 
dominated by new products.  However, the sources of funding for this innovation 
program are essentially internal.  Due to monopoly patent rights on medical products, 
the company books gross margins of around 70 per cent (some external estimates are 
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closer to 90 per cent).  In effect, a major part of the free cashflow from its current 
generation of products on sale is used to fund research (and acquisition) to create 
future generations of products.  This is a constant process of reinvestment – a 
controlled, successful form of venture capital manageable in large part due to J&Js 
established international distribution network. 
Between 1984 and 1993, a period in which the J&J share price increased five-fold, the 
company returned $US 2.5 billion to markets in buy-backs, above and beyond regular 
dividend payments (J&J, 2001: 20).   Between 1996 and 2000 (inclusive), historical 
cashflow accounts show it returned another $US 3.8 billion in share buy-backs, along 
with $US 6.6 billion in dividends (J&J, 2001: 7).  The company also made use of 
short-term and long-term debt markets, with total transactions in debt markets of 
between $US 1 and $5 billion.  However, these debt transactions largely netted out, 
with the result that J&J's net impact on capital markets was to supply cash and 
demand (principally equity) securities.  J&J is mostly owned by institutional investors, 
including pension funds, but the flow of capital from these funds into J&J shares does 
not represent a flow of capital to J&J, and does not finance addition to the capital 
stock.  J&J could function effectively without any additional external financing. 
Far from issuing new stock, companies like J&J are de-issuing stock.  As a result, 
while the demand for these securities from pension funds and other investors is 
increasing, the supply, far from increasing as Bloomestein (2001a) optimistically 
suggests, is actually decreasing.  For this reason, US Flow of Funds accounts 
produced by the Federal Reserve show that net issues (issues minus buy-backs) have 
not been positive for any of the last twenty years, including during the dot.com boom 
from 1995 to 2000 (BGFRS, 1980-2002: Table F101-1).  New, smaller growth 
companies do make new stock issues, including IPOs (initial public offers).  However, 
these transactions are dwarfed by the massive buy-backs of established market leaders 
like J&J.  Additionally, the effect of these smaller issues on pension fund acquisition 
is marginal, as pension fund asset allocation to small-cap shares is very low. 
In the UK and Australia, equity markets have grown more rapidly during the 1980s 
and 1990s than in the US, as they were less developed before this period (World Bank, 
2001).  In the UK and Australia, net issues have been consistently positive.  However, 
Minns (2001: 111) notes another reason why stock issues have a much lower impact 
on capital markets than they would appear to: many issues are related to corporate 
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restructure, not finance for investment.  During the 1990s in the UK and Australia, 
aggregate new issues on both major and emerging markets have been dominated by a 
few large transactions unrelated to external financing.  These are corporate 
restructures, including demutualisations and privatisations, and issues to fund 
corporate mergers and acquisitions.  Minns notes that during demutualisation (notable 
in insurance in Australia and the UK), far from the entity drawing in additional 
finance, members receive cash from the entity.  Privatisations involve new issues on 
stock markets.  However, the new stock issues are offset by retired government debt 
or reduced future government borrowing on bond markets.  Depending on the 
valuation of the debt and equity, the net effect of the corresponding transactions may 
be low or negative.  In Australia, the Reserve Bank observes that governments made 
$A 60 billion from privatisation during the 1990s, and that  
the equity market has been a major beneficiary of privatisation, 
which has boosted both market capitalisation and liquidity. 
Former PTEs [private trading enterprises] now listed on the stock 
exchange currently account for about 10 per cent of the 
capitalisation of the Australian share market (1997b: 12). 
Neoliberal experts have argued that the lack of supply of quality assets, particularly 
but not only in developing countries, can be addressed via a program of privatisation.  
Bloomestein of the OECD argues that such a strategy can "kill two birds with one 
stone", meaning that radical neoliberal reformers can simultaneously achieve two key 
goals: an end to both public pensions and public ownership of productive assets 
(Bloomestein, 1998).  This statement underlines the powerful ideological role of 
private pension systems, and their promotion by the IFIs.  This role is investigated 
more fully in chapter 6.  
The 'two birds' strategy has been widely adopted in Latin America.  In Chile, pension 
fund equity holdings are 90 per cent privatised companies (Minns, 2001: 112).  While 
the Chilean reform is held up as a model for emulation, Palmer and Fox report that 
40% of returns during the early 1990s were from two previously state-owned energy 
companies (Fox and Palmer, 2001 :10).  Studart describes similarly close links 
between privatisation and the growth of pension funds in Brazil (Studart, 2000: 36).  
A similar policy was adopted in Kazakhstan, in which the only assets available for the 
new private pension system to acquire were either government securities or issues in 
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previously government-owned corporations.  The pension reform plan involved 
privatisation of public mining and financial companies (Andrews, 2000: 39). 
That fact that privatisation is suggested by neoliberals as a method of contriving a 
supply of securities to match pension fund demand is an admission of policy failure.  
The reorganisation of the pension system has no positive impact on investment in the 
underlying economy, but instead justifies other neoliberal policies.   
The need for such a strategy recognises that increased demand for securities on capital 
markets caused by increased institutional savings will not cause a corresponding 
increase in the supply of new securities issues, nor stimulate underlying economic 
development.  The rise in prices on stock markets to 2000 represented inflation of the 
capital stock rather than its expansion.  Rather than addressing market failures in 
listed equity markets, the focused demand of pension funds on large-cap equities has 
contributed to this process. 
4.1.4 As an indirect source of capital investment 
The focused demand of pension funds generates premium prices for liquid securities 
issued by large firms.  As discussed above, this flow of capital largely does not 
represent addition to the capital stock, because it does not fund firm creation or 
expansion.  It is possible that the premium on the shares of leading companies caused 
by institutional investment patterns does create a strong incentive to create successful 
new start-ups which might eventually be floated.  In support of such an effect, there is 
evidence of a relationship between sentiment on the stock market and the level of 
venture capital activity.  The venture capital industry gained from the dot.com share 
market boom of the late 1990s, growing more than five fold between 1998 and 2001, 
from $266 million to $1.4 billion (AVCAL, 2001).  In the US, VC funding mirrored 
the dot.com boom upwards and down again.  VC funding increased from $21 billion 
in 1998, to $55 billion in 1999 to $107 billion in 2000, before dropping rapidly in 
2001 and 2002 to pre-1998 levels. 
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Figure 3.3 Venture capital and the dot.com stock boom 
Source: (Metzger and Reyes, 2002) 
Three comments can be made about this indirect mechanism to encourage the 
provision of risk capital.  First, it is indirect and inefficient.  The financial might of the 
pension funds is first misdirected in order to create incentives which may lead 
eventually to the intended outcome.  If a farmer had a source of water and wished to 
irrigate, it would make sense to pipe water to the fields directly, rather than build a 
brewery, use the water to brew beer, have a party with the beer and let the guests 
urinate on the fields.  It is a capital flow 'trickle down' effect to which J.K. Galbraith's 
comment applies: "if the horse is fed enough oats, some will eventually pass through 
to the road for the sparrows" (Globe & Mail, 22/7/2002).   
Second, to the extent that this method of trickle down finance for productive 
investment actually operates, the distribution of benefits works in favour of 
entrepreneurs, early stage investors and agents (brokers and underwriters), rather than 
pension fund savers, who, in buying in after the early growth phase, miss the most 
rapid gain, but realise the investment of the earlier groups. 
Third, indirect provision of venture capital is highly volatile.  As figure 3.3 shows, 
venture capital funding has collapsed following the stock market collapse in March 
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2000.  This is an undesirable fluctuation in investment in innovation, which is a major 
driver of economic growth and employment. 
4.2 Governance 
Much has been made of how rapidly increasing pension fund holdings could 
potentially affect corporate performance via direct shareholding. The UK peak body 
for socially responsible investment presents the highly optimistic position that pension 
funds will take an holistic view of investment: 
For long-term investors such as pension funds, there is clearly a 
case for encouraging companies to pursue a model of 
development which strengthens, rather than undermines the 
social and environmental fabric in which they must operate 
(JustPensions, 2001: 4). 
A more conservative, though still positive expectation, is that pension fund investment 
will have strategic and procedural benefits for firms.  Impersonal professional 
directors may be expected to require best practice in financial stability, management 
structure, long-term strategic focus, employment practices and training, and 
accounting standards (Devesa-Carpio and Vidal-Meliá, 2002: 25).  Negative 
expectations relate to the lack of industry-specific managerial experience, the short-
termism of financial management overcoming longer-term strategic considerations.  
Concerns have been expressed over the concentration of economic power in the hands 
of financial technocrats who are not themselves shareholders, and who appear to have 
no concern for the 'social and environmental fabric' in which they operate (Nitsch and 
Schwarzer, 1996)  
There is little evidence that pension funds as shareholders exert pro-active influence 
over firm management.  This is largely because, in keeping with the investment 
philosophy of liquidity and diversification, fund managers attempt to keep 
shareholdings at relatively small levels.  Diversification requires that holdings are 
kept at low levels as a proportion of total fund assets, which implies that an individual 
fund's equity holdings will be spread over many firms.  Liquidity requires that 
holdings are kept at a low level as a proportion of total shares issued by the firm.  A 
large shareholding in a company is relatively illiquid because attempting to sell a part 
or all of the shareholding will tend to effect total trades in the share, leading to a price 
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fall which would discount its value.  Relatively small shareholdings will reduce the 
incentive and ability of an individual fund to have direct input to firm management. 
These issues are discussed in research into pension funds in the UK by Faccio and 
Lazfer (2001).  As pension fund shareholdings are split to avoid large holdings, the 
effort required to actively monitor the management of each firm is prohibitively costly.  
They also found that funds avoid public intervention, such as criticism at board 
meetings, because it draws attention to a company, which lowers its share price.  
Faccio and Lazfer conclude that having a large degree of pension fund ownership on 
the shareholder register does not positively affect firm performance, though the 
authors do not report a negative effect either (Faccio and Lazfer, 2001: 22). 
A major Swedish fund adopted a set of guidelines for investment following a 
‘negative screening’ socially-responsible investment approach.  Companies were 
ranked according to various social criteria, including use of child labour and 
environmental impacts, and investment in poor performers was discouraged for five 
years.  However the fund maintained investment in gambling, alcohol and weapon 
producers in which the Swedish government had an interest, the General Manager 
arguing that a consistent approach would also require divestment of Swedish 
government bonds (Weaver, 2003b: 22).  In any case, for such an approach to be 
adopted at the national level would contravene the dominant ‘prudent man’ 
philosophy.  Furthermore, recent research suggests negative screening has no 
discernible impact on firm behaviour (Gifford, 2003). 
Arguably, pension funds are forced to take a long-term strategic view of firm value 
once they reach a large size relative to the market.  This is because they must 
eventually hold fairly large shareholdings within companies that are heavily weighted 
in major indices, and these holdings cannot easily be sold without moving the market.  
However, the weight of evidence points to continuing short-termism among pension 
funds.  Evidence includes moving from value stocks into growth stocks during the 
technology boom and back again subsequently (IIM, 2000), moving into and out of 
'cyclical stocks' at the end of the 1990s boom and at the end of the 2001 recession 
(SMH, 14/5/2002), Australian funds moving into and out of foreign (particularly US) 
markets (Garnaut, 11/11/2002) and pension funds abandoning equities in ‘emerging 
market’ economies following the East Asian currency crisis in 1996 (Studart, 2002: 
52). 
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More is revealed about this culture in specific instances.  The Boots pension fund in 
the UK took the extraordinary step of selling all of its equity holdings during 2000-
2001 to take advantage of the high price of equities and expected lower returns.  It 
also promoted its strategy widely in both the mass financial media and pension 
economics research media (Ralfe, 2001).26  The intention of taking such a radical 
strategy (most funds in the UK hold between 60 and 75 per cent of assets in equities) 
and making it public seems to be to encourage a generalised movement, which would 
sell down the price of stocks.  The effect on capital markets in the UK (and globally) 
of a generalised movement by pension funds out of equities would be catastrophic.  
Such a strategy “forgets”, as Keynes suggested, "that there is no such thing as 
liquidity of investment for the community as a whole" (1936: 155).  Nonetheless, 
following from Boots’ success, pension funds around the world – especially small and 
medium finds – will try to repeat the move by swinging in and out of equities to take 
advantage of speculative booms.  One possible implication of this trend is stronger 
commitment among pension funds to investments in derivatives based on the future 
values of securities. 
There is anecdotal evidence that growing pension fund shareholding does have an 
effect on the culture of management.  The mechanism of control is the collective 
power that a group of institutional investors has on management due to a similar 
perspective of what constitutes appropriate corporate strategy. Pressure is exerted not 
in an interactive and instructive manner, but via the threat or promise of decisions to 
buy, sell or hold stock.  Management keep institutional investors informed of 
developments in private briefing sessions.   
The type of influence exerted by institutional shareholders on management is evident 
in media reports concerning News Corporation during June 2002.  Lachlan Murdoch, 
son and heir of NewsCorp Chairman, Rupert Murdoch, has been under pressure from 
institutional investors over the acquisition by NewsCorp of the Italian pay-TV 
operator Telepiu (Mychasuk, 17/6/2002).  NewsCorp shares fell more than 2 per cent 
in a week, reportedly due to institutional investor disappointment that an earlier 
 
26 John Ralfe has since launched an independent investment consulting firm based on the self-
promotional opportunities associated with this single act of market-timing investment.  See 
http://www.JohnRalfe.com/. 
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commitment to emphasise cost reduction and earnings improvement had apparently 
been ignored.  There is little evidence here that professional fund managers would 
provide the financial support necessary to create a NewsCorp from scratch, inevitably 
involving a much higher level of commercial and technical risks than acquisition of an 
established business. 
These types of intervention are consistent with the analysis of Mike Dempsey (1998), 
who has explored the implications of modern investment theories on corporate 
strategy.  Dempsey interviewed senior management in leading industrial and 
technology companies.  He notes the risk averse behaviours encouraged by use of 
statistical investment analysis such as discounted cashflow (DCF) models, which are 
favoured by pension fund analysts.  The emphasis of institutional shareholders is on 
incremental process improvements, rather than substantial innovation which involves 
risk-taking.  Dempsey notes that senior executives in Japanese companies are aware 
that the post-war industrial miracle in that country would not have occurred had DCF-
style investment evaluation been widely used during the 1960s.  Major long-term 
strategic moves such as Honda entering the markets for motorcycles and trucks could 
not have been supported using DCF analysis, but have led to the establishment of 
globally-competitive industry sectors. 
The strongest indictment of the quality of governance exercised by institutional 
investors has surely come from the failure of these shareholders to control the self-
serving remuneration strategies of senior management during the late 1990s, and 
acting to prevent the series of major corporate collapses in the US and Australia 
during 2001 and 2002.  Retirement savers should be able to expect that professional 
fund managers are capable of assessing the underlying value of acquired assets, and 
assuring senior management is not systematically undermining shareholder value.  
Pension funds have proven incapable of adding even this minimal level of value. 
Pension funds in the US were caught up with the collapses of WorldCom and Enron, 
along with retail investors.  According to the Wall Street Journal:  
Pension fund officials say there was no way they could have 
known that WorldCom, the nation's second-largest long-distance 
telephone company, was hiding nearly $4 billion in expenses 
from the investing public. 
"We're scrutinizing things closer than we might have," said Gary 
Bruebaker, chief investment officer of the Washington State 
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Investment Board. "The trouble is, all we can use is publicly 
available information." (WSJ, 29/6/2002) 
This statement sums up much of the weakness of 'pension fund capitalism'.  Pension 
funds now represent the largest household financial assets and hold between 30 and 
50 per cent of issued corporate securities, but apparently can exercise no more direct 
control over management than small individual investors.  Indeed, to the extent that 
pension funds emphasise corporate strategy oriented to boosting stock price, as Faccio 
and Lazfer (2000) have found, pressure on management from pension funds would 
encourage, not discourage, accounting practices such as the use of reserves to smooth 
earnings, and encourage malpractice, such as capitalisation of expenses and the design 
of corporate structures to conceal liabilities. 
4.3 Summary 
The assets of pension funds are held almost exclusively in cash and marketable 
securities.  This analysis has focused on investment in equities and venture capital, as 
investment by pension funds in cash and marketable debt securities duplicates the 
activities of other major financial institutions, including banks. 
• Investment is governed by a philosophy emphasising liquidity, risk-minimisation  
and diversification. 
• Pension funds provide very little support for venture capital, as it is high risk, low 
liquidity, requires specialist skills, and provided poor returns during the 1980s 
compared with listed equities.  Support for venture capital in Australia is at less 
than half of one per cent of assets.  In the US, institutional investors are only the 
8th largest source of finance for venture capital. 
• Pension funds exhibit herding, the replication of similar investment strategy 
throughout the funds management industry.  This results from generally similar 
investment parameters (diversification and liquidity), similar performance 
evaluation criteria (against leading indices), and the increasing prevalence of 
passive investment. 
5 Conclusions 
Proponents of NPR argue that investment by private pension funds provides benefits 
for individuals and for society.  Pension fund investment is purported to provide 
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higher returns than public systems, boost the capital stock and economic growth and 
improve corporate governance.   
Claims of higher returns in private systems have been found to be based on selective 
data which ignore periods and countries with low returns, and particularly those 
markets which have experienced collapse.  This data also consequently 
underestimates the potentially extreme risks associated with market volatility.  Public 
pension systems insure against these risks.  A number of factors mitigate 
intergenerational inequity due to aging, including higher incomes for younger 
generations and more concentrated inheritance.  
Pension fund investment is risk averse and concentrated on the issues of large firms 
which feature on national and international indices.  The extent to which pension fund 
investment boosts the capital stock appears limited based on analysis of these firms, 
whose aggregate requirement for external finance is negative in the US, and in the UK 
and Australia, largely related to corporate restructure.  Investment by pension funds in 
venture capital is at a trivial level. 
In the area of governance, available evidence points to a short term investment culture.  
The emphasis in pension fund investment on liquidity and diversification acts to 
prevent significant shareholdings that would justify direct long-term interaction with 
management.  There is evidence of fund investment responding to trends and cyclical 
factors.  The short-term stock price focus discourages high-risk long-term strategic 
investment.  Pension fund shareholding does not protect against, and may even 
encourage, unethical accounting and managerial practices. 
Arguments related to returns and to the impact of investment have been treated 
separately in this chapter.  In macro terms, however, the two are directly related.  In 
order to provide returns for members, it is necessary that pension fund investment add 
to the capital stock.  Gains for members achieved during the 1980s and 1990s with 
limited addition to the capital stock have been based essentially on speculative asset 
price rises.  These gains are liable to evaporate, as the period since early 2000 has 
demonstrated. 
 
  102 
 
Chapter 4 Administration 
The price of financial services is of great consequence for 
consumers. Mistakes due to misunderstandings or the expense of 
collecting information can be costly, especially with long-term 
contracts, such as pensions. Furthermore, private pensions will 
for most people be their most valuable asset or second most 
valuable after their home. 
However, measuring the price of financial services is more 
difficult than other goods and services. Fees can take many 
different forms. Different kinds of charges interact and 
accumulate in complex ways, particularly with long-term 
products, such as pensions and life insurance. This often means 
that the price of financial services is not transparent. (Whitehouse, 
2000a: 5). 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described the preferred neoliberal private pension scheme and 
considered investment and rates of return in such schemes in comparison to public 
schemes.  This chapter considers how pensions being delivered by private operators in 
a market setting affects cost and quality.  Proponents argue that a private plural 
structure encourages innovation and price competition.  Detractors point to a number 
of systemic weaknesses.  These include: market failures related to consumers' access 
to and understanding of information; added costs associated with 'competition', such 
as marketing and selling costs; reduced economies of scale; additional administration 
costs borne by individuals and the state; account proliferation; and the reliance of the 
system on the integrity of the financial community. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of orthodox perceptions of competitive 
dynamics in consumer markets.  It reviews the impacts on these dynamics of high 
information cost due to complex products and pricing.  Determinants of the cost of 
pension administration are described.  Evidence of systemic fraud in the financial 
community is reviewed, and the potential impacts on private pensions drawn out.  
Finally, non plural administration systems implemented in Bolivia and Sweden are 
briefly reviewed.  These systems facilitate private fund management, but competition 
is organised by the state in an institutionalised auction rather than a consumer market.  
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2 Information cost 
Private pension provision in the Anglo-American countries is organised in a low 
regulation, plural, competitive market.  A similar structure is in operation in most 
developing and transition countries whose pension policies have had input from the 
World Bank.  The assumption underlying this delivery structure is that the market will 
discipline suppliers into providing optimal services at an efficient price.  This requires 
that markets are competitive, as predicted by orthodox theory, with consumers 
actively comparing providers, products and pricing.   
The emergence and growth of private pension systems occurred during the 1980s and 
1990s when the perception that financial markets were over-regulated held sway.  
Deregulation was perceived to have a variety of benefits.  The ‘Wallis Report’, a 
government inquiry into the financial system in 1996/97, had this to say about 
historical and prospective deregulation. 
Deregulation [following publication of the ‘Campbell Report’ – 
(Australian Financial System Inquiry, 1981)] stimulated change 
in the financial landscape in two respects. First, it focused 
innovation on the delivery of financial services rather than on the 
unproductive activity of circumventing outdated regulations. 
Secondly, it created a more competitive environment in financial 
markets. Nonetheless, the financial system remains subject to a 
wide array of regulations and entry restrictions and there is scope 
to encourage greater competition and efficiency through further 
regulatory reform. (Financial System Inquiry, 1997: 5) 
The perceived connection between deregulation, competition and efficiency is clear.  
However, it has long been recognised that consumer markets are not necessarily 
competitive or efficient.  Scitovsky (1944) found differences in prices in consumer 
markets that could not be explained by differences in quality.  This result has been 
confirmed in many studies since (Kerton, 1998: 12).  The notion of the market tending 
to an equilibrium price where marginal cost equals average cost is dependent on an 
auction-type bidding process with many buyers and sellers such that none can 
individually influence price.  Other necessary assumptions including low fixed costs, 
decreasing returns to scale and free and instantly available information.  There are few 
real-life examples of such a market.  In most consumer markets, buyers and sellers are 
dispersed geographically and products may or may not be directly comparable.  
Consumers must spend time and effort to find, understand and compare alternatives.  
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The decision whether to 'search' or not – to incur information cost (Stigler, 1961), – 
becomes an economic decision distinct from the decision to purchase.   
The decision to search is complicated by uncertainty.  A shopper may buy a known 
product at a known price here and now, or spend time and effort looking for a better 
product/price.  The level of benefit from the search is unknown and must be estimated.  
The consumer is aware the benefit may be low or even zero, resulting in wasted effort.  
A market will include buyers prepared to research purchases to varying degrees.  As a 
result of uncertainty over potential benefits, many worthwhile searches are not 
conducted. Marketing strategies which target 'inefficient' shoppers will hence provide 
super returns. 
Inefficient pricing has generally not proven a persuasive argument in favour of 
regulation of consumer markets.  The diligent consumer can, at least in theory, 
overcome information cost.  And despite its flaws, the consumer market is seen as a 
least worst solution; that is, preferable to regulation.  As I argue below, however, 
pension administration has several structural characteristics which make a consumer 
market an inappropriate organising mechanism.  These features were finally 
recognised by World Bank researchers in a recent technical paper which found that an 
‘institutional market’ such as that implemented by the Swedish was substantially more 
efficient than a consumer market (James et al, 2001).  The defining features of the 
Swedish institutional market are discussed in section 7 of this chapter. 
Information cost is extremely high in the private pension market.  Factors which 
contribute to the cost include: the proliferation of suppliers, the heterogeneity of 
suppliers, the complexity of products and pricing, the lack of product transparency 
and the complexity of relevant regulations and tax law.  There is ample evidence that 
many customers do not actively ‘purchase’ pensions, taking default options instead.  
Those that do ‘actively purchase’ often misunderstand products and invest poorly as a 
consequence.  These are more important issues than inefficiencies in other consumer 
markets because apparently small differences in price compound over time with 
potentially dramatic effects on retirement accumulation.  The state has a responsibility 
to ensure fair and efficient outcomes because it creates, shapes and promotes private 
pension systems.  Finally, the industry delivers products that are too important for 
individuals and society to be allowed to be organised so inefficiently. 
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The analysis in this chapter is based primarily on the Australian market, supplemented 
by data from other private pension systems. 
3 Products 
Private pension products are complex.  This is partly due to the inherent challenges of 
financial investment, and partly related to specific features of pensions, such as 
unique industry structure, tax treatment and product add-ons, including insurance. 
Private pension assets are held in pooled, diversified investment vehicles broadly 
equivalent to mutual or managed funds.  As a form of indirect investment, the burden 
of many tasks associated with direct investment, such as selecting individual 
securities and executing transactions, is removed.  However, the ease of indirect 
investment is deceptive.  The consumer must choose the type of fund (determining the 
mixture of assets) and the provider.  Indirect investment, especially in equities or 
overseas assets, holds most of the risks of direct investment, with dramatic gains and 
losses possible in relatively short periods.   
3.1 Constrained provider choice 
The Australian market for retirement savings products is complex.  While 'Choice of 
Fund' is government policy (Costello, 1997), the industry has developed iteratively, 
resulting in a market partially segmented by regulation and incumbency.  Not all 
providers face direct competition for all business.  Public sector funds, corporate 
funds and industry funds each have areas of business with little or no overlap with 
other providers.  Many customers, particularly while employed by a given employer, 
must accept the fund chosen by their employer.  Portability is improving, but 
obstacles remain to shifting and combining funds, particularly when an employee 
changes profession or industry.   
This structure does not remove choice from the market; it merely constrains when and 
how the choice can be made.  It is typical for an employee to be forced to hold an 
account with a given provider while with one employer, but not be able to continue to 
contribute to that account when they cease employment with that employer.  Ideally, 
when changing jobs, the individual would roll-over balances from one employer 
nominated fund to the next.  However, due to fund rules, the individual may not be 
allowed to rollover sums either from the old employer nominated fund, or to the new 
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employer nominated fund.  Fund rules often treat balances from alternate sources27 
differently, allowing some funds to be rolled-over and others not.  The transfer is also 
complicated where an individual becomes unemployed, or has multiple employers.  
With generally shorter average employment periods and growing casual and part-time 
employment, it is necessary for individuals to recurrently make pension investment 
choices, though often with only a fraction of their retirement savings.  Exit fees, 
frequently up to 5 per cent on some retail accounts, also add to the transaction cost of 
account consolidation. 
In combination with a widespread apathy in relation to retirement saving, complex 
rules associated with pensions and compelled fund changes at inconvenient times 
result in account proliferation, discussed in section 5. 
3.2 Product choice 
Making a choice about the appropriate pension fund is a complex, and arguably 
impossible, task.  It requires a range of specialist skills and knowledge.  It certainly 
requires an understanding of the individual's personal financial situation, including 
current asset holdings, disposable income and planned retirement age.  Issues which 
bear on the choice of investment fund type include weightings of asset classes, a 
preference for passive or active investment and an understanding of investment 
strategies such as 'buy and hold' or market timing.  Poor decisions regarding type of 
fund can have a rapid, negative and irreversible effect on retirement accumulation. 
A basic understanding of the pension industry value-chain is necessary to analyse 
providers.  The two main value-add components - fund management and account 
administration - are separate functions.  Both may be internal or outsourced to 
consultants.  Evaluation of performance and cost in each area should be considered 
separately, though this is often difficult to establish given published information, and 
may change over time.  Indeed, the question of how to evaluate fund managers is as 
yet unresolved in investment theory.  Important issues include whether or not passive 
investment is superior to active investment, whether past performance is a guide to 
 
27 Types of contributions include employee compulsory contributions, employee voluntary 
contributions, employer contributions and Award-based productivity components. 
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future performance, and, if so, how to separate 'the signal' (good investment) from 'the 
noise' (lucky investment).   
Research in the UK, for example, suggests that, on a fund by fund basis, historical 
performance is not a useful guide to future performance (Rhodes, 2000: 5). In 
Australia, a preliminary paper by Hazel Bateman and Olivia Mitchell found evidence 
of a negative relationship between price and net returns among superannuation funds 
(Bateman and Mitchell, 2002: 11).  These findings make it unclear how even a very 
well informed consumer should evaluate fund options. 
Products are further complicated by tax treatment.  In the Australian market, 
superannuation, retirement savings accounts, and life insurance are all taxed at 
different stages and rates.28  There is a longer list of products with varying tax 
treatment in the American market.  In any case, the private pension customer must be 
aware of varying tax treatment of competing products in order to make an informed 
and efficient decision.  Finally, when purchasing pension products, customers must 
also make a decision about difficult to value add-on features such as death and 
disability insurance. 
Decisions over fund type and product type are non-trivial.  They have a direct impact 
on the price and form of the product, which can have a significant affect on retirement 
accumulation.  The relationship between fund type and price is discussed in section 
4.4. 
4 Pricing 
4.1 Complexity 
Pricing structures represent an additional layer of complexity.  Pension funds can have 
fees levied at four stages: account establishment, contribution, periodic (asset-based) 
and exit.  Charges at each of the four stages can be either flat (dollar-based), variable 
(percentages) or a combination of both.  Some providers separate the charges for 
account administration and fund management; others do not.  Many funds, especially 
retail funds, also have additional stepped penalty rates for small accounts and/or 
 
28 Tax rates also depend on whether benefits are taken as lump sums or annuities. 
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stepped discount rates for large accounts.29   The various stages and methods of 
levying fund charges create a large number of possible fee structures.  Each product 
has a virtually unique pricing mechanism.   
Understanding the pricing structure only gets the customer half-way to understanding 
the cost.  The actual cost of the product will depend on a range of variables in the 
future which must be estimated at the outset, including career contributions 
(dependent on household earnings and contribution rates), length of working life, 
length of retirement, and rates of return on assets (Whitehouse, 2000a: 11).  To 
compare products effectively would require a financial model for each product with 
base assumptions for the relevant variables, and sensitivity analysis to cater for 
alternate circumstances. 
Figure 4.1 Negative impact on final accumulation of different annual asset-based 
fees with different annual gross returns 
 
Annual Gross Real Returns Annual asset-
based fees 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 
0.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0.5% 11% 11% 11% 12% 12% 12% 
1.0% 20% 21% 21% 22% 22% 23% 
1.5% 28% 29% 30% 31% 32% 32% 
2.0% 35% 36% 38% 39% 39% 40% 
2.5% 41% 43% 44% 45% 46% 47% 
3.0% 47% 49% 50% 51% 52% 53% 
Source: Author's calculations.30 
                                                 
29 Examples from the Australian market are discussed in section 4.4.3, below. 
30 The table displays the reduction in final accumulation resulting due to the annual asset-based fees in 
the left-hand column being deducted from the gross annual real returns in the top row.  The table 
displays output using these variables as input to a formula for future value: FV = PMT * (GR – A) ^ P, 
where FV is future value, PMT is annual contribution, GR is gross returns, A is Administration Fees 
and P is period.  The period used is 40 years.  PMT is set at 9% (the current contribution rate of 
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Finally, administration and fund management costs are not necessarily made explicit.  
In Australia, the UK and the US, some costs are kept hidden from the consumer.  For 
example, payments to brokers by consultant fund managers may be bundled with 
payments for research (Davis, 2001: 27).  Alternately, these costs may be subtracted 
from income 'above the line' of gross returns, making it unclear to the consumer 
where the line is between returns and administration cost.  A range of transaction 
costs, including stamp duty and legals, are treated in this fashion by Australian 
industry funds with external fund managers.  Steven Wynn argues that in the UK and 
the US, hidden costs include research and other services purchased from brokers that 
are not paid for explicitly (Wynn, 2002).  The outcome of the opacity of cost 
structures is that consumers are not aware of how much they are paying for fund 
management. 
The lack of transparency in fund pricing structures makes price differences difficult to 
detect, but it does not make them trivial.  Small differences in percentage charges 
have a substantial effect on retirement accumulation.  The output of calculations in 
Figure 4.1 suggest that each half per cent rise in annual asset based charges will result 
in a 6-9 per cent drop in final accumulation.   
4.2 Consumer skills and motivation 
As discussed, effective comparison of private pension products and pricing clearly 
requires considerable financial skill.  There is evidence that most consumers lack the 
necessary skills.  
Under current Australian legislation, super funds must provide the consumer with a 
“Key Features Statement” which contains all relevant consumer information.  Ross 
Clare reports that formal comprehension testing commissioned by ASFA (Australian 
Superannuation Funds Association) found that neither the current lay-out, nor an 
experimental new lay-out, produced adequate comprehension levels, or allow 
 
Australian superannuation) of a constant representing real income.  The intermediary output therefore 
is in the form of a multiple of median income.  The output displayed shows the percentage lost due to 
administration cost against the hypothetical case in which there are no fees. 
This approach is a slight abstraction in that real income increases over time.  However, the alternate 
approach of calculating a median income which grows over time produces very nearly identical results. 
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informed comparison between products.  Even use of the heading "Key Features 
Statement" was not well-understood (Clare, 2001: 38). 
ASFA's findings in relation to financial skills are grim.  The survey found that most 
Australians have difficulty understanding fees expressed as percentages (Clare, 2001: 
40), although this is the most meaningful way for certain fees to be expressed.  This 
suggests that these consumers would be incapable of comparing products with 
complicated pricing involving both fixed and percentage components, especially 
considering that fees based on contributions and fees based on assets are not directly 
comparable.  This type of finding has led to fees commonly being published for 
comparison in dollar terms based on a hypothetical account balance and contribution 
levels.  But these examples may be misleading, as they would only reflect the 
circumstances of some consumers. 
A recent report into financial literacy by Roy Morgan commissioned by ANZ Bank 
made a number of findings which confirm that a majority of Australians have no 
effective understanding of pension products and pricing. 
The survey highlighted limited awareness of fees, charges and 
taxes in relation to superannuation: 
- fifty-five per cent (55%) of fund members claimed to know 
little or nothing about the fees and charges that apply to 
superannuation; and 
- only 54% of those with superannuation were aware that it is 
taxed at a lower rate than other investments. (RMR, 2003: 7:) 
Studies of financial skills in other countries support the notion that consumers are ill-
equipped to evaluate private pension products.  Kevin James of the UK Financial 
Services Authority writes: 
Surveys of investor knowledge in both the UK and the US 
consistently find that retail investors do not understand how 
disclosed charges affect performance, let alone the pound and 
pence cost of that performance impact.  
Consequently, retail investors now lack the information and 
knowledge they need to evaluate the investment funds they must 
choose between. Choosing funds on the basis of imperfect 
information and imperfect knowledge potentially imposes 
significant costs upon retail investors. (James, 2000: 6-7) 
A study by the US Securities and Exchange Commission found that 50 per cent of 
American adults did not know the difference between a stock and bond (cited in 
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Diamond 2000f: 8).  As these are basic financial instruments with fundamentally 
different historical rates of return, risk-profiles and tax treatment, it follows that these 
individuals would struggle to make informed choices about fund type.  Markets 
include far more complicated securities than these basic kinds.  An associate of mine 
who works as an information officer at a finance company finds the naiveté of 
customers extreme, recalling the following conversation with a potential client 
requesting information about an Australian property trust prospectus: 
Potential investee:  "Is this prospectus intended to finance one 
property development?" 
Information officer:  “Yes, that's correct." 
Potential investee:  “How much are the units each?” 
Information officer:  “The units are $1 each.” 
Potential investee:  “Only $1 per unit?!  How many are there?” 
Information officer:  “There are 11 million units in this issue.” 
Potential investee:  “11 million units?!  How do they get that many 
units in one building?” 
 
Research by Anna-Maria Lusardi suggests that the process of obtaining and 
evaluating relevant information can be an unpleasant task for consumers with little 
financial literacy (2001: 10). Lusardi also found that financial skills are correlated 
with educational attainment (2001: 9).  Busseri et al (1998, cited in Kerton, 1998: 11) 
found that some consumers are bewildered and disempowered by the market, feeling 
that the outcome of transactions are "beyond their control."   
Findings like these have prompted studies into the effectiveness of financial education.  
Experience with worker education in 401k plans (voluntary pension schemes) in the 
US shows that substantial and expensive worker education is needed to have a 
noticeable effect on workers’ investment choices (Diamond, 2000f: 11).   
A lack of motivation to conduct search and analysis of competing products also has a 
bearing on consumer efficiency.  The rationale for government policy to encourage 
retirement saving is that many people would not otherwise save adequately.  This is 
partly related to a lack of skills, and partly related to a lack of interest in the long-term.  
NPR treats the symptoms rather than the cause of the problem: the government 
encourages and/or forces the population into the private pension market without 
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addressing either the lack of skills or motivation which create the imperative for 
government intervention.   
This has some interesting implications for competitive dynamics in the marketplace, 
particularly by changing the default, 'hands-off' outcome.  Without NPR, few 
disinterested individuals would purchase pension products.  With NPR, the default 
result is purchase of a product that the consumer may know little or nothing about.  
Despite being thrust into the market, financial preparation for retirement remains 'out-
of-sight and out-of-mind' for most people.  These consumers significantly reduce 
competitive pressure on incumbent funds which are selected by employers to be the 
workers' default option.  In American occupational 401k schemes with 'automatic 
enrolment' (similar to automatic employer contribution to superannuation in 
Australia), default levels of saving and investment options are initially taken by 80 per 
cent of employees.  Three years later, 50 per cent of employees still have these 
options (Choi et al, 2002: 2).   
This ‘no look’ consumer behaviour is self-reinforcing.  Despite purchasing certain 
products, these consumers do not go through an active purchase process involving 
product selection.  The customer, despite owning the product, may not become 
familiar with its details (or of competing products) and does not gain the market 
knowledge which normally comes with market participation.  Their lack of skill and 
interest is unchanged by the experience and remains a factor for future activity in the 
market. 
In many employment-base funds in Australia and the US, the employee's choice is 
effectively delegated to the employer.  In this circumstance it is necessary for the 
employer to evaluate the merits of competing funds on behalf of the employee.  
However, in the Australian system currently, there is no incentive for the employer to 
conduct the search for an efficient solution because all costs are passed on to 
employees.  As John Piggott points out, a system where employer contributions are 
determined net of administration costs would have a completely different effect.  If 
employers were required to contribute 9 per cent of remuneration plus administration 
costs, they would have an incentive to keep administration costs as low as possible 
(Piggott, 2002).  Additionally, the combined administration costs payable on the 
pension holdings of a large number of employees would provide the economies of 
scale necessary to justify an effective search, encouraging market efficiency. 
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Another factor which affects the consumers’ relationship with the supplier is that 
retirement savings can generally be accessed only late in life.  A consumer who 
'selects' the default option without analysis may be unaware of the costs for many 
years.  The consumer experiences no short-term negative cashflow or utility effect as 
they would if they purchased an expensive or ineffective consumption good.  The 
benefits of cheaper pricing or better performance may never be discovered, or 
discovered only decades after the initial commitment is made and the potential 
benefits of a superior decision are lost.  
Finally, in the case of compulsory membership, there is no possibility of withdrawing 
from the market, or choosing a substitute product.  These are options open to 
consumers in most markets, and are options essential to validate the liberal maxim 
that all commercial transactions are entered into freely and are mutually beneficial.  
This is not merely a theoretical issue.  In terms of competitive dynamics, compulsion 
lowers the bar on supplier performance.  As a default choice, suppliers do not have to 
provide a product attractive enough to shake off consumer inertia to enable purchase.  
Rather, they need only provide a product that is not so relatively unattractive as to 
encourage a switch of fund; a process which entails a complex, time-consuming and, 
for some consumers, intimidating search and analysis process.   
4.3 Marketing and selling - bias and cost 
As discussed, many consumers in the pension product market have neither the skills 
nor the motivation to conduct the search necessary to be efficient consumers.  
Providers of pension products who compete for these customers in the retail market 
(where funds are not selected by employers) must bridge the information and 
motivation gap.  This is achieved by commission-based selling including via 'financial 
advisers', and marketing material including mass media advertising. 
There are two negative consequences of this effort for consumers.  First, easily 
available information is biased in favour of the provider who is paying for it.  The 
intention of the effort is to sell rather than inform, and often to do so by appearing to 
inform.  This can result in consumers being mislead and purchasing inappropriate 
products.  
An important source of supposed ‘advice’ comes from financial planners, who are 
nominally employed by the consumer, but who are in effect sales agents remunerated 
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by the product suppliers.  A recent survey into the quality of financial planning by the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) found that an extraordinary 
70% of financial planners surveyed had an ownership link to offered products (ASIC, 
2003: 6).  More than half of the advice prepared in the survey was borderline, poor or 
very poor.  Planners aligned with major banks had the lowest rating as a group (ASIC, 
2003: 5).  ASIC noted a number of general weaknesses, including a tendency to 
recommend higher cost investments, and recommend selling existing investments, 
without appropriate explanation.  These biases are explained by the remuneration of 
the agents, explained below. 
A typical tactic of agents in Australia, particularly during the recent bull market in 
equities, was to explain that higher fees associated with investment options such as 
overseas equities would not be noticed given the returns of 15-20 per cent achieved in 
these assets.  This was the advice I received in late 1999 on rolling-over my own 
super, without any discussion of the inevitably temporary nature of the investment 
conditions, or even the additional currency risks associated with overseas investment.  
Overseas equities have since fallen 30 – 40 per cent in Australian dollars.  Recent 
retirees have gone to court over similar misrepresentation made to them during the 
1980s, so far without gaining redress (SMH, 13/6/2002). 
The Financial Services Authority in the UK has researched consumers' choices of 
mutual fund.  To do so, it has developed its own measure of fund cost, MP1.  High 
MP1 funds are high cost funds.  Kevin James writes: 
Since retail investors do on average choose high MP1 funds, 
these funds must look attractive to them. This attraction arises 
from a combination of how investors select funds and how funds 
compete for investors. Surveys of investor behaviour find that, 
while investors generally desire low MP1 funds, they lack the 
information and knowledge needed to distinguish between high 
and low MP1 funds. (James, 2000: 8) 
That high cost funds attract customers seeking low cost funds is not accidental.  
Without the skills necessary to conduct their own analysis, consumers are heavily 
dependent on fund literature, and studies "show that high MP1 funds can behave in a 
way that makes them look superior to low MP1 funds to such investors." (James, 2000: 
6)  Unfortunately, research of this kind has not been carried out in Australia. 
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In Latin America, aggressive selling techniques have lead to the account switching 
phenomenon.  In Chile and Argentina, 30 to 50 per cent of workers switch pension 
providers each year.  Agents achieve this through a combination of misleading 
information, fraud (including counterfeiting signatures), and offers of kickbacks on 
the agents' hefty up-front commissions (Vittas, 1998a: 18; Diamond, 2000f: 18).   
A second negative implication of the marketing and selling functions is that they are a 
significant cost of running a competitive private pension fund.  All things equal, the 
providers best represented by agents and most visible in the media will be more 
expensive than those that are not.  All things equal, the funds most likely to attract 
consumer attention, are the most expensive, and the least deserving of it.  In Latin 
America, marketing and selling costs are often over 50 per cent of total costs in plural 
private pension markets (Vittas, 1998a: 19). Edward Whitehouse discusses an 
Argentinean study of the interaction between increased advertising and marketing on 
cost and membership flows.  The study concluded that increased spending on 
advertising and marketing made sense (to the supplier) because the increase in 
members attracted by the selling effort was approximately double the loss of members 
from increased costs (Whitehouse, 2000a: 29). 
In Australia, financial planners and other sales agents receive up-front commissions 
from the initial contribution charges and annual 'trailing fees'.  Up-front contribution 
fees are generally 5 per cent in retail funds, of which the financial planners would 
receive between 1.5 and 2.5 per cent.31  Trailing fees frequently amount to 0.6 per 
cent of assets.  The trend in commissions is up, as funds can improve subscription to 
new, more expensive products if they offer preferential remuneration for planners 
(Bruining, 26/6/2002). 
As Choice of Fund became policy, established industry funds became able to achieve 
public offer status in competition with the private retail funds.  As Hely observes, 
although the Government hoped that this would put price pressure on the private retail 
funds, it instead put cost pressure on the industry funds (Hely, 1999: 20).  To gain 
 
31 ASIC (Australian Securities and Investments Commission) suggests that 1.5 to 2.5 per cent of assets 
invested is what an investor can expect to pay a financial planner for investment in general (ASIC, 
2002: 3). 
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market share, the industry funds had to change product offerings, invest in new IT, 
and develop and maintain a marketing exposure, all of which represented additional 
costs (Mace, 1999: 46).  In summary, as competition was introduced to this sector of 
the Australian market, the price of administration rose, in direct contradiction of 
orthodoxy. 
4.4 Determinants of price 
The market for private pensions in Australia exhibits a wide range of prices.  Fees 
vary by fund type, fund size, account balance and type of investments. 
4.4.1 Fund type 
In the Australian market, fund type is a major determinant of cost.  Industry, corporate, 
master trust and retail funds all have quite different cost bands.  Similarly, costs in the 
markets in the UK differ between 'stakeholder' funds and other funds, and in the US, 
between no-load funds and load funds. 
A study by Bateman and Prieto (cited in Whitehouse, 2000a: 32) emphasises the 
difference in charges between master trust (retail funds) and industry funds in 
Australia.  Master trusts are private pension funds which market to employers, while 
industry funds are non-profit funds which were set up to receive contributions from 
employees in an industry after Award-based super was set-up in the 1980s.32  The 
industry funds had an average flat rate of $45 p.a., 0 per cent on contributions and 
0.45 per cent on assets, while the master trust had an average flat rate of $70 p.a., 4.5 
per cent on contributions and 1.3 per cent on assets for administration and 0.6 per cent 
on assets for funds management.  On reasonable assumptions of contribution rate and 
rates of return, that resulted in a reduction in yield of 0.51 per cent for the industry 
funds and 1.9 per cent for the master trust.  Consistent with my analysis above, 
Bateman and Prieto estimate that the difference in impact on final accumulation could 
be as much as 23 per cent.  Private funds in the retail market are more expensive again, 
costing at least another 1 per cent on yield, equivalent to around 15 per cent of 
accumulation (Sampson, 26/6/2002).   
 
32 Many major industry funds now have public-offer status so they effectively compete directly with the 
private funds operating Master Trusts and in the retail market. 
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Differences in price are only partially related to value-add activities, such as 
administration and fund management, as these are generally outsourced to external 
consultants by funds of all kinds (discussed below).  The difference in price is related 
to differences in marketing and selling costs (discussed in the previous section), and 
differences in corporate structure.  Industry, public sector and corporate funds are run 
for members on a non-profit basis, and administration may be subsidised by 
sponsoring employers.  Charges are intended to cover costs, which do not include 
distributions to shareholders.  Private funds are, by definition, commercial businesses 
owned by private shareholders.  These businesses operate to maximise returns for 
shareholders.  In perfectly competitive markets, providers are price takers and can 
only make return on capital by matching best practice.  As we have seen, the market is 
not perfectly competitive.   
Private funds still have an incentive to be efficient, to increase margins.  But there is 
no compulsion to pass efficiency gains onto consumers in the form of price reductions.  
Price dynamics and structural change are discussed in section 4.5.  
4.4.2 Fund size 
Economies of scale are important determinants of efficiency in financial services.  
Figure 4.2, below, displays administration fees falling significantly with each order of 
magnitude of fund size (in member numbers).  Funds with more than 100,000 
members had administration fees per member of $2 per week, while those with less 
than 1000 members had fees per member of at least $6 per week.  Data on US mutual 
funds from the ICI (Investment Company Institute) demonstrates similar effects in 
that market.  In 1997, the average operating expense ratio for funds with less than 
$250 million in assets was 1.25 percent. In contrast, the average for those funds with 
assets greater than $5 billion was 0.64 percent (Rea and Reid, 1998: 12). 
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Figure 4.2 Range of administration charges per member by size of fund 
Source: Clare and Connor, 2000: 16. 
 
Economies of scale have important implications for competitive dynamics in the 
industry.  They are one of several barriers to entry that leads to a stable market 
structure, and the main factor driving the biggest structural changes in the industry: 
market concentration and outsourcing.   
4.4.3 Account size 
The second dimension of differences in charges is between members within the same 
fund, based on both size of account and choice of investment option.  Account 
administration carries largely fixed information and handling cost components.  While 
some charges are based on a percentage of assets, it is also common for charges to be 
fixed at a flat dollar rate.  This is typical of the industry funds, possibly responding to 
a need for simplicity on the part of members.  Retail funds operate charges that 
combine fixed and variable elements, including some rates that carry surcharges for 
smaller accounts and discounts for larger accounts.  The implication is that, in general, 
account administration charges will impact to a greater extent on smaller account 
balances. Figure 4.3 displays charges by size of account from a group of leading 
Australian retail funds.  These are rates charged on assets per year, and exclude entry 
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fees, which typically amount to 5 per cent of new contributions.  Annual asset based 
fees vary from over 5 per cent to 3 per cent for account balances of $2,000 to $5,000, 
down to around 2 per cent for account balances of $5,000 and over.  Some funds have 
discounts for accounts larger than $50,000, bring annual costs just below 2 per cent. 
Figure 4.3 Asset-based charges, by size of account (medium expense investment options) 
Source: Author's calculations based on published literature by major Australian retail funds 2001. 
 
This tendency has important equity implications for compulsory systems.  Lower 
income earners, who make lower contributions, will receive lower net returns.  All 
things equal, the rate of return of the wealthy will be superior to that of the poor.  
Arguably, the price structures reflect the fixed cost of administering an account.  
However, under NPR, the private pension system replaces or augments an existing 
public system with an existing administration structure funded progressively via the 
tax system. Moreover, in voluntary private pension systems, there are only middle and 
high income members, and these members bear all administration costs.  In a 
compulsory system, to the extent that fees on lower income members contribute to 
overheads, fixed fund costs can be spread over more people, resulting in cheaper 
account administration and fund management for middle and high income participants 
than would otherwise be the case. 
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In Australia, there is legislation to protect low balances from being eaten-away by 
fees.  However, the legislation only protects sub-$1000 balances, and it relieves the 
fund of the obligation to credit interest earned to small accounts.  The effect is 
nominal balance maintenance but declining purchasing power, and no compensation 
for the time value of money. 
4.4.4 Investment choice 
The cost of the fund management component of administration depends on the type of 
investment option chosen.  For example, an investment option including overseas 
assets will generally be more expensive than one without.  These differences are 
significant.  Among the retail funds considered in Figure 4.3 for an account balance of 
$50,000, fees averaged 1.9 per cent of assets for low cost investment options and 3.0 
per cent of assets for high cost options.  The more expensive investment options are 
58 per cent more expensive again than the cheaper investment options on average. 
In theory, consumers are accessing asset types which suit their preferences via more 
expensive investment options.  Arguments for expensive choices can be based on 
accessing higher returns, or on achieving portfolio diversification.  However, as noted 
above, more expensive funds in Australia have been found to provide lower returns.  
There appears to be no price-performance relationship that would be expected in an 
efficient market. 
4.5 Structural change and the cost of administration over time 
The Australian finance industry has undergone significant structural change in the 
period since deregulation in the early 1980s.  Factors besides deregulation have 
included the increasing exposure to and integration with international financial 
markets, the introduction of new technologies, a reduction in the banking branch 
network and a reduction in front- and back-office labour.  Major trends have included 
an increase in the size of financial entities due to mergers and consolidation, and the 
emergence of financial conglomerates due to mergers across the previously existing 
boundaries between insurance and banking (Kent and Debelle, 1999: 15-16) These 
trends have contributed to a rapid increase in profitability, particularly in banking. 
The two main internal structural changes in the superannuation industry are increasing 
outsourcing and increasing concentration, both taking advantage of economies of 
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scale.  The industry has also been shaped by government policy, which has driven an 
increasing proportion of income through the pension system.   
Many of the activities of funds are outsourced to specialised service providers who 
also service other institutional investors including mutual funds.  Activities often 
outsourced include funds management, administration, asset consultants, broking, 
actuarial and legals. Use of consultants for these tasks is standard practice, such that a 
superannuation fund is often a shell with responsible trustees but very few employees.  
Around 71 per cent of funds are invested via an external fund manager being either a 
life insurance company (32 per cent) or an independent fund manager (39 per cent).  
And 60 per cent of all large funds use external consultants for administration (Clare 
and Connor, 2000: 8, 15).  
Market concentration in these superannuation service industries is high compared to 
the numbers of actual funds.  In fund management, the top ten operators hold around 
63 per cent of the market.  In asset consulting the major five hold around 75 per cent 
of the market.  In administration, two major players - AAS (an AMP subsidiary) and 
Jacques Martin Industry - dominate the industry fund sector with a combined market 
share of 83 per cent.  In the corporate fund market, there are six majors, including 
subsidiaries related to the two major players mentioned above (Clare and Connor, 
2000: 18-19). 
The number of independent funds is also shrinking.  APRA figures show that between 
June 1995 and June 2002, the number of 'non-small' funds decreased from 5,001 to 
3,742, a reduction of 25 per cent (APRA, 2003: Table 9). 
Government policy has also continued to drive growth in the super industry, and this 
can be expected to continue.  Initiatives to increase growth include measures to block 
loop-holes allowing early removal of funds (particularly at change of employment), 
and steadily increasing contribution levels.  Contribution levels reached the final 
planned stage at 1 July 2002 at 9 per cent of income.  Net transfers (contributions 
minus benefits) have continued to rise, as is shown in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4 Net annual contributions to Australian superannuation 
Source: APRA, 2003: Table 3 and author's calculations.  
 
In competitive markets, cost efficiencies should be passed on to customers in the form 
of reduced price.  The outcome is different in an uncompetitive market.  Cost savings 
driven by concentration, growth and outsourcing contribute to higher margins.  
Figure 4.5 shows a data series produced by APRA of super fund internal operating 
costs.  The data excludes a range of important external costs, including external fund 
management.  Nonetheless, it is a constant series that provides an indication of trends 
in total super costs.  The chart shows annual administration, and the ratio of 
administration to assets.  In absolute terms the costs rise steeply, increasing by 122 
per cent.  Internal costs as a proportion of assets fell slightly between 1995 and 1998, 
before rising to its highest level in 2001 and 2002.  The first two quarters of 2003 
suggest a record figure for that year also.   
The data suggests that the efficiencies gained from market concentration, outsourcing 
and growth have not been passed on to consumers.  Costs have risen as a proportion 
of assets, despite rapid and unsustainable asset growth.  Efficiencies gained through 
increasing economies of scale and outsourcing are not being passed on to members. 
Chapter 4 Administration 123 
 
Figure 4.5 Aggregate internal operating costs for Australian superannuation 
Source: APRA, 2003: Table 3 and Table 1b and author's calculations.  
 
4.6 Summary 
When production is organised by profit-driven operators in a market setting, as private 
pensions are in the Anglo-American countries, efficiency is dependent on competition.  
A necessary condition for competition is that consumers understand the products, and 
the prices associated with those products, and exercise choice on the basis of that 
understanding.  All available evidence points to a lack of necessary understanding.  
Consumers are consequently making inappropriate choices, driven in no small part by 
the ‘advice’ of paid agents of profit-driven suppliers.  Pension administration cost 
when organised in a plural market is far more significant than it need be.  Efficiencies 
resulting from structural change are not being passed onto consumers. 
5 Account proliferation  
In Australia, compulsion to join pension funds, inflexible rules governing membership 
based on employment, and an absence of centralised account management combine to 
cause account proliferation.  This partly explains how a country of less than 20 
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million people can support over 3,500 pension funds (APRA, 2003).  In Australia in 
November 1995, there were 6.6 million superannuation fund members and 15.5 
million accounts at an average of 2.3 accounts per person.  The number of accounts 
increased by another 25 per cent to 20.55 million by December 1999 (Clare and 
Connor, 2000: 2).  In 2000, accounts per person reached 2.6 accounts (Clare 2001: 32).  
Unofficial estimates from the Australian Tax Office suggest the number might now be 
as high as 3 accounts per person.  
This results in lower net returns for members with more than one account, due to the 
prevalence of administration fees with a fixed component.  The impact on savers is 
amplified because the retail sector - with more expensive fees - accounts for a 
disproportionate share (56 per cent) of accounts (Clare, 2001: 32).  The implications 
of multiple accounts are significant for administration cost and therefore rates of 
return and final accumulation.  Additionally, having smaller account balances results 
in higher rates of fees due to low balance penalty rates and high balance discount 
rates. 
The analysis of cost by fund type provided above (section 4.4.1) suggests that retail 
funds are up to 2 – 4 times more expensive than non-profit public offer funds.  While 
the cheapest option is to have all one's super in a single non-profit fund, the average 
option is three accounts, two of which are retail accounts.  Assuming fixed costs 
represent 50 per cent of fees, on assets of $10,000, the average option will cost 3 – 6 
times the cheapest option (author’s calculations).  Presumably, some members have 5 
or more accounts, with administration costs proportionately higher.  Small accounts 
would be protected by (nominal) balance protection legislation, resulting in real 
balance erosion. 
Another negative symptom of the plural market structure and account proliferation is 
the growth of lost accounts.  After only 10 years of compulsory pensions in Australia, 
the Australian Tax Office now holds more than $7 billion in 4.5 million lost super 
accounts (Wade, 9/9/2002).  This compares with the $220 million held by the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) for all bank accounts, life 
insurance and lost shares since the 1950s.  Many consumers are clearly disinterested 
in compulsory pensions.  An industry in account search services has emerged to help 
unite individuals with their lost super accounts. 
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The same dynamics have created similar situations in the UK and US.  The quantity 
of lost pension savings is unknown in the US, but is presumed to be significant, based 
on UK estimates in 1998 of between £10 and £77 billion (Turner and Bruce, 2002: 2). 
6 Negligence and fraud 
A plural private pension system sees the direction of vast flows on income through a 
relatively new and unregulated administrative sector consisting of (mostly) private 
entities.  As we have seen, the level of scrutiny from consumers is so low that more 
than one per cent of assets in the Australian system are considered lost.  The potential 
for fraud within the industry is significant.  The system is also dependent on integrity 
within the wider financial community, both in relation to the cost and quality of 
consulting services, and more generally in ensuring assets are correctly valued and 
well managed. 
In Australia, regulation of the pension industry is exercised via an approved trustee 
structure.  Under this structure, trustees for public offer funds must be registered with 
the regulator APRA (Australia Prudential Regulatory Authority).  In extreme 
circumstances, APRA has limited powers to replace or remove trustees.   
As discussed above, the integrity of the pension system generally is compromised by 
the selling practices of sales agents and financial planners.  However, in respect of 
administration, the system of regulation in Australia has worked reasonably 
effectively – at least to the extent that APRA’s powers have been exercised only 
occasionally.  A medium sized superannuation company, Commercial Nominees, had 
new trustees appointed after losing 80 per cent of member assets in non-performing 
asset acquisitions (Seeder, 2/7/2001).  The trustees of several smaller superannuation 
funds have also been replaced (APRA, 2001a; 2001b).  Some relatively minor frauds 
have been discovered relating to avoidance of superannuation and false business 
registry services (APRA, 2001c).   
A greater concern is the lack of accountability in respect of the purchase of services 
by pension fund administrators on behalf of members, and fund managers on behalf of 
pension funds.  Given the absence of direct pressure on parties to these contracts, and 
the consequent capacity for deals involving kick-backs, there appears to be very little 
scrutiny of these relations by regulators.  There is certainly cause for concern over a 
failure to maintain arms-length dealings between funds and related service providers.  
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Indeed, Wynn argues that ‘soft commission’ transactions between funds and brokers 
represent an institutionalised form of kick-backs, protected by non-transparent cost 
reporting (Wynn, 2002). 
The assertion that this risk is material would seem paranoid if not for the daily reports 
of wrong-doing on the part of one aspect or another of the financial community.  The 
recent (2002/2003) round of convictions of senior executives in Australia and the US 
is profoundly disturbing in the context of the commitment of governments to private 
pension systems.  The evidence across a number of major cases exposes a spectrum 
from small, isolated, opportunistic crimes to groups of executives across multiple 
entities conspiring over many years to embezzle billions of dollars from millions of 
people.   
At the small end of the scale is the case of famous Australian stock-broker, Rene 
Rivkin, recently convicted for insider trading after receiving a hot tip concerning an 
airline take-over.  On a medium but intolerable scale are major corporations such as 
insurer HIH and life insurance office AMP losing billions through negligence and 
mismanagement, and providing preferential information to an inner circle of 
shareholders to allow timely sale of shares.  On the most disturbing level is the 
systematic abuse by financial services conglomerates (notably Anderson, Citibank 
and Merrill Lynch) of research and auditing services in order to secure other business 
from clients, including IPOs, underwriting, broking and consulting.  These practices 
facilitated the accounting fraud that enabled corporations including WorldCom, Enron 
and HIH to continue to trade and raise capital while insolvent.  It is clear also that the 
investment banks released specific and general public misinformation to fuel the 
equity price bubble of the late-1990s.  In February 2003, merchant banks had agreed 
to a $US 1.48 billion settlement (Collins, 20/2/2003).   
The political pressure in the US has led to much talk of reform, and ten of the largest 
US investment banks have agreed to pay $US 1.46 billion in fines in respect of 
unethical and illegal practices during the ‘boom-time’ (Maiden, 12/5/2003).  However, 
regulators are reluctant to break up the financial conglomerates.  As reported in The 
Sydney Morning Herald: 
New York State Attorney-General Eliot Spitzer's idea of breaking 
up the stock research and investment banking businesses at Wall 
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Street firms ''is a very drastic remedy", Securities and Exchange 
Commission chairman Harvey Pitt said. 
Mr Pitt said the federal agency would consider this step ''only as 
a last resort". (SMH, 13/5/2002) 
The background to this white-collar crime wave is apparent general acceptance in the 
management and shareholding community of white-collar ‘near crime’ in the form of 
spiralling executive remuneration made up of exorbitant salaries and stock option 
plans.  It seems, in short, that every opportunity is taken to serve oneself.   
The pension industry consists of a massive quantity of capital moving through 
pension systems on behalf of unaware, anonymous and often unwilling consumers, 
watched over by disinterested regulators.  In this context, the absolute cynicism with 
which the financial community has bent and broken rules for their own advantage is 
cause for the utmost concern.  There can be little doubt, at minimum, that contracts 
between financial service providers on behalf of pension consumers would involve 
generous pricing, and relatively low pressure to perform. 
7 Alternative systems 
7.1 Bolivia and Sweden - funded systems without consumer markets 
Bolivia and Sweden were among many countries that underwent significant pension 
reform during the 1990s.  Both reforms included creation of new fully funded pension 
systems.  In Bolivia, the private system represents the bulk of retirement income 
arrangements.  In Sweden, the private system is an important element of a 
comprehensive system which also includes a transformed contributory unfunded 
public system.  The unfunded system is a 'notional defined contribution' (NDC) 
system run on principles intended to reflect the actuarial realities of an aging 
population.   
The design of the private funded elements of the Bolivian and Swedish reforms 
represented an important break with the then orthodoxy of delivery via Anglo-
American style consumer markets.  In the Bolivian funded system, as with other Latin 
American countries and the Anglo-American countries, private (foreign) corporations 
administer accounts and manage funds.  However, only two providers were licensed, 
and the licensees were appointed by the government after a lengthy bidding process 
which provided a centralised price determination process.  The two providers were 
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appointed customers on a geographical and alphabetical basis with no overlap, and no 
account switching allowed for the first years of operation.  In the Swedish funded 
system, there is no private involvement in account administration.  This function is 
handled by the public agency which runs the NDC system.  The funded system assets 
are managed by private fund managers appointed by the state in a bidding process.  
Products offered by these fund managers are offered to fund members, though there is 
no direct contact between customers and fund managers.   
The Bolivian system has several important advantages over an unregulated consumer 
market.  Having only two providers allows considerable economies of scale, lowering 
average administration costs.  Having only two providers with separate client bases 
prevents competition.  However, the monopsonistic bidding structure reduces the 
scope for super profits to be made on administration.  Hermann von Gersdorff 
comments that the structure "allowed a competition for the market instead of a 
competition in the market resulting in competitive fees" (Gersdorff, 1997: 18).  
Moreover, as we have seen, much of the marketing and selling activity involved in 
pension market competition adds cost without giving the consumer efficacy.  The 
Bolivian government was keen to avoid the high selling costs and account switching 
that developed in Argentina and Chile.  The entire administration cost is captured in a 
single contribution-based percentage fee of 4 per cent (Gersdorff, 1997: 6).  This 
compares to an average fee of 16 per cent of contributions in Chile (Whitehouse, 
2000a: 29).  Finally, having no overlap in the client bases of members prevents 
wasteful account proliferation.  
The Swedish system moves further from the Anglo-American model by having no 
private account administration.  Among other advantages, this system maximises 
economies of scale in administration by having a single provider.  Economies of 
scope are achieved by having a single administration system which deals with both 
public and private pensions, and which potentially coordinates with other social 
programs (Diamond, 2001f: 9).  This structure means that certain aspects of the 
administration task, including collections and disbursements, would have a marginal 
cost of close to zero (Palmer, 2000: 33).  A centralised administrator would be the 
best method of avoiding the problem of account proliferation.   
The Swedish system shares advantages with the Bolivian system, gained by not 
having consumers directly exposed to fund marketing and selling.  By having a range 
Chapter 4 Administration 129 
 
of fund managers, the Swedish system has lower economies of scale in funds 
management than the Bolivian system.  The intention was to allow choice but prevent 
the costs associated with choice in other systems.  The state acts as a clearing house 
for information and funds.  Individuals have access to relevant information, such as 
returns, risk and cost, in a format that allows direct comparison (Palmer, 2000: 33).  
Fund management charges are determined via a centralised process involving a 
formula based on size of fund.  For a large fund, a consumer would expect to pay 0.75 
per cent of assets annually, half normal fees in the voluntary mutual fund market in 
Sweden.  This amount includes the cost of establishment of a new public personal 
account system, which is being amortised over a fifteen year period (Whitehouse, 
2000a: 34). 
Some issues remain in any system involving investment choice.  As has been 
discussed above, even with full disclosure and transparency, it is unclear how 
consumers should evaluate financial investment options, as past performance does not 
predict future performance, and there is no correlation between price and risk return.  
The Bolivian and Swedish pension reforms demonstrate that a funded pension system 
does not need either private administration or a consumer market to operate 
effectively.  A system without private administration and a consumer market has 
certain advantages: administrative efficiencies related to scale and scope, reduced 
waste related to selling and marketing, an efficient market (at least in regard to price) 
via bidding 'for the market', transparent product information, and reduced account 
proliferation.  The decisions of the Bolivian and Swedish governments to avoid 
consumer markets for private pensions have effectively been endorsed by the World 
Bank, whose researchers have found a measurable and significant difference in 
average administration cost between institutional markets and traditional consumer 
markets (James et al, 2001).  The Bank has stopped short of explicitly criticising the 
many plural consumer markets that it had previously endorsed or assisted to 
implement. 
7.2 A reformed consumer market for the Anglo-American countries 
The competitive market for funded pension administration is firmly established in the 
Anglo-American countries.  It is unreasonable to expect that administration could be 
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brought under monopoly public management, or even that monopoly licenses could 
be auctioned by the state in the short term.   
There is significant scope, however, for relatively simple reforms that would 
immediately improve operation of the current system, leaving room for a transition to 
a more rational structure in the longer term.   
The reform would have as aims: 
• a radical reduction in the number of providers, to increase economies of 
scale; 
• immediate implementation of a 10 per cent investment limit in own-
company stock by pension funds (equivalent to Australian law); 
• a simplified fee structure – limited to one or two types of fees and 
including all administration costs, to improve transparency; 
• a public, centralised information service on funds, to improve transparency 
and efficiency; 
• a compulsory public centralised account registration process linked to tax 
or social security identification numbers, to control account proliferation; 
• enforced account rationalisation when entering funds, to control account 
proliferation; and 
• compulsory employer contributions excluding administration cost, to 
encourage efficient fund selection by employers. 
8 Conclusions 
Neoliberal pension reform was presented to the public as a method of providing for 
old age income that offered substantial macroeconomic benefits.  As argued in 
chapters 3 and 4, benefits in terms of increased national savings and improved 
investment performance are impossible to substantiate.  However, the benefits of NPR 
for the financial community are obvious. 
A consumer market for complicated products buoyed by tax incentives and 
compulsion provides no effective discipline on suppliers.  There is a great deal of 
evidence to suggest that many consumers have no effective understanding of the 
products or pricing.  Manipulation of consumers’ ignorance by commission-based 
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agents including financial planners is standard practice.  Ironically, expenses 
associated with competition, including agents’ fees, make the system less efficient.  
Communities with consumer markets for private pensions are paying to be misled.  
Structural change to cut costs continues, but benefits are not flowing on to consumers. 
The lack of interest from consumers is demonstrated most powerfully by the extent of 
account proliferation, with the average Australian consumer now having three 
accounts (and rising), and more than one per cent of assets separated from their 
owners.  In this context, a largely deregulated industry seems an inappropriate method 
of delivery, especially given apparently pervasive corporate negligence and fraud. 
Replacing the consumer market with an institutional market consisting of a small 
number of licensed fund managers and administrators, appointed periodically via 
auction, provides a demonstrable efficiency gain.  Reforming the consumer market by 
simplifying products and fees, centralising account registration and forcing employers 
to pay for administration costs, would have a less pronounced but immediate positive 
effect. 
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Chapter 5 Labour markets and inequality 
1 Introduction 
Robert Holzmann and Estelle James of the World Bank, and Axel Börsch-Supan of 
the European Union, among others, propose that high-replacement rate public 
PAYGO pensions33 create damaging labour market distortions.  They argue that 
income transfers and other aspects of public pension systems impede the efficiency of 
markets by altering the price and mobility of labour, reducing both labour demand and 
labour supply.  Purportedly, outcomes include increased unemployment, harmed 
national competitiveness and lowered labour market participation, particularly in the 
form of early retirement. 
Public pensions are intended to directly affect labour markets by enabling retirement 
(permanent withdrawal of labour supply) for people who have insufficient personal 
resources to support themselves.  This is achieved via a transfer of income from 
workers.  This effect is directly related to the prime political and economic need 
addressed by public pensions: the prevention of elderly poverty or, in high 
replacement systems, elderly disadvantage.  The impact of pensions on labour markets 
and poverty are inextricably linked and considered here together.   
The World Bank also claims that public pension systems create labour market 
distortions without necessarily reducing elderly poverty.   In support of this position, 
the Bank points to pension systems that are regressive and exclusive, and also to those 
so poorly managed they collapse.  The impact of pension systems on elderly poverty 
and inequality is considered in section 2 primarily with reference to OECD countries.  
Public pension expenditure varies widely in these countries, but the systems are 
relatively well-managed and the underlying political and economic systems are 
relatively stable.  Trends in elderly poverty and elderly inequality in recent decades 
are considered in view of the spread of NPR.  Pension system crisis is examined in 
chapter 6. 
                                                 
33 Unless stated otherwise, 'public pensions' is used in place of 'public PAYGO pensions' for the 
remainder of the chapter. 
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Section 3 examines labour market distortions associated with public pension systems, 
including purported effects on competitiveness and unemployment, and 
encouragement of early retirement.  Section 4 concludes the chapter. 
2 Pensions and inequality 
The first goal of public pensions is to ensure an adequate standard of living for the 
elderly, or, at least, to prevent elderly poverty.  However, the World Bank (1994: 11) 
asserts that it is a myth (Myth 2 of 6) that "public social security programs are 
progressive, redistributing income to the old who are poor."  The Bank argues that 
windfall gains at pension system inception are "invariably" made by middle- and 
upper-income groups.  It argues that: people with higher incomes live longer on 
average, therefore receiving higher average benefits; payroll tax ceilings put a limit on 
the contributions of the wealthiest reducing their contribution rate; and earnings-
related benefit formulas are regressive and subject to manipulation, which typically 
benefit powerful client groups.  Moreover, according to the Bank, mismanagement 
and poor indexation systems frequently result in collapsed systems or benefits which 
fail to keep up with wages and prices.  The Bank's survey of evidence on pensions and 
redistribution concludes: 
Not a single study for any country has presented strong evidence 
that the public pension scheme has substantially redistributed 
income from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor once mortality 
differences are taken into account.  In fact, in some countries the 
redistribution goes from the poor to the rich (World Bank, 1994: 
135). 
Fox and Palmer’s description of Latin American public pensions is a representative 
characterisation of the World Bank view: 
As in Europe, Latin American systems expanded in the 1950s 
and 1960s. For the most part, however, they remained fairly elite 
systems, reflecting the small formal sector labor force and high 
income inequality. (Fox and Palmer, 2001: 7) 
The approach taken here is to consider the impact of pensions on elderly poverty and 
elderly inequality.  Data on elderly poverty in the OECD is regressed against data on 
public pension expenditure and private pension assets.  Studies looking at the 
transition in elderly poverty rates within countries over time due to pension system 
change are also reviewed.  This exercise does not directly explore the level of 
redistribution within pension schemes.  However, it does point to the extent to which 
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different types of pension systems achieve the goal of reducing elderly poverty.  The 
impact of neoliberal pension reform on elderly inequality is also discussed.  Some 
parameters for modelling the future impact of funded pension schemes on poverty are 
considered. 
2.1 Defining poverty 
The word poverty is used to describe the circumstance of the poor: people 
experiencing inadequate levels of consumption.  There are a number of definitional 
issues associated with the concept.  How to define 'inadequate' is a central and 
potentially contentious issue.  The two main methods – based on absolute and relative 
definitions – are discussed below.   
Other issues relate to measurement of consumption.  Income is often used as the basis 
for analysis in place of consumption because the two are closely connected (especially 
for those on lower incomes) and data for personal income are far more readily 
available than for personal consumption.34  Measurement of income is also not 
without problems.  According to Edward Whitehouse, issues which impact on the 
measurement of income include: what is included/excluded in income (treatment of 
tax, transfers and assets such as pension assets and housing assets); what time period 
is used (shorter-time periods produce higher levels of poverty as income levels even 
out over time); what unit is the basis for analysis (i.e. families or households); and 
what method is used to calculate 'equivalence' for families/households with varying 
numbers of income earners and dependants (Whitehouse, 2000b: 14-5).   
The surveys referred to in the sections below address these issues in slightly different 
ways, with some impact on comparative results.  Relevant issues are mentioned with 
the results. 
There are two widely recognised approaches to defining the line between adequate 
and inadequate levels of consumption/income: the absolute method and the relative 
method (Rainwater, 1999).  The absolute approach seeks to describe a level of 
 
34 Peter Saunders found that basing analysis on consumption figures rather than income reduced 
poverty rates substantially, primarily because many people with sub-poverty line incomes consume 
more than they earn (Saunders, 1998: 9).  Saunders suggests that this is partly explained by people 
supplementing income by borrowing and asset round-down, which was only possible in the short-term. 
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subsistence consumption, below which people are considered to be in poverty.  This 
was, for example, the notion of poverty guiding Sir William Beveridge, whose report 
on social insurance provided the basis for rationalisation and redesign of the British 
social security system during World War II (Macnicol, 1994: 84).  According to 
Beveridge "The rates of benefit or pension provided by social insurance should be 
such as to secure for all normal cases an income adequate for subsistence…" 
(Beveridge, 1942: 76).  Studies were conducted to establish what level of income was 
required to provide adequate shelter, clothing and meet human nutritional needs.  
Levels of absolute poverty are negatively correlated with the wealth of a country, in 
terms of income per capita.  
The relative approach is derived from the sociological study of poverty, and defines 
the level of adequacy relative to general consumption levels of the community to 
which an individual or family belongs.  The underlying concept is that social 
participation and identification are essential human needs, and in modern society 
these are largely defined by consumption activities.  It follows that a level of income 
substantially lower than general levels results not only in a lower material quality of 
life, but also social exclusion.  This social exclusion is both practical and 
psychological, as people in relative poverty will be identified by others and by 
themselves as different, as they are unable to participate in consumption activities 
which define social membership (Rainwater, 1999: 33).  Levels of relative poverty are 
not necessarily correlated with levels of income per capita.  A rich country can have 
higher levels of relative poverty than a poor country. 
Although associated with 20th century sociology, the idea that poverty is determined 
culturally has early origins.  In the 18th century, Adam Smith noted different standards 
of poverty for different countries, times and between genders.  He also recognised the 
importance of social judgments made by individuals about themselves and others: 
By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are 
indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the 
custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, 
even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, 
is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and 
Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably though they had no 
linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, 
a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public 
without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to 
denote that disgraceful degree of poverty which, it is presumed, 
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nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct. Custom, 
in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life 
in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be 
ashamed to appear in public without them. In Scotland, custom 
has rendered them a necessary of life to the lowest order of men; 
but not to the same order of women, who may, without any 
discredit, walk about barefooted. In France they are necessaries 
neither to men nor to women, the lowest rank of both sexes 
appearing there publicly, without any discredit, sometimes in 
wooden shoes, and sometimes barefooted. Under necessaries, 
therefore, I comprehend not only those things which nature, but 
those things which the established rules of decency have rendered 
necessary to the lowest rank of people (Smith, 1937: 821-2). 
The relative approach to poverty has a significant practical advantage for comparative 
study.  Relative poverty levels can be used in multiple jurisdictions without time-
consuming, expensive, and ultimately subjective analyses of the comparability of 
prices and incomes.  This is because the relative measure takes the general level of 
personal income in a jurisdiction as a fair basis for analysis. By contrast, absolute 
measures of poverty produce absurd results when comparing rates over space and 
time (Rainwater, 1999: 35).  Standards of housing, clothing, food, healthcare, 
transport and education have changed over the last hundred years, with the effect that 
people living in conditions that were standard 100 years ago would today be 
considered to be living in poverty. 
The relative poverty line is usually defined as a proportion of median income, because 
the median gives a better indication than the mean of the central tendency (due to the 
small proportion of people with extremely high relative incomes).  While societies 
feature gradations of poverty and social exclusion, a consensus has emerged among 
sociologists that people with less than half the median income are certainly poor 
(Rainwater, 1999: 36), though the claim can still be made that any level chosen is 
arbitrary (eg. Whitehouse, 2000b: 20). 
Another relative poverty method is to define the lowest income group, for example 
the lowest quintile, as in poverty.  This is a useful mechanism for exploring the 
question: 'Who is in poverty in country X?' However it is not useful for comparing 
levels of poverty in different jurisdictions, as each will be, by definition, 20 per cent 
(Whitehouse, 2000b: 13). 
Absolute and relative poverty measures have different policy implications, and can be 
used to support different pension policies.  For example, indexing public pensions 
Chapter 5 Labour markets and inequality 137 
 
according to prices will help to prevent increases in absolute poverty, as future 
pensions will have the same buying power as current pensions.  However, as wages 
rise faster than prices, pensions linked to prices will fall behind wages, resulting in 
increases in relative poverty levels.  If pensions are indexed according to prices, the 
living standard of the elderly will remain constant in absolute terms, but will fall 
behind the rest of society.   
The relative measure of poverty is used here for comparative research, which is 
restricted to the OECD.  It is not the case that the relative definitions of poverty used 
for international comparison are more generous than other definitions.  A well known 
Australian definition of poverty - the 'Henderson Poverty Line' - is substantially more 
generous than the 50 per cent of median income line.  In 1995-96, the Henderson 
Poverty Line was $A 496 per week for a family with two children, whereas 50 per 
cent of median equivalent income was only $A 353 per week (ABS, 2000c).   
It is important to note also that potential for use of a relative measure is limited in 
countries where there is only a very small group with very high incomes and a large 
majority with extremely low incomes.  The relative measure in such countries may 
produce a quite low level of poverty, though the majority may have no access to 
employment or education, or even clean drinking water and food. 
2.2 Elderly poverty in OECD countries 
Timothy Smeeding (2001) used data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
database, which contains information on household incomes for 28 nations, to 
compare the income of the population of people aged 65 and over in OECD countries.  
He provides detailed comparisons of eight of those countries, including Australia.  
The data are from the mid-1990s in each of the countries, and incorporate a wide 
definition of income including 'near cash', such as food stamps and housing 
allowances.  Income levels are adjusted for family structure, including marital status 
and numbers of dependants.  Tables are provided for two levels of elderly poverty, 40 
and 50 per cent of median disposable income.  Data are displayed graphically in 
Figure 5.1.   
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Figure 5.1 Elderly People in Relative Poverty in Selected OECD Countries 
Percentage of Population Aged 65+ with Incomes Less than Given Percent of Adjusted National 
Median Disposable Income. Source: Smeeding (2001, Table 1) 
A general review of the figures shows a significant gap between elderly poverty levels 
in Australia, the United States, Japan and Israel and the other countries.  The levels in 
these countries were well above the average levels of 4.8 and 11.6 per cent for the 
respective categories.  These four countries were the only countries in the sample to 
have more than 10 per cent of elderly people in poverty at the 40 per cent poverty line.  
Australia topped both tables with 12.4 per cent at the 40 per cent poverty line and an 
extraordinary 29.4 per cent at the 50 per cent line.  Second at both levels was the USA 
with 12.0 and 20.7 per cent respectively.  A number of countries show large gaps 
between the two poverty lines.  These countries have a concentration of pensions at a 
level between the 40 and 50 per cent median line. 
Smeeding provides some breakdown by age, gender and household structure.  In 
Australia, at the more extreme poverty level of 40 per cent, elderly women as a group 
are not worse off than men, with a 12.2 per cent rate of poverty (Figure 5.2).  
However, at the 50 per cent level, women are noticeably worse off than men, with a 
figure of 33.9 per cent.  This implies that almost half of women over 65 living alone 
in Australia have adjusted incomes at the very low level of between 40 and 50 per 
cent of median income.  Conditions are slightly worse still for the sub-group of 
women over 75, with more than two-thirds of women who are over 75 who live alone 
having adjusted income below 50 per cent of the median. 
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Figure 5.2 Gender Breakdown of Elderly Population in Australia in Relative Poverty 
 40% (rank) 50% (rank)
All persons (65+) 12.4 (1) 29.4 (1)
Women (65+) 12.2 (2) 33.9 (1)
Women living alone (65+) 15.2 (2) 62.3 (1)
Women living alone (75+) 19.7 (2) 68.7 (1)
Incomes Less than Given Percent of Adjusted National Median Disposable Income and rank in OECD.  
Source: Smeeding (2001)  
2.3 Elderly poverty and pension systems 
The main transitions undergone in neoliberal pension reform are a decreased reliance 
on public pensions and an increased reliance on private funded pensions.  In this 
section, public pension expenditure data and private pension asset data are regressed 
against the Smeeding OECD elderly poverty data.  Studies on elderly poverty which 
shed light on the impact of neoliberal pension reform on inequality are also discussed.  
The impact of pension system change on poverty – particularly the impact of funded 
systems – takes time to be felt.  Parameters necessary to model this impact are 
discussed, as is my provisional work in this area. 
2.3.1 Regression of pension and poverty data 
Regressing Smeeding's data on elderly poverty against World Bank data on public 
pension spending suggests that public pension spending is an important determinant 
of elderly poverty.  Although the data are imperfect and one would hesitate to make 
more specific assertions, the regression suggests that levels of elderly poverty are 
negatively correlated with public pension spending (see Figure 5.3 below).  As public 
spending rises, levels of elderly poverty fall.  The fit (R2) is 0.3296, and is much 
higher (0.5918) if Canada, an obvious outlier, is excluded.  It is likely that the 
Canadian public expenditure figure is an underestimate, as Canada has both a public 
pension financed out of general revenue and a public contributory (PAYGO) system 
(Banting and Boadway, 1997: 3-4).   
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Figure 5.3 Public pension spending versus elderly poverty (50% of median income) - 
Selected OECD Countries 
* (Date of poverty data, Date of pensions data)  ** Former West Germany. 
Sources. For pensions data World Bank, 2000a; for poverty data: Smeeding, 2001: Table 1  
 
The relationship is strongest at the higher end of the poverty distribution.  Excluding 
Canada, the three lowest spenders each have the highest level of elderly poverty.  In 
qualifying this conclusion, it is important to recognise that there is a range of elderly 
poverty outcomes possible for a given level of spending.  Those countries above the 
regression line in Figure 5.3 appear to get poor value for money, and those below the 
line are getting better value.  The difference, for example, between Italy and Sweden 
is quite large, as Sweden has a very low elderly poverty level with public pension 
expenditure of 11.5 per cent of GDP, while Italy has a medium-poor elderly poverty 
level (13 per cent) with the highest public pension expenditure at 15 per cent of GDP. 
Figure 5.4 shows the proportion of elderly women living alone in poverty plotted 
against public pension expenditure as a proportion of GDP.  The sample is small but 
the fit on the regression is high (R2 = 0.84), suggesting that public pension 
expenditure is particularly important in reducing female elderly poverty. 
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Figure 5.4 Public pension spending versus elderly women living alone in poverty (50% 
of median adjusted income) - Selected OECD Countries 
* (Date of poverty data, Date of pensions data)  ** Former West Germany. 
Sources. For pensions data World Bank, 2000a; for poverty data: Smeeding, 2001: Table 2  
 
Figure 5.5 shows the proportion of elderly in poverty at the 50 per cent of adjusted 
median income line plotted against private assets as a percentage of GDP for selected 
OECD countries.  The regression suggests no clear relationship between private 
pension assets and levels of elderly poverty.  The countries with private pension assets 
above 25 of GDP show a wide variation in rates of poverty.  Switzerland, Sweden, 
Canada, The Netherlands, and Finland have relatively low rates of elderly poverty 
while the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States and Australia have relatively high 
rates.  Countries with low levels of pension assets generally have medium to low 
levels of elderly poverty, however this would be explained by the level of spending on 
public pensions rather than the level of commitment to private pensions.   
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Figure 5.5 Private pension assets versus elderly poverty (50% of median income) - 
Selected OECD Countries 
 
* (Date of poverty data, Date of pensions data)  ** Former West Germany. 
Sources. For pensions data World Bank, 2000a; for poverty data: Smeeding, 2001: Table 1 
 
2.3.2 The impact of NPR on elderly poverty and inequality 
As discussed in chapter 2, in Australia the level of the public pension conformed 
closely to the neoliberal ideal by historical chance.  Neoliberal pension reform in 
Australia therefore consisted of a reversal of the trend during the 1970s towards 
making public pensions universal, and an extension of the superannuation system.  
These changes have been followed by a notable increase in the level of elderly 
poverty, and increased levels of elderly income and wealth inequality. 
During a brief period (1976-78) the pension became practically universal as there was 
no assets test and a means test only for those between 65 and 70 years of age.  
However, the assets test was reintroduced for people over 70 in 1978, and for all 
people in 1985 – the year superannuation was extended to Award workers via Accord 
Mark II.   
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Smeeding’s time series data show that between 1981 and 1994 the level of elderly 
poverty in Australia increased at both the 40 and 50 per cent levels.  The data 
suggested an increase of 5.4 per cent at the 50 per cent level and 3.9 per cent at the 40 
per cent level (Smeeding, 2001: 37).  On this evidence, the impact of the new 
retirement income system on elderly poverty is negative.  Whitehouse suggests that 
data for Australia underestimate elderly income because super is often paid as a lump 
sum, and may not be captured by income data (Whitehouse, 2000b: 26).  However, 
ASFA data on super payouts show that the majority of payouts until recently have 
been less than $20,000 (ASFA, 2001a).  Amounts would typically be significantly 
lower than $20,000 for those under or near the poverty line.  Such transfers would 
have little effect on consumption in retirement (over a 10 or 20 year period) whether 
taken as a lump sum or an annuity.   
Superannuation offers the opportunity to pay reduced tax on earned income and 
property income.  Compulsory contributions and optional contributions made by 
employers are taxed at the concessional rate of 15 per cent.  An additional 'surcharge' 
of up to 15 per cent is levied on high income earners, though current plans are forits 
reduction.  Even with the surcharge, a detailed study by the RIM Taskforce 
demonstrates that for both standard employer contributions and one-off investments 
(typically only made by high income earners) the proportional tax benefit is far higher 
for those on the highest marginal tax rate, with the level of benefit increasing over 
working life.  Over a whole working life, the benefit approaches 100 per cent of 
contribution value for those on the highest marginal tax rate (primarily due to the 
compounding effects of concessional tax on earnings), but is only around 30 per cent 
for those on the next highest marginal tax rate (Rothman, 2000: 7).     
Superannuation has appeared to have a significant effect on average levels of elderly 
wealth and income, though this is predominantly due to an apparently very large 
impact on those who already had significant wealth.  A recent Australian study 
suggests that average levels of elderly wealth nearly doubled in real terms between 
1986 and 1997, due significantly to superannuation.  Harding et al report that while 
superannuation made up only an estimated 2 per cent of their [the 
elderly’s] total wealth in 1986, by 1997 this had risen to about 18 
per cent.  Equities also became more significant, rising from 
about 7 to 14 per cent of total wealth over the same period. 
(Harding et al, 2002: 9) 
Chapter 5 Labour markets and inequality 144 
 
The rise in the proportion of superannuation and equities occurred during a period of 
rapid increase in housing wealth, particularly in the major capital cities.  As a result, 
the share of wealth held by the wealthiest elderly 25 per cent rose from about 67 to 71 
per cent (Harding et al, 2002: 16).   
The impact on inequality of the shift in retirement income provision in favour of 
private schemes has an important gender dimension.  The change will inevitably 
disadvantage women, due to women having, on average, longer periods out of the 
workforce, higher levels of casual work and lower levels of pay.  Bateman and Piggott 
(2001: 20) note the disadvantage that women and other 'non-standard' workers 
experience in the private system, but do not attempt to quantify it. 
The experience in the UK reinforces the picture of funded pension systems providing 
tax benefits for high income earners, which in turn leads to increased inequality.  In 
the UK, the Thatcher government introduced several neoliberal pension reforms 
between 1981 and 1985 (Whitehouse, 1998).  Key elements included: 
• reducing future public pension benefits by changing indexation to CPI instead of 
average wages (1981);  
• increased support for private occupational pensions; and 
• allowing people to 'opt-out' of the public system altogether by allowing a swap of 
public pension rights for private pension assets provided by government. 
While average income for the elderly in the UK has increased, the disparity in 
incomes has widened.  Curry and O’Connell report that while average income for 
single people of pension age is £UK 9,500 a year, the richest fifth earn an average of 
£UK 19,000 a year, and the poorest fifth only £UK 4,600 a year (or 21 per cent of 
average earnings).   
Whitehouse also cites studies showing a pronounced broadening of the elderly income 
distribution in the 1980s and 1990s (Whitehouse, 2000b: 51-3).  In the 1970s, the 
income distribution for the elderly in the UK was very even, with only a 10 per cent 
difference between the highest and lowest paid pensioners.  By the beginning of the 
1990s, the wealthiest decile of elderly were earning 5 1/2 times the earnings of the 
lowest decile.  These changes are attributed to the rapid growth of private pension and 
investment income.  
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While the richer majority enjoyed the fruits of this growth, a 
poorer minority of pensioners is dependent on state benefits 
whose value has increased little in real terms since 1980 
(Whitehouse, 2000b: 52-3). 
Indeed, due to the change of indexation policy, the value of public pensions (and 
unemployment benefits and other social assistance) decreased in value by 38 per cent 
relative to average wages between 1981 and 1998 (Whitehouse, 1998: 5).  A quarter 
of pensioners are in relative poverty, with older pensioners, women, ethnic minorities 
and the previously self-employed over-represented in this group (Curry and 
O’Connell, 2003: 3).  The importance of gender in pension policy is emphasised by 
Curry and O’Connell who note that there are only 3.9 million male pensioners, but 6.9 
million female pensioners (2003: 5). 
The conclusion in relation to UK pension policy reached by Sue Ward is that the two 
objectives of the current UK government: to further shift from public to private 
provision, and to end elderly poverty, are completely incompatible (Ward, 2002: 1). 
The US has a strongly neoliberal pension policy setting with a three-decade old 
commitment to voluntary and occupational concessionally-taxed private pension 
savings, and a contributory earnings-based public pension system which provides a 
replacement rate of around 50 per cent of wages.  Although American social security 
provision is somewhat progressive, the high and increasing levels of income 
inequality in the workforce are reproduced in the essentially earnings-based pension 
system.  Between 1973 and 2000, the 90-10 'Gini coefficient'35 jumped 38 per cent for 
men and 33 per cent for women among full-time employed (Bosworth et al, 2001: 1).  
The level of income inequality among the elderly is high compared to other OECD 
countries.  The elderly 90-10 Gini coefficient in the US in 1998 was 5.5 (Whitehouse, 
2000b: 43); that is, the average income of the top decile is 5.5 times that of the 
average income of the bottom decile.  As is indicated in Figure 5.3, the US has the 
second lowest level of public spending on pensions as a proportion of GDP and the 
second highest level of elderly poverty among a sample of 19 OECD countries.   
Munnell et al suggest that pension income for poorer workers in the US is so low that 
it has led to a complete breakdown in the standard retirement age.   
 
35 The ratio of the 10th percentile income to the 90th percentile income. 
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Thus, it would appear that low-income workers … do not receive 
enough from Social Security to avoid a decline in economic well-
being upon retirement and, therefore, they need supplementary 
pension income. In the current environment, their only option is 
to continue working. That is a possibility for some, but for others 
unemployment and ill health make continued work very difficult. 
(Munnell et al, 2002: 9) 
As was discussed in chapter 2, concessionally-taxed retirement saving mechanisms in 
the US are criticised for their regressivity.  Nonetheless, neoliberal reformers are 
currently attempting to increase the level of tax deductibility for pensions and 
privatise social security by investing system assets in private securities.  
The World Bank has been involved in implementing neoliberal economic reforms, 
including pension reform, in many developing and transition countries.   
Beginning with Chile in 1981, NPR has been implemented in ten Latin American 
countries.  Barrientos writes that the period from 1980 to 1989 saw poverty incidence 
in Latin America as a whole increase from 26.5 per cent to 31 per cent (Barrientos, 
1998: 23).  Pension reform in Latin America involved dissolving existing public 
pensions or excluding more of the population from them. 
A World Bank researcher notes the direct relationship between neoliberal reform, 
fiscal sustainability and social exclusion in the Argentinean case.  
The evolution of the financial situation of the RPP [public 
pension system] will improve in future decades for the same 
reason that the coverage problem will emerge. The projections 
show that the public scheme’s finances should improve 
significantly due to stagnation and even a decrease of the number 
of beneficiaries and to a reduction in the amounts paid as benefits 
begin to be replaced by those of the funded scheme. Obviously, if 
that happens, the system will be in better financial shape because 
of the exclusion of an important part of society from the system. 
(Rofman, 2000: 21) 
40 per cent of the population over 65 in Argentina no longer have any social security 
(Vibes, 2002: 2). 
Gender gaps in pension coverage also appear to have worsened in Latin America 
(Bertranou, 2000).  The ILO note that women are among the main losers of the 
reforms in Latin America (Nitsch and Schwarzer, 1996).  A pro-reform article 
published on the World Bank website notes that the accumulations of women in 
private pension systems are always less than those of men and usually less than 50 per 
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cent of men’s' (Edwards, 2000: 31).  Nonetheless, the author remains committed to 
the reform: 
If one thinks of labor market behavior as immutable and women's 
place as in the home, some method of subsidizing women in old 
age may be necessary. But, if one views the role of women as 
changing and responding to incentives, the new structure is a 
more appropriate way to provide a social safety net while 
encouraging work and discouraging dependency. (Edwards, 2000: 
2) 
This approach ignores the reality of gender differences in pay and gender-based child-
caring responsibilities which social security has sought to redress.  This reality is 
borne out in the observed emergence in Latin America of a 'family income gap'.  This 
is the disparity in incomes between women who have children and those who do not 
(Bertranou, 2000: 20).  For individual women and families, avoiding having children 
is one solution to falling incomes and security.  However, if social reform is intended 
to address the problem of aging, it should facilitate child-rearing, rather than punish 
those who choose to reduce paid work to raise children with lower retirement income.  
Retirement income, whether in public PAYGO or private funded pension systems, is a 
transfer of income from the working generation, brought up by parents, whose access 
to private pensions (all things equal) is reduced.  Child care is justly recognised as an 
essential contribution to society in European social security systems. 
2.4 Modelling private pensions and poverty 
The indications from studies of the early stages of neoliberal pension reform are that 
tax concessions on private pensions and reduced public pensions increase the level of 
inequality among the elderly, including increasing the level of elderly poverty.  
Particularly in voluntary private pension systems, high income earners benefit 
disproportionately from concessionally taxed pensions.  Later generations of retirees 
in countries with voluntary concessionally taxed private pensions will show 
increasing levels of inequality as high income earners gain the benefits of 
concessionally taxed savings over a greater period, while those with lower incomes 
and broken work patterns continue to rely on stagnant or reduced public benefits, or, 
as in much of Latin America, face complete destitution. 
In compulsory private pension systems, such as those in Australia and Switzerland, 
high income earners also benefit from tax concessions disproportionately.  However, 
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it is possible that these systems may increase the wealth at retirement of the relatively 
poor by forcing them to save during working life.  It was certainly the intention in 
Australia that compulsory superannuation would enable increased self-sufficiency in 
retirement, with a fiscal benefit arising from reduced eligibility for public pensions 
due to means-testing.  While there is little evidence of this trend to date – 
accumulations are generally small (as discussed in chapter 2) – the long term impact 
will be felt only a generation after the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. 
An attempt can be made to model the capacity of low income earners to avoid poverty 
in retirement via participation in compulsory private pensions.  Important issues for 
modelling include: 
• the level, timing and consistency of income earned; 
• the manner in which private pension accumulations interact with the tax system 
and public benefits including public pensions; 
• the severity of financial hardship experienced during working life (the opportunity 
cost of saving); and 
• the relative benefit of other forms of saving, including owner-occupied housing. 
The exercise is complicated by a number of factors.  The first is the wide variety of 
income and consumption conditions experienced during working life, particularly for 
low income earners.  It is not enough to categorise households by income level, as the 
idea of a 'standard worker' is largely irrelevant for low-income worker families, 
especially in single-parent families.  Workers in these families may experience 
periods of unemployment, periods of casual or part-time employment, and periods of 
unpaid caring work and periods of full-time employment on low or medium incomes.  
Changing family structures also have a profound bearing on household income and 
consumption.  The mix, timing and duration of different circumstances determine the 
level of participation in the private pension system, the amount of accumulation, and 
the degree of financial stress before and during retirement.  The length of working life 
and retirement are also key variables which would require a probabilistic approach. 
Estimating returns from private pensions and alternative forms of investment 
represents another set of complications.  Alternative forms of investment include 
owner-occupied housing and human capital.  The analysis would have to estimate 
(regressive) administration cost, the wide disparity in capital gains evident on 
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different types of housing, and the financial implications of home ownership and 
renting during working life and retirement.  The effects of different kinds of income 
and assets on welfare entitlements, including the aged pension, would also have to be 
considered.  Calculation of the annuity paid in retirement based on the accumulation 
is also dependent on investment returns, inflation and life expectancy.  The accuracy 
of the model would also depend on numerous aspects of government policy. 
A modelling exercise at the necessary level of detail is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  However, I have conducted some provisional work in this area.  The 
model inputs and outputs are summarised in Figure 5.6, with a more detailed 
summary at Appendix A.  The model estimates the pension achieved in a compulsory 
pension system by two households – one with median income and one with two-thirds 
of median income – under various assumptions.  The pension achieved is expressed as 
a percentage of median income.  Median income grows over time with assumed 
productivity gain.  Variables included are: 
• length of working life; 
• length of retirement; 
• inflation; 
• investment return in the accumulation and annuity phases; and 
• the tax structure. 
No changes in life circumstances are considered.  It is assumed implicitly that 100 per 
cent of median income for the whole of working life, or two-thirds of median income 
for the whole of working life, is a reasonable approximation for a variety of life 
circumstances for an ordinary or low income working household.  These levels 
correspond with the ABS central quintile and second lowest quintile of earnings – 
essentially middle and low income working families.  According to the ABS, 30 per 
cent of all families in the bottom two quintiles (the ABS' definition of 'low income 
families') of the income distribution do not have welfare transfers as the main source 
of income.  This group – the working poor – represents 12 per cent of all Australian 
families (ABS, 2000d).  It is this group’s prospects for a self-funded retirement that 
the modelling exercise intends to capture. 
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This group of poor working families shows evidence of financial stress.  The ABS 
reports that 29 per cent of families in the second lowest income quintile gave answers 
consistent with high levels of financial stress to a series of survey questions on 
consumption tasks such as paying bills, buying first or second hand clothes, eating out 
once a fortnight, or going away once a year (ABS, 2002).  While an estimate of the 
opportunity cost of pension saving is inevitably subjective, it appears that for families 
in this situation, the opportunity cost in terms of housing investment or disposable 
income may well be too high to justify, given the very small impact it may have 
during retirement. 
Many families are certainly in a more grave financial position than those considered 
here, with inconstant employment and lower access to the funded pension system.  In 
considering patterns of unemployment, the ABS found that 75 per cent of the 
unemployed are unemployed for a period of less than one year.  Amongst these, many 
can only find short-term employment and have subsequent periods of unemployment 
(ABS, 1998: 5).  The type of employment found by the unemployed directly affects 
their access to the funded pension system.  55 per cent of the unemployed have no 
superannuation coverage (ABS, 2001b: 4).  Those who are not in the paid workforce, 
including unpaid carers (mostly women), experience even lower coverage.  70 per 
cent of those aged between 15 and 64 who are 'not retired' and not looking for work 
have no coverage (ABS, 2001b: 4).  Research on these groups appears less beneficial 
as it is self-evident that funded pensions provide no benefit for those without access to 
the system. 
The provisional modelling suggests two points.  The first is that pensions for families 
on ordinary or low incomes from compulsory funded pensions are not likely to be of a 
level that will enable self-sufficiency.  A family on median income in the base case 
(working life 40 years, retirement 15 years, Australian tax structure, inflation 2 per 
cent, interest rate 6 per cent during accumulation phase and 4 per cent during annuity 
phase) will receive a pension equal to 30 per cent of median income averaged over 
retirement.  If this family in addition receives 25 per cent of wages in aged pension, 
they will only just be over the poverty line. 
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Figure 5.6 Summary of provisional modelling of the potential for ordinary and low-
income earners to avoid poverty in retirement in funded pension systems 
Case
Base
Optimistic
Pessimistic
Base
Optimistic
Pessimistic
INPUT
proportion of median 100% 100% 100% 67% 67% 67%
inflation 2% 1% 2% 2% 1% 2
working life 40 45 40 40 45 4
retirement 15 10 25 15 10 25
lifespan 75 75 85 75 75 8
tax 
contributions 15% 0% 15% 15% 0% 15%
earnings 15% 0% 15% 15% 0% 15%
benefits 15% 25% 15% 15% 25% 15%
contribution rate 9% 9% 7% 9% 9% 7%
interest rate (nom) 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 5
annuities rate (nom) 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 3
OUTPUT
Start ratio 36% 70% 21% 24% 47% 14%
End ratio 24% 59% 10% 16% 39% 7%
Average ratio 30% 64% 15% 20% 43% 10%
Better/worse than base 118% -50% 118% -50%
%
0
5
%
%
 
Note: Shaded cells have inputs differing from the base case. 
Source: Author’s calculations (see Appendix A for explanation of methodology and more detailed 
table). 
A family that earns two-thirds of median income receives a proportionately smaller 
pension: 20 per cent of median income averaged over retirement.36  Even with a full 
public pension this family would expect to spend retirement in poverty. 
The second important finding of the modelling is the wide range of possible outcomes 
for savers in funded pension systems.37  The model produces a very wide range of 
potential difference between optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, despite having a 
                                                 
36 No allowance is made in the model for regressive administration cost.  Regressive fees could cost 
low income earners an additional 1 or 2 per cent annually in returns.  
37 This is an inevitable feature of modelling future pension liabilities.  Recent court cases in the US 
over pensions have seen actuaries on opposing sides give vastly different testimony as to pension 
liabilities (in some cases a difference of 100 per cent) (Barakat, 28/2/2003). 
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very short list of variables and making only slight adjustments to each.  The optimistic 
case provides more than double the base case pension, while the pessimistic case 
provides around half the base case pension.  For high income earners, this can mean 
the difference between a comfortable and very comfortable retirement.  For low 
income earners this means the difference between comfort and poverty.  A funded 
pension system implies a high degree of financial risk, both for individuals and 
society. 
2.5 Summary 
This section considered pensions and elderly inequality, particularly poverty.  Data on 
public pension expenditure and elderly poverty in the OECD suggests higher public 
pension expenditure is necessary to reduce elderly poverty, particularly among 
women living alone.  The review of studies of elderly inequality in developed and 
developing countries suggests that neoliberal pension reform does increase inequality.  
The analysis of the Australian compulsory funded pension system demonstrates that 
more than half of the unemployed and more than two-thirds of carers have no 
superannuation coverage.  Provisional modelling suggested that working families on 
median incomes may expect a pension of only 30 per cent of median income from 
superannuation, and families on low incomes (two-thirds of median income) may 
expect a pension of only 20 per cent of median income.  These families will continue 
to require public support to avoid poverty.  Small adjustments to base case variables 
produced widely divergent results, emphasising the high degree of financial risk 
associated with funded pension systems.  The alternative to high replacement rate 
public pensions is poverty and uncertainty. 
3 Pensions and labour markets 
3.1 The neoliberal view: labour market distortion 
Neoliberal academic economists associate a variety of economic ills with high 
replacement rate public pension systems.  The labour market is one of the 
mechanisms by which these ills are supposed to be generated.   
Robert Holzmann of the World Bank argues that high replacement rate public pension 
systems cause labour market distortions with 'dead-weight losses' of resources and 
output (Holzmann, 1999: 4).  Börsch-Supan claims that “the overall tax burden on 
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labour [in European high replacement rate systems] has reached highly distorting 
levels, creating disincentives to work and reducing labour demand” (Börsch-Supan, 
1999: 2).  Ralf Nöcker writes that in Germany, “as in many other European countries, 
high social security charges have been identified as one of the causes of sustained 
high unemployment” (Nöcker, 2000: 2).  Siebert (1997: 2) makes identical 
conclusions in relation to Germany.  These authors essentially follow the line 
developed by the World Bank that pension contributions are a tax wedge rather than a 
savings mechanism (representing deferred income and consumption). 
[T]he defined benefit formula and pay-as-you-go method of 
finance break [the] link between benefits and contributions – 
benefits to some are not as great as their contributions, whereas 
others can get the benefits even if they do not contribute.  So, 
workers who bear the tax may try to evade it by reducing their 
labour supply or escaping to the informal sector, whereas 
employers who bear it may reduce the quantity of labour they 
demand. 
… 
In the few situations in which wages cannot fall any further 
because a legal or social minimum has been reached, employers 
pay the tax and may cut back on employment and output as a 
result.  This is inefficient.  This line of thought suggests that the 
rise in payroll tax rates in OECD countries over the last two 
decades may be one possible explanation for the rise in 
unemployment and the more general slowdown in the growth of 
real wages. (World Bank, 1994: 121) 
Much of this literature asserts the superiority of an 'Anglo-American’ socio-economic 
model characterised by a small state, low income transfers, and flexible labour 
protection laws.  It is contrasted with a continental European socio-economic model 
with the opposite characteristics.  Lower unemployment rates and higher growth rates 
in the former case have been key to these assertions during the 1990s.  In this context, 
pensions are a part of a broader debate, though an important part, as pensions 
constitute the largest single component of the welfare state.  
In summary, the neoliberal position is that public pensions increase labour costs and 
therefore reduce competitiveness, reduce demand for labour which causes 
unemployment, and reduce labour supply particularly by encouraging early retirement.  
As discussed in the previous section, this analysis discounts the profound effect that 
public pensions have in reducing elderly poverty; an effect that cannot be matched by 
private pensions.  The position has other weaknesses.  It is ahistorical, ignoring higher 
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growth rates and lower unemployment rates in areas with non-Anglo-American socio-
economic models, including Europe and Japan.  At the aggregate level it 
misrepresents the relative levels of competitiveness between the Anglo-American and 
European models.  It also ignores the wide regional differences in employment and 
growth within the regions, which suggest more complex determinants of these 
measures than social security arrangements. 
In relation to early retirement, the neoliberal position exaggerates the connection 
between social security and retirement, ignores more modest reform methods, which 
remove incentives to retire early without reducing redistribution, and does not provide 
a realistic policy alternative for governments that explicitly promote early retirement 
to maintain employment turnover and reduce unemployment. 
3.2 Pensions and competitiveness 
A notion underlying much criticism of generous social security in Europe is that an 
Anglo-American free market socio-economic model produces superior economic 
growth.  The flipside of this is that it is assumed that European economies are in 
urgent need of radical neoliberal economic reform.  This notion ignores the tendency 
for economic growth to exhibit long-term cycles at the regional level.  Western 
Europe grew rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s, as did Japan into the 1970s and 
1980s.  An apparently higher growth trajectory in the USA and UK during the 1990s 
appears to have stalled.  Predictions could not currently be made about economic 
growth with any certainty, even in the short term. 
The critique of pensions based on their impact on labour markets ignores the profound 
geographic differences in employment and growth within the large regions.  There are 
heavily depressed areas in much of both Europe and North America, and also areas 
with very high growth and low unemployment in both regions.  These differences 
suggest that macro policy settings, including social security, do not determine levels 
of employment.  Reducing public pensions  and social security is not the key to a 
dynamic and successful economy. 
The International Labour Office (ILO) offers an alternative interpretation of the 
European socio-economic model to the neoliberal analysis.  According to Michel 
Cichon of the ILO, high labour remuneration including pension contributions 
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encourages a longer-term perspective to employment, including ongoing investment 
in education and training, and higher levels of investment in capital and technology: 
What is claimed here is that there are good reasons to believe that 
high levels of social spending in Europe are not only financially 
sustainable but might even be economically efficient since they 
help in sustaining high levels of productivity and thus reduce the 
number of hours that European populations have to work. 
(Cichon, 1997: 2) 
The European Union has higher average productivity than the US.  High income 
countries in the EU, such as Germany, Northern Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands 
and Austria, have significantly higher productivity than the US.  The US does have 
higher income per capita.  However, this is the result of higher employment, longer 
working days, longer working weeks and fewer holidays, which more than 
compensate for lower levels of productivity.  Work in the US is less efficient, 
particularly in terms of labour hours used, due to lower average skills and lower 
capital intensity.  As a result, average earned income (wages and salaries) is lower, 
despite having higher income per capita (and workers working for more of their lives).  
Pension systems and other aspects of the welfare state contribute to making the 
economy more productive.  Such a tendency is self-reinforcing, as higher productivity 
will drive increased growth and higher incomes. 
3.3 Pensions and early retirement 
The period between 1950 and 1990 have seen the average age of retirement fall 
markedly in OECD countries.  The average retirement age for males decreased by 
more than 6 years from 68.5 in 1950 to 62.2 in 1990.  Japan was the only country in 
which the retirement age increased (Latulippe, 1996).  The trend was most 
pronounced on average in the 1970s, and slower during the 1980s.  The fall in total 
labour participation has been offset by growing female labour participation generally, 
including among older cohorts.   
Feldstein (1974) argued that one mechanism by which public pension systems reduce 
savings is to encourage reduction of labour supply, particularly among those 
approaching retirement.  An empirical effect of this kind was found by Gruber and 
Wise (1996, initially 1981).  They found retirement 'spikes' at ages that correspond to 
eligibility for entitlements, particularly the age of earliest available benefits, and the 
age of maximum available benefits.  In the US, 62 is the earliest age at which 
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participants can claim social security for old age.  Gruber and Wise present evidence 
in relation to the US, France and Germany, that such spikes have appeared when 
certain design elements that encourage early retirement have been introduced, and 
disappeared when they have been removed (1996: 18-19).   
There is evidence that benefit formulae and eligibility criteria combine to provide low 
or negative financial incentive for workers approaching retirement age to keep 
working.  This happens when people are excluded from pension benefits if they 
continue to work, including via means tests, and/or if they get no extra benefits from 
continuing to work even though they continue to make contributions to the pension 
system.  The marginal benefit from staying in the workforce and in the fund can 
reduce very quickly and even become negative.  These effects are described by 
neoliberals as an 'implicit tax on labour' (Holzmann et al, 2000, Blöndal and Scarpetta, 
1998).  These arguments are used in support of radical neoliberal pension reform. 
There are a number of reasons why such a radical response might not be appropriate.  
The first is that early retirement may well be an intended outcome of public pension 
policy.  Strong encouragement for elderly workers to retire was an explicit aim of 
both unions and employers in calling for public pensions in the UK during the early 
years of the 20th century.  They sought to ‘speed the exit’ of older workers from the 
labour market (Macnicol, 1994:76).  This goal was again emphasised in the late-1970s 
and early-1980s in some European countries, such as France.  These countries 
reduced minimum retirement ages during periods of high unemployment in an attempt 
to reduce labour supply (Clark, 2001b: 1).  Encouragement of early retirement is a 
policy response to a real and difficult economic context.  With continuing high 
unemployment in most developed countries, there is no indication that such effects are 
on the decline, so this social pressure cannot be expected to disappear. 
Second, elements of public PAYGO system design that do encourage early retirement 
can be easily reformed without affecting the overall replacement rate.  Benefits can be 
moved to an actuarially fair basis in which people are rewarded fairly for continuing 
to work and make contributions.  American Social Security benefit formulae were 
altered to an actuarially-fair basis in the early 1980s without altering redistribution or 
overall replacement rates, and a schedule of retirement age increases were slated to 
begin in the year 2000 (SSA, 2000: 12-13).   
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Reforms with similar aims were implemented in Australia by the Howard 
Government in the 1997-1998 Budget.  The Deferred Pension Bonus Plan offers 
individuals reaching pension age a positive incentive to defer retirement.  Under the 
plan, a person who defers pension take-up (and works more than 25 hours per week) 
receives a tax-exempt bonus payment of 9.4 per cent of the basic pension for each 
year deferred up to five years (Treasury, 2001: 71).  There is no reason why such 
reforms cannot be implemented in more generous public pension systems.  For 
example, in Sweden, normal retirement age is 61, however, under measures 
introduced in 1994, people can continue to work longer for higher pension benefits 
(Diamond, 2000g: 9; Palmer, 2000: 1). 
Elements of system design that encourage early retirement are not a rationale for 
system destruction.  System redesign to prevent early retirement would exclude some 
basic neoliberal reforms, including the means-testing of public benefits.  Means-
testing prevents workers from engaging in potentially valuable part-time work 
because it may exclude the worker from benefits.  Means-testing also adds significant 
administrative costs. 
Finally, the effect of the retirement income system on the retirement decision can be 
exaggerated.  The trend towards early retirement has occurred in several countries that 
have had no change in their pension systems, such as New Zealand.  Surveys suggest 
that the retirement decision for some may be involuntary.  Burtless and Quinn 
reviewed US social security surveys which suggest that retirement is most commonly 
associated with health concerns and redundancy, as it always has been (Burtless and 
Quinn, 2000 in Grimmond, 2001).  Undoubtedly, prejudice among employers has 
reduced demand for older labour.  Researchers have found no rational grounds for 
'younger worker preferences', which are obvious among employers.  Social mores 
have a role here: from the employers' perspective, offering early redundancy is the 
most socially-acceptable method of shedding labour.  The fact that labour demand 
falls with age suggests that reform of pension systems to 'prevent early retirement' 
may simply punish the victims of prejudice who have increasingly poor access to the 
labour market. 
Average retirement ages also conceal differences among socio-economic groupings.  
Early retirement is more common among those with lower education levels.  Common 
explanations for this effect include higher pay during later employment for those with 
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higher education levels, more job satisfaction, and lower physical deterioration from 
less physical work (Grimmond, 2001: 14).  As cohorts with higher education levels, 
such as the baby-boomers, head towards retirement, it is plausible that these cohorts 
will have higher retirement ages, and the trend will be reversed. 
4 Conclusions 
Neoliberals claim that public pensions distort labour markets and do not redistribute 
wealth.  The findings in this chapter contradict this claim.  There is a strong inverse 
relationship between public pension expenditure as a proportion of GDP and the level 
of elderly poverty, particularly among women.  Countries that have lower reliance on 
public pensions show higher levels of elderly poverty and countries that have 
encouraged private pensions show increasing levels of elderly inequality. 
There is no evidence that reducing levels of public pensions will facilitate greater 
economic growth due to the removal of distortions in labour markets.  High 
replacement rate public pensions are entirely consistent with high levels of 
productivity, based on higher investment in training and capital.   
Incentives to retire early in the pension system are explicit policy in some countries.  
If and when policy priorities change, encouragement of early retirement can easily be 
removed by means of reforms to award benefits on an actuarially fair basis, and by 
removing work restrictions and means-testing, without reducing the replacement rate 
of the pension system or removing progressive redistribution. 
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Chapter 6 Political economy 
Averting’s diagnosis, in a nutshell, was that pillar 1 systems, 
funded or unfunded, were fatally flawed from a political 
economy point of view. The temptation to shift costs to future 
generations could easily be irresistible, especially in less 
developed political systems which are typical in Bank client 
countries. Low savings, systemic deficits and crises were 
therefore postulated to be an inevitable outcome of this model. In 
addition, even if politicians were well-behaved, and adequate 
funding for demographic shocks was created, public sector 
management of these reserves had a poor record compared with 
private sector management, and anyway, private sector 
management improved financial sector development, increasingly 
recognized as an important element in overall economic growth. 
Finally, the poor design and credibility problems of ‘solidarity’ 
systems distorted labor market choices, reducing formal sector 
demand for labor, and thus creating unemployment and 
inefficient informal markets. (Palmer and Fox, 1999: 3-4) 
1 Introduction 
This recent World Bank paper summarises and reaffirms the position on public 
pension administration promoted in Averting the Old Age Crisis (World Bank, 1994).  
The Bank raises two issues relating specifically to the interaction between the state 
and public pension systems.  First, political pressure on leaders encourages them to 
make offers of generous pensions which may only be feasible in the short term.  
Winners and losers from pension system transfers are constituents who may be 
appealed to in democratic elections.  Fox and Palmer describe politicians succumbing 
to this ‘irresistible temptation’ as ‘shifting costs to future generations…leading 
inevitably to low savings, systemic deficits and crises’.   
Second, the public pension system cannot, ultimately, be quarantined from other state 
finances.  According to the Bank, pension reserves can and will be ransacked. 
One of the main conclusions of Averting was that while advance 
funding is highly desirable, there is considerable political risk 
involved in public administration of pension funds. … The risks 
involve everything from restricting investments and investment 
returns to fund confiscation to meet political ends. To mitigate 
these risks, individual account systems, privately managed, were 
recommended. (Fox and Palmer, 1999: 23) 
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There is no point disputing the existence of these risks.  Any financial system carries 
the risk of appropriation and mismanagement.  And the long-term interests of any 
nation – democratic and otherwise – can be undermined by short-term populist policy.  
However, in this chapter I argue that public pension crisis due to political interference 
is not inevitable, or necessarily likely.  A brief global survey of public pension 
systems shows both that pension crises in most cases have other causes, notably large-
scale political and economic collapse, and that there are many examples of sustainable 
and anticipatory public management.   
I also contest the assertion that neoliberal reform is an effective solution to these risks.  
A review of private pension systems demonstrates that they suffer identical or greater 
risks: private pension systems have winners and losers who influence policy; and 
private pension assets are also subject to misappropriation and cannot be quarantined 
from fiscal, economic and political crisis.   
2 Public pension system crisis 
Promoters of neoliberal reform have conducted a long-term campaign to characterise 
public pension systems as inherently and inevitably susceptible to crisis.  According to 
the World Bank and others, political leaders either promise too much (especially 
important in the context of demographic change), direct public pension reserves into 
non-performing investments, or undermine system finances by diverting pension 
funding for other purposes.  Populations prefer lower contributions and seek to avoid 
making contributions by under-declaring income, using tax havens and joining 
informal labour markets.  Elements of this characterisation – particularly in relation to 
the negative impact of demographic change – have been taken up by the media in 
developed countries.  Many voters no longer have faith in public pensions; expecting 
zero or reduced benefits at retirement (Lam et al, 1997: 108; Boeri et al, 2001: 4).  
This voter perception is an important aspect of support for private pensions.  
An international review of public pension systems suggests alternative conclusions.  
System failure in most cases is related to political and economic crisis, in some cases 
brought about by radical neoliberal economic policy.  Demography adds fiscal 
pressure to systems in developed countries, but is not a factor in system crisis in 
developing countries.  Many public systems demonstrate a capacity to manage 
pension liabilities and assets in the long-term, including periodic alterations to policy. 
Chapter 6 Political economy 161 
 
2.1 Chile and Latin America 
As discussed in chapter 1, above, the experience of Chile is notable for a number of 
reasons.  Chile was the first country to embark on a compulsory private funded 
pension scheme, and the reform was implemented under the Pinochet dictatorship, 
with policy input from the IMF.  The Chilean reform began a domino effect in Latin 
America, where Peru (1992), Colombia (1993), Argentina (1993), Uruguay (1995), 
Mexico (1995-1996), Bolivia (1997) and El Salvador (1998) have implemented 
private pension systems and Nicaragua and Venezuela are both likely to implement 
such a system (Turner, 2001: 18).  Reform is also underway in Brazil, the largest 
regional economy (Studart, 2000).  Elements of the Chilean reform were reproduced 
in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, also with guidance 
and encouragement from international financial institutions. 
In Chile, the replacement of the public system with a compulsory private system took 
place in 1980.  Pension reform was part of a suite of neoliberal reform which included 
trade liberalisation, capital market liberalisation, privatisation, labour market 
liberalisation and reduced government spending (Acuna and Iglesies, 2001: 21).   
The traditional neoliberal narrative holds that pension systems in Latin America failed 
due to insolvency caused by 'political resistance to change to systems'.  Brooks and 
James lament: 
It has become apparent that many policies that we recommend at 
the [World] Bank for technical economic reasons have not been 
implemented for political reasons. (Brooks and James, 1999) 
The standard narrative blames crisis on insufficient contributions caused by 
demographic issues, overly generous benefits and low retirement ages, and narrow 
coverage.  In this vein, Aiyer suggests that:  
While not every country has the same degree of problems with 
regard to contributions, benefits and coverage, the preponderance 
of these concerns suggests that these problems are inherent in 
pay-as-you-go, defined benefit plans (1997: 3). 
Barrientos' study (1998) of Latin American pension reform provides a more detailed 
analysis.  He notes some traditional neoliberal concerns, including a structural 
weakness in Latin American public pension systems that allowed full benefits to be 
earned with very few years of contributions.  However, his research suggests these 
issues were not the main cause of crisis.  In Chile between 1960 and 1980, there was a 
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sharp deterioration in the system support ratio38 - the ratio of active to passive 
members - from 10.8 to 2.2 - requiring a five-fold increase in worker contributions.  
This change was not due to demographic influences but instead due to a set of policies 
intended to undermine and bankrupt welfare provision.  These included economic 
policies which encouraged the growth of informal labour markets, and industrial 
relations policy which gave employers freedom from administrative and legal 
constraints.     
Important elements of the Junta’s economic policy undermined formal labour markets.  
Privatisation, reduced government spending and trade liberalisation all reduced the 
scope of formal labour markets, and therefore the numbers of contributors to the 
public system.  Government business enterprises, the bureaucracy and the 
manufacturing industry were all formal labour markets, featuring high union 
membership and pension participation (Barrientos, 1998: 20, 22).  The decrease in 
employment in each area was a double blow to the pension system, which lost high 
paid contributors but gained more beneficiaries in the form of the unemployed, early 
retirees and an increased number of disability pension claimants.  New areas of 
economic activity encouraged by trade liberalisation, particularly mining and 
agriculture, were informal labour markets outside the existing and new pension 
arrangements (Barrientos, 1998: 23).   
In the industrial relations area, although labour protection laws were not removed 
until 1979, employers had an effective carte blanche.  The regime had leaders of the 
political and union opposition imprisoned, tortured and assassinated, with the effect 
that the existing labour laws were rendered meaningless (Barrientos, 1998: 22-23).  
Among other deteriorating conditions, employers were able to avoid making social 
security contributions on behalf of employees. 
By 1980, the situation was untenable and opportune for reformist elements within 
Chile which, under direction from the Junta, had been working since 1974 on the 
design of a new private pension system based on personal accounts (Acuna and 
Iglesies, 2001: 19). 
 
38 The reciprocal of the system dependency ratio. 
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Similar effects were wrought on the public pension systems of other Latin American 
countries during the economic crisis and debt spirals of the 1980s and 1990s. 
According to Barrientos, across Latin America economic conditions had a stronger 
impact than demographic factors, demonstrated by the fact that crisis occurred in 
countries without any demographic pressure (Argentina has a relatively old 
population) (1998: 24).   
Neoliberals suggest high contributions associated with public pensions encourage 
labour to ‘escape to informal labour markets’ (World Bank, 1994: 122), but the 
Chilean case suggests another causality: reactionary governments intentionally 
encouraged the development of informal labour markets, undermining social welfare 
including pensions. 
2.2 The Transition Economies 
World Bank reports on Eastern European and Central Asian transition economies 
describe the hopeless situation of public pension systems in those countries by the 
mid-1990s.  In Hungary, for example, the health and pension budgets were both 
financed by payroll taxes, which were up to 7-8 per cent of GDP, and 40 per cent of 
labour costs (i.e. 80 per cent of wages) by the early 1990s (Palacios and Rocha, 1997: 
1).  This fiscal pressure precipitated action by the Bank to encourage39 a series of 
countries, including Poland, Hungary and Kazakhstan, to adopt private funded 
systems. 
The Bank does not discuss the contribution made to fiscal pressure by the abrupt 
transfer of ownership and restructure of public enterprises combined with trade 
liberalisation.  Transition reforms from 1990 onwards in Hungary caused a massive 
increase in unemployment.  As unemployment benefits did not exist (they were not 
required in the former communist countries due to the full employment policy), many 
of the newly unemployed entered involuntary early retirement and began claiming 
disability pensions.  The Bank describes this trend as an 'abuse' of the pension system 
(Palacios and Rocha, 1997: 5).   
 
39 Methods employed by the Bank and other IFIs in developing and transition companies on behalf of 
the neoliberal political agenda and foreign business interests are discussed in Section 4. 
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Events followed a similar pattern in Poland: 
Difficulties appeared in assuring the financial sustainability of the 
Social Insurance Fund (FUS). As a result, the social insurance 
contribution rate grew quickly from 25% in 1981 to 38% during 
1987-1989 up to the present level of 45%. The crisis was caused 
by the simultaneous occurrence of a sudden increase in the 
number of new pensioners, especially in 1991, with effects in 
later years including a decrease in the number of contributors as a 
result of a decline in employment, and a distinct growth in the 
real value of pensions compared to real compensation.  As a 
result, the consolidated state budget became more burdened with 
disability pensions and other benefit costs. (OGSPPR, 1997: 4) 
The importance of precedents in other countries, such as Chile, is obvious in 
documents describing the Kazakhstan reform: 
Although the analysis of future benefits was far from thorough, 
the general optimism about future economic growth and high 
rates of return, in light of the Chilean experience, led Kazakhstan 
policymakers to discontinue the PAYGO system while 
maintaining rights accrued before January 1, 1998. (Andrews, 
2000: i) 
The summary of conditions in Kazakhstan before the reform suggest institutional and 
general economic weakness, rather than demographic or political failure. 
Kazakhstan, a country with favorable demographics for a pay-as-
you-go pension scheme, had a high system dependency burden 
and correspondingly high payroll taxes due to ineffective 
collection procedures and early retirement ages. Essentially, the 
growth of the informal sector and the development of wage 
arrears led to a relatively small tax base relative to the actual 
labor share of income in the economy. (Andrews, 2000: 4) 
A group of reformers with backgrounds in finance implemented the radical reform 
that included closing the public pension system, privatisation of state assets, 
implementation of compulsory private pensions and attempts to rapidly boost capital 
market capitalisation.  
In summary, pension system crisis in Latin America and the transition economies 
resulted from economic turmoil related to structural change, the impact of which was 
worsened by neoliberal economic policy.  These examples do not suggest that public 
pensions are inherently and inevitably flawed. 
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2.3 Africa 
The World Bank uses examples of pension systems in Africa to illustrate its critique 
of public pension systems.  Averting describes how the Zambian public provident 
fund lost 23 per cent of assets invested in public securities in one year, and half of the 
value of contributions were wasted on administration during the 1980s (World Bank, 
1994: 2).  Many of the former British colonies in Africa and Asia had provident funds, 
the most successful and longest-lasting of which are the Singaporean and Malay 
systems.  The provident fund is a form of public pension system which is funded and 
holds personal accounts unlike European and American PAYGO social insurance.  
Several of these systems in Africa were converted to PAYGO systems due to very 
low or negative returns, including those in The Seychelles (late-1970s), Ghana (1991), 
Nigeria (1994) and Tanzania and Gabon (1997), with proposals under consideration in 
Kenya and Uganda (Turner, 2001: 9-10).  Assets in these systems appear to have been 
eroded by inflation, poor investment or misappropriation.  
It is unclear exactly what crisis in these (mostly sub-Saharan) African pension 
systems proves. Many of the countries with systems in crisis have underdeveloped 
physical and social infrastructure, which are essential prerequisites for effective 
centralised collection, payment and administration.  A pension system is not possible 
without modern transport and communication systems.  Coverage is less than 10 per 
cent in most African countries, with no systems at all until very recently in Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Turner, 2001: 10).  Internal 
and external conflict has wrecked havoc in the economies of Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Liberia, and 
HIV/AIDS has reduced life expectancy by more than a decade throughout sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly decimating working age populations (Turner, 2001: 10).   
Economic growth has been anaemic in much of the region during its recent history.  
The background of economic and political conflict hardly provides a controlled test of 
the effectiveness of public pension systems.  Social insurance, like other forms of 
insurance, offers only limited protection against systemic collapse. 
Elsewhere on the African continent, public pension systems have proven effective in 
providing near universal coverage and reducing elderly poverty.  ILO researcher 
Mohamed Chaabane found that in Tunisia, the social security system covers more 
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than 80 per cent of the employed population, with successes in the last ten years 
including inclusion of more than 50 per cent of the self-employed (Chaabane, 2002: 
11).   
Mauritius, while arguably having unique characteristics as an island state, is another 
African nation with a successful, universal, non-contributory (i.e. funded out of 
general revenue) public pension system.  The pension in Mauritius has been universal 
since means tests were removed in 1958.  As Larry Willmore concludes: 
Mauritius demonstrates clearly that basic pensions for all are not 
only theoretically desirable; they are also affordable and 
politically feasible in a developing country (Willmore, 2003: 19). 
2.4 South-East Asia 
The provident funds of South East Asia have been relatively successful.  There are 
provident funds in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, The Philippines and Thailand.  
The level of success appears to be a function of political stability, population structure 
(higher density is better) and effective physical and social infrastructure.  Coverage in 
1996 was 90 per cent of resident workers in Singapore, more than 50 per cent of 
resident workers in Malaysia, and around 70 per cent of the labour force in the 
Philippines.  In Indonesia, at best 20 per cent of the workforce is covered (Asher, 
Undated). 
Contributions are very high in Singapore, at 40 per cent of income (reduced to 30 per 
cent during the Asian currency crisis of 1997).  The provident funds are not 
necessarily just retirement income systems.  Though originally intended for this 
purpose, members are allowed to access most of their funds before this date to fund 
housing purchase, pay for medical and educational expenses, and in periods of 
financial hardship such as unemployment.  It is typical, despite the high contributions, 
for members to reach retirement with little available capital (Asher, 1999: 26).  
However, most people own their own homes (often subsidised housing) at retirement, 
which is a significant achievement for an Asian country with an extreme land shortage.  
This, in itself, has a significant impact on elderly poverty. 
Some researchers have been critical of the Singaporean provident fund for a lack of 
transparency and excessive regulation of fund investment. In 1998, fund investment 
was partially liberalised, though it is too early to evaluate these policies. It has been 
suggested that due to a lack of data on fund earnings, it is possible that the 
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government may be appropriating fund profits (Asher, 1999: 19). It is certainly 
reasonable to suggest that a more transparent administrative structure would assist in 
evaluation of the provident fund. 
2.5 OECD countries 
A detailed survey of the public pension systems of OECD countries is not possible 
here; however only a brief summary is necessary to illustrate the weakness of the 
assertion that public pensions inevitably tend toward crisis.  In particular, it is evident 
in the responses of governments in developed countries that: 
• governments can reform in anticipation of changing financial needs; 
• a range of reform options are available to governments; and 
• there is strong political support for pension systems, including in countries 
with very high contribution levels. 
In an effort to impress the need for the reform of generous public pension systems 
upon the policy and general community, neoliberals describe pension liabilities as 
'implicit government debt'.   Governments with generous public PAYGO systems 
carry financial obligations associated with those systems which may be several times 
explicit government debt (Holzmann et al, 2000).  However, as discussed in chapter 2, 
Diamond (2000c) argues persuasively that explicit and implicit debt are not 
comparable.  Public PAYGO pension system benefits are not fixed liabilities but 
negotiable and conditional upon governments', and the community’s, ability to pay.   
Governments can and do reduce benefits when necessitated by demographic or 
economic circumstances.  Turner (2001: 25-6) lists ten methods by which OECD 
governments have reduced benefits in the last 15 years: 
• introducing an actuarially adjusted calculation of early retirement benefits 
(eg. US, Australia); 
• raising the retirement age of women (lower in many countries) to match 
that of men (eg. Germany, Australia); 
• raising the early or normal retirement age of both men and women 
(Germany); 
Chapter 6 Political economy 168 
 
• increasing the number of years used to calculate benefits, which tends to 
include years from earlier in working life at lower levels of pay, and 
increases the chance of inclusion of some period of unemployment, (Italy 
– the period was increased from the last 5 years to lifetime earnings); 
• changing indexing to prices rather than wages (eg. UK); 
• changing accrual benefit formulae (Japan); 
• lowering survivor's benefits calculations (The Netherlands); 
• basing accruals on net wages rather than gross wages (Germany); 
• basing indexing on net wages rather than gross wages (Germany - indexing 
will be lower due to anticipated rises in social security contributions); and 
• introduction of means tests and other mechanisms to reduce eligibility (eg. 
Australia). 
Governments clearly have and exercise the capacity to reduce benefits if this is 
necessary.  Incremental reform is possible and desirable, given the demonstrated value 
of public pensions in reducing elderly poverty. 
Neoliberals assert powerful and growing voter discontent in relation to social security, 
and have conducted extensive polling on the issue.  The level of resentment is seen as 
a driver of evasion and political resistance to contributions, which undermines welfare 
systems. 
Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001) conducted a major study in Europe to 
document increasing opposition to high social contributions associated with the 
cradle-to-grave welfare state.  To the authors' surprise, however, the high replacement 
rate welfare states of Europe enjoy majority political support in all countries (2001: 
10).  Voters are aware of the benefits of high replacement rate pension systems as 
well as the costs.  Critical views concerning welfare state provisions, and support for 
radical reform, is highest in Italy.  Arguably, Italy is a special case by Western 
European standards.  Its welfare system lacks traditional elements such as 
unemployment benefits, there are widely-held perceptions of a corrupt and inefficient 
bureaucracy, and socio-economic differences between the North and South fuel 
resentment over social transfers.  Even in Italy, however, the group of dissatisfied 
voters is in the minority. 
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Despite widespread promotion of the idea of social security crisis in the US, Marmor 
and Mashaw report similar findings in that country: American opinion polling shows 
strong support for social insurance (Marmor and Mashaw, 1998: 5).  Concerns that 
government might undermine social security in the US are real, but these are not 
related to the irresistible temptation faced by populist politicians to woo voters with 
unsustainable pension policies.  Economists such as Paul Krugman regard current US 
tax policy as self-evidently designed to sabotage government revenue balance in order 
to cause a ‘fiscal train-wreck’ that will necessitate the dismantling of social security 
and other key social programs (Krugman, 27/5/2003). 
The financial sustainability of public pensions is considered in more detail in the next 
chapter.   
2.6 Summary 
The neoliberal suggestion that public pensions inevitably lead to crisis appears 
unfounded.  Examples of system crisis appear to have causes other than policy 
paralysis caused by political economy.  In the case of several African countries, 
particularly in the sub-Sahara, causes for crisis include ineffective institutional 
apparatus, economic and political collapse and war.  In Chile, as in much of Latin 
America, and potentially in the US, economic policy contributed directly to a collapse 
in social security system revenue, making the systems unsustainable.  
Examples of effective, universal or near universal pension coverage of a variety of 
kinds – such as the non-contributory Mauritian system, the Provident funds of South 
East Asia and the contributory system of Tunisia – indicate that public pensions do 
not inevitably fall into crisis.  In the developed world, in which demographic change 
will soon have an impact on system finances, governments have been able to 
incrementally reform systems, without the need for radical neoliberal reform. 
3 Insulation of private pensions from government 
Government decision-makers are perceived by neoliberals as having a detrimental 
impact on pension fund investment.  Mitchell and Piggott describe the risks of… 
…the practice known in Australia as “directed” and in the US as 
“economically targeted” investment (ETI). The concern behind 
the ETI issue is that public pension managers may be investing 
assets using political criteria rather than risk and return, a 
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problematic outcome if such investments perform poorly. 
(Mitchell and Piggott, 2000: 8) 
The neoliberal solution is to implement private funded systems. 
Private management of the funds allows the funds to be separated 
from the political process so that the funds are managed for the 
retiree’s best interest rather than being forced to fulfil other 
political objectives (Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt, 1999: 6). 
The neoliberal position is that private funded pension systems are not headed by 
politicians, and management does not report to politicians.  Fund investment and 
administration is in the hands of finance professionals, who, with appropriate 
incentive structures and a suitable regulatory environment, will make investments in 
the fiduciary interest of the beneficiaries.  It is hoped that the pension system is 
outside the influence of politicians, and should not be affected by state fiscal crisis 
(and also that the state cannot be compromised by pension system failure).  Funds 
invested according to risk management principles should provide members with 
appropriate risk-return. 
However, the notion that the pension system can be quarantined from political 
influence or systemic crisis is unrealistic.  Any state-sanctioned pension system has 
been created by government, and policies can be withdrawn or amended at any time.  
Moreover, a private pension system is not independent of the domestic or global 
economy.  Economic and political turmoil will undermine the capacity of a private 
pension fund to provide retirement income, as severely or more so than a public 
pension fund.  In cases of extreme fiscal pressure, private pension assets are a 
relatively accessible form of financial value for use by a government.   
Neoliberal faith in private sector managers is misplaced.  Private pension funds 
periodically fail, creating a moral and practical dilemma.  Either members must be left 
out of pocket or the state must assume financial responsibility.  In either case, the 
objective of providing retirement income without government support is not met.  
State-sanctioned pension systems, particularly compulsory systems, have a political 
obligation to provide compensation.  In voluntary systems, such as in the US, 
compensation is not paid. 
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3.1 Private pension system reform 
Private funded pension systems are implemented by governments through 
concessional taxation and/or mandated contributions.  More generally, pension 
systems exist in a regulatory framework provided and enforced by the state.  As was 
discussed in chapter 3, there are a number of approaches to provision of a regulatory 
framework.  Pension funds may have restrictions on investment, such as limits on 
exposure to certain assets, or foreign holdings. 
Neoliberals favour a laissez-faire or 'prudent man' philosophy, which has a reduced 
emphasis on explicit regulations related to investment and returns.  However, even the 
'prudent man' approach requires regulations that deal with licensing, governance, 
communications, administration, conflict resolution, and, in the UK (for ‘stakeholder’ 
pensions) the fee basis. 
Political machinations aside, it is implausible and undesirable that a regulatory 
environment should be designed once and then never be altered.  It is necessary that 
pension system design be flexible, and may be altered in response to either technical, 
organisational or external developments (such as changing economic conditions or 
state development).  An example of a driver of system redesign is European 
unification, which may lead to the standardisation of private pension regulations 
throughout the EU (Tillotson, 2000). 
The political objectives of different governments may also be expected to have an 
impact on system design.  The Australian superannuation system has had many major 
regulatory changes since 1985.40  Several of these changes have involved system 
fundamentals, such as coverage, tax treatment and contribution levels.  It is with 
regard to this history that Bateman and Piggott observe that the independence of 
private pension systems from the political system is an impossibility: 
… while Superannuation Guarantee accumulations rest in the 
private sector, and are therefore not part of the government 
budgetary process, they are not completely insulated from 
political risk. It is open to any government to increase tax rates 
on accumulations and/or benefits – as was the case with the 
introduction of the superannuation surcharge – or to make 
 
40 For a history see Treasury, 2001 or Rothman, 2000.  
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detrimental changes to the regulatory environment. (Bateman and 
Piggott, 2001: 19) 
In the US, reforms planned by Bush are intended to enable private pension funds to 
restructure defined benefit pensions.  This will reduce employers’ exposure to 
investment risk and reduce member benefits (Walsh, 13/1/2002).  The plans have 
been represented as being a necessary and pragmatic response to current financial 
conditions to avoid potentially widespread corporate failures.  This reform represents 
a unilateral recasting of liabilities impossible in other areas of the financial system.  
Pension assets, whether public or private, are not equivalent to other financial assets. 
Far from being insulated from political decisions, private pensions are, like other 
areas of policy, subject to review and alteration by government. 
3.2 Economic and political crisis 
The lack of insulation of private pension systems from government is most visible in 
extreme economic and political conditions.  This has been demonstrated by the 
Argentinean economic crisis of 2001.   
The Argentinean crisis represents a failure in economic policy.  In 1990, the 
Argentinean peso was pegged to the US dollar to stem hyper-inflation.  The policy 
required the acquisition of foreign currency reserves to maintain the peg which 
necessitated borrowing and diverted government spending from other areas.  The 
policy did not anticipate the rapid appreciation of the US dollar against other Latin 
American currencies, which made Argentinean exports (a major focus of other 
neoliberal economic reforms such as trade liberalisation) relatively uncompetitive.  
The policy suppressed economic growth, achieving low inflation at the expense of 
high unemployment.  Maintaining the peg also required interest rates of up to 20 per 
cent, which inflated public borrowing to 9 per cent of GDP (Stiglitz, 10/1/2002).   
Tax revenue fell due to further economic stagnation, and the government became 
dependent on emergency loans from the IMF.  In December 2001 the IMF refused to 
extend further credit, and the government was left unable to pay bills, including 
salaries (Rohter, 26/2/2002).  Soon after, the government took control of $US 3.5 
billion in private pension funds (Catan and Lapper, 7/12/2001).  This appropriation 
followed a year of near compulsory diversion of pension fund and bank capital flows 
to finance government debt.  The Financial Times reported that an IMF spokesman 
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said that actions taken by the Argentinean government were '"regrettable", but that 
few alternatives were available'. 
The Argentinean collapse demonstrates that a state under pressure to meet urgent 
financial needs can and will appropriate funds accumulated by private pension 
systems.  Quarantine of private pension funds from the state is ineffective. 
More general conclusions can be drawn about the usefulness of private funded 
pension systems in developing countries.  In many very poor countries, social security 
coverage is a profound problem, with coverage levels below 50 per cent in many 
developing countries and below 10 per cent in many extremely poor African countries 
(Turner, 2001).  However, lack of coverage caused by small formal labour markets 
and inadequate communications and transport infrastructure cannot be addressed via 
implementation of private funded pensions.  As the ILO recognise,  
both funded and PAYG pension systems are faced with largely 
the same problem with regard to the extension of coverage, i.e. 
the fact that in many countries a large, and often growing, part of 
the labour force works in the informal economy (Ginneken, 2003: 
38).   
The major difference between the two types of system is not the level of vulnerability 
to economic or political crisis, nor in overcoming institutional obstacles; it is simply 
that in private systems the state avoids making a direct moral obligation to provide 
income for all elderly people. 
3.3 Implied public responsibility for private pensions 
Private pension systems are based on a principle of self-provision, and therefore 
enable the government to avoid general obligations of retirement income support.  
However, private pension systems are supported and/or enforced by government 
policy, so that financial obligations created in these systems (earned by those who 
save in these systems) remain morally tied to government.   
The link is particularly clear in systems with mandatory contributions, and in 'opt-
out'-style reforms such as in the UK, where individuals can replace their public 
pension rights with private pension rights.  By participating in design, implementation 
and regulation of the system, the system is connected with government from a 
practical perspective, and in the perceptions of voters. 
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Chile is held up as an example of successful social security privatisation; however, 
returns in the Chilean system were propped up by the very high price paid by the 
government for loans from the pension funds, and by subsidies to save it from 
financial crisis during the period 1983-84 (Fox and Palmer, 2001: 10). 
Most OECD countries have public compensation systems in case of private 
occupational pension system failure.  Australia is an exception, though plans are 
under review to implement such a system (O’Loughlin, 9/9/2002).  The design of such 
systems is oriented towards provision of compensation necessitated by a specific plan 
failure, caused by negligence or fraud in investment or administration.  Large scale 
private pension failures, however, are potentially disastrous for government in both 
political and fiscal terms.   
The largest such failure in an OECD country to date is the UK ‘mis-selling’ scandal, 
which involved individuals being convinced to opt-out of the public system against 
their interests.  By 1998, 645,000 cases of potential mis-selling had been identified, of 
which 255,000 have been settled.  Compensation, paid for by Government, totalled 
£UK 1.2 billion by 1998 (Whitehouse, 1998: 27).   
In the US, a system with ‘voluntary’41 employment-based private pensions, there 
appears to be no public compensation available for private pension system failures.  
As was discussed in chapter 3, pensions are currently a serious issue in a number of 
bankruptcy proceedings involving major corporations in the US.  Millions of 
American workers consequently face simultaneous loss of employment and retirement 
benefits. 
3.4 Summary 
Neoliberals suggest that private pensions, unlike public pensions, are not vulnerable to 
political intervention or fiscal or economic crisis.  However, private pension systems 
are subject to government policy, and there are examples of fundamental reform to 
private pensions with profound effects on fund members.  Private pension systems 
cannot be quarantined from economic or state fiscal crisis, as the recent Argentinean 
 
41 Contribution to company pension plans is a condition of employment in many large firms. 
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• 
case demonstrates.  Periodic failure of private pensions leaves members without 
benefits, or dependent on the state for compensation.   
4 Private pensions - private interests  
The neoliberal pension reform literature suggests that public pension systems are 
hopelessly embroiled in political subterfuge whereas private pension systems are free 
from vested interests.  The reality is that the implementation and operation of private 
funded pension systems advances the interests of certain groups.   
The previous chapters have illustrated that the economic and social benefits for the 
community as a whole are doubtful.  However, the economic benefits for select 
groups are material.  One to two percent of system assets are spent on administration 
every year.  In the Australian system, this represents around $A 7 billion annually.  
This is the prime source of revenue for a range of lucrative, price-insensitive 
businesses.  A larger amount (currently around $A 9-10 billion annually in Australia) 
is foregone in tax as a result of private pension tax concessions.  This provides a 
benefit for income earners, though the benefit is not distributed evenly.  The 
advantaged groups include: 
The funds management industry and interests associated with it, including: 
¾ fund managers, brokers, lawyers, actuaries, asset consultants, 
merchant banks and IT consultants; 
¾ consultants who advise governments on pension reform and related 
reforms including privatisation; 
¾ the investment fund sales industry including marketers and 
advertisers, insurance and pension sales people, and financial 
planners; 
¾ trustees and administrators, including former and current union 
representatives; and 
¾ banks (also fund managers) and non-bank financial institutions 
which benefit from an additional source of funds and the increase in 
financial assets as a proportion of total assets (housing equity is 
reduced and housing debt is increased with the growth of private 
pensions). 
Higher income earners and wealth holders: 
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¾ who can contribute less or nothing to redistributive public schemes 
when they are reduced. 
¾ who benefit disproportionately from regressive tax breaks on earned 
and property income; and 
¾ have seen the value of the stock market driven up during the 20 year 
bull run. 
4.1 Direct lobbying 
Merchant banks, life insurance companies and brokers are keenly aware of the 
benefits for their industries associated with private pension schemes and of the 
sensitive politics involved.   
In the US, the financial community has provided dedicated funding for research and 
lobbying on social security privatisation in organisations such as the Cato Institute 
and the Heritage Foundation, which has been instrumental in the plans to privatise 
social security (Dreyfuss, 21/1/1999) discussed first by the Clinton Administration, 
and now the Bush Administration.   
In Australia, there is a long history of merchant banks and life insurance companies' 
involvement in research and lobbying.  The development of national contributory 
social security was prevented by, among other obstacles, the sustained opposition of 
the life insurance industry and friendly societies from the 1920s on (Kewley, 1965: 
140).   
More recently, in relation to the current funded system, the initial modelling in the 
1980s on the impact of superannuation on saving in the Australian economy was 
performed by National Mutual, and then transferred to the Treasury's RIM Taskforce 
(Gallagher and Preston, 1993: 10).  Currently, a major suite of research activity into 
future budgetary pressures related to the aging process is being directly funded by 
AMP (AMP-NATSEM, 2002).  The researcher’s press release received front page 
coverage in The Sydney Morning Herald, without mention of the direct financial 
interests of the backers of the research (SMH, 21/5/2002a). 
The ABA (Australian Banking Association) and the CPA (Certified Practicing 
Accountants) have both financed major submissions to government during financial 
year 2002.  The submissions focus not on the needs of industry providers, but on the 
needs of retirement savers.  Both groups find retirement saving at current levels is 
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inadequate (SMH, 21/5/2002b, CPA, 2002).  Recommendations include new 
employee contributions and government contributions to match employer 
contributions, and further reduction of taxes, particularly the super surcharge, which 
reduces tax incentives for high income earners.  The superannuation providers’ 
industry association, ASFA, similarly recommends that the government provide direct 
contributions to personal accounts and that tax be reduced on superannuation. 
The role of financial communities in the promotion of neoliberal pension reform is 
globalised.  Many large financial and business service providers, fund managers and 
banks are global operators.  These institutions fund research promoting NPR, 
including that of Jan Mantel (2000; 2001) and David Miles (1998; 1999), both of 
whom work for Merrill Lynch.  As discussed in chapter 4, Merrill Lynch recently 
settled a suit in New York involving fraud during the late 1990s.  
American merchant banks were involved in promotion of neoliberal reform in Europe 
during the late 1990s for strategic reasons, when the US pension market was 
perceived as relatively saturated.  These operators were closely involved in 
negotiations over the first private pension tax concessions offered in the German 
reform of 2001.  A major conference featured ‘wild guessing as to the value of the 
market’ to be created by the reforms which channelled a portion of pension 
contributions to private funds (Nöcker, 2001: 3). 
In Sweden, the government and insurance industry shared the view that funded 
pensions were required.  However, as Edward Palmer writes: 
There was less of a consensus from the outset on the organization 
of insurance provision. Needless to say, the insurance market 
promoted the idea of competitive insurance providers, while 
politicians across party lines favored the idea of a single (state) 
monopoly provider. (Palmer, 2000: 32) 
In both Sweden and Finland, life insurance companies entered fierce negotiations with 
government (including legal action) over pricing regimes for funded pensions (IPE, 
1998).   
Direct support for the neoliberal pension policy, and ongoing lobbying to encourage 
expansion and advantageous restructure is a current feature to be expected by 
institutions who gain direct benefit from its implementation.   
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4.2 IFI policy encouragement 
Radical neoliberal pension policy was first implemented by the Pinochet dictatorship 
in Chile during the 1970s and early 1980s with input from American economists 
under the auspices of the IMF.  Since that time, neoliberal pension reform has been 
implemented in many developing and transition countries with support and guidance 
from the IFIs.  The IFIs in some cases offer direct assistance by seconding advisers to 
client governments.  The IFIs also produce much literature on pension reform, dealing 
with technical issues and tactical advice on ‘political economy’; that is, methods of 
selling the reform to the public.  The IFIs also offer short courses and workshops for 
politicians and bureaucrats.   
The IFIs are also capable of exerting pressure on the governments of these countries.  
Countries in dire economic circumstances need external funding, and therefore the 
support of international financial markets.  World Bank and IMF finance, while often 
not in itself sufficient to fund nation rebuilding, represents a stamp of creditworthiness 
which is a necessary condition to access private sector funding from the developed 
world.  The IFIs hold effective monopoly rights over overseas capital, offering 
powerful leverage over economic policy. 
The structure of the relationship between the IMF and client states is outlined in the 
overview of the role of the IMF: 
In both its regular and concessional lending operations, financing 
is provided primarily under “arrangements” with the IMF, which 
are similar to lines of credit. For the large majority of IMF 
lending, use of these lines of credit is conditional upon the 
achievement of economic stabilization and structural reform 
objectives agreed between the borrowing member and the IMF. 
The IMF can also create international reserve assets by allocating 
SDRs to members, which can be used to obtain foreign exchange 
from other members. Use of SDRs is unconditional, although a 
market based interest rate is charged. (IMF, 2002: 8) 
Robert Holzmann, Director of Social Programs at the Bank, describes the relationship 
between the Bank's funding roles and its interest in economic policy in more pointed 
terms: 
In general, the Bank’s involvement comes in two contexts: (i) 
structural adjustment lending, where the large influence of 
pensions on a country’s fiscal, financial and economic life cannot 
be ignored, and (ii) investment lending directed to helping 
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countries modernize government operations in revenue collection, 
payment services and regulatory supervision. Understandably, 
the Bank prefers to do its lending to governments pursuing 
economic and social policies that are not self-defeating. 
(Holzmann, 1999: 3 [Italics added]) 
The notion that non-approved economic policies are ‘self-defeating’ is interesting 
given how ineffective IFI advice has been in the past.  IMF economic policy was a 
major cause of the 2001/2002 Argentinean economic crisis and amplified the 1997 
Asian currency crisis which IMF policy amplified (Stiglitz, 10/1/2002).  IFI economic 
advice has also turned 180 degrees in the last decade on some major issues, such as 
whether it is most appropriate to float, peg or abandon a national currency.  
Application of orthodox economic policy by economists at the IMF and World Bank 
have had devastating consequences for ordinary people in developing countries, as in 
Mexico following the implementation of the NAFTA agreement (Blecker, 1996).  
Nonetheless, for developing countries, lending from the IMF is contingent upon 
adoption of a program of trade liberalisation, privatisation and, in many cases, 
implementation of a neoliberal pension system.  Specific social and economic policies 
are conditions of the loan agreements entered into by the developing nation. The 
process of negotiation over loan agreement wording in relation to the 1997 pension 
reform in Hungary is discussed in a SAPRI (Structural Adjustment Participatory 
Review Initiative) document (SAPRI, 1999: 8).  SAPRI is a joint effort of the World 
Bank and national NGOs "to improve the understanding of the impact of adjustment 
policies and to seek ways of incorporating the participation of civil society in future 
policy formulation” (SAPRI, 1999: 1). 
The notion that policies other than those approved by the World Bank are 'self-
defeating' was not shared by all involved in the design of the new pension system in 
Hungary.  Critics regarded the Bank "as an advocate of radical market-based reforms 
without ‘social sensitivity’" (SAPRI, 1999: 8). 
The Hungarian reform, in which the public PAYGO system is maintained in reduced 
form in parallel with a new mandatory private contributory system, was far less 
radical than some in other former communist states.  In Kazakhstan, the public 
pension system was entirely replaced with a private funded system, as the local free-
market authors of the reform believed an incremental approach would be stymied by 
opponents of reform.   
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To generate public support and quell political opposition, the reformers won $US 1.7  
million in funding from USAID to conduct market research and create promotional 
material, which included 600,000 leaflets and a number of custom-designed episodes 
of the nation's favourite sitcom Perekrestok (Crossroads) (Andrews, 2000: 3).  It is 
inconceivable that organisations that oppose neoliberal reforms would have matching 
resources to effectively present a competing perspective to the Kazakhstan population.   
Neoliberal pension reform was implemented first by a totalitarian regime as a solution 
to a failed public pension system that it had previously undermined.  IMF economists 
worked with this regime to implement the pension reform, along with an extensive 
program of privatisation and trade liberalisation.  The IFIs have subsequently worked 
with many countries in more democratic settings to implement funded pension 
systems.  It is questionable whether the commitment of these governments to 
neoliberal reform is a democratic expression of political will.  The IFIs have effective 
monopoly control over foreign finance, and use conditional loan agreements to ensure 
that the governments adhere to programs of neoliberal economic policy, including 
implementation of private pension systems.  Some methods used to win public 
support for these changes have been highly insidious. 
5 Conclusions 
An important branch of arguments raised by the World Bank in support of neoliberal 
pension reform relate to political economy.  It is claimed that public involvement in 
pension administration leads inevitably to crisis because politicians cannot resist the 
temptation to implement unsustainable policy in exchange for short-term political 
gain.  Private administration supposedly ensures pensions are managed exclusively in 
members’ interests by quarantining benefits from the political process.  Private 
pensions are purportedly also protected from state financial crisis, and, reciprocally, 
should not compromise state finances due to demographic change or other shocks.  
The impact on the political process of potential gains to groups advantaged by private 
pensions are not discussed by the World Bank. 
A brief international review of public pensions suggests that instances of crisis are 
caused primarily by political and economic collapse.  There is no evidence that the 
political economy of pensions inherently and inevitably causes crisis.  Public systems 
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in both developed and developing countries can be well managed and sustainable, and 
exhibit the capacity for incremental reform.   
The notion that private pension systems may be quarantined either from government 
policy or fiscal crisis is absurd.  Pension systems – public and private – are brought 
into being by government and may be rapidly, radically and retrospectively changed 
with potentially dramatic effects for system members.  Private pensions are within 
reach of government if emergency funding is required, as the Argentinean crisis 
demonstrates. 
The implementation and administration of private pension systems directly advantage 
certain groups, particularly those associated with financial markets, who lobby 
aggressively to have systems structured in their favour.  The IFIs are directly involved 
in pension policy formulation in many developing countries, often using their control 
over foreign finance as leverage to ensure that their advice is heeded. 
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Chapter 7 Demography and fiscal sustainability 
To some degree the clash between individualistic and collective 
visions of fairness frames the debate about universalism in the 
right terms.  We believe that the social, political and economic 
arguments for universalism are persuasive.  And, opinion polling 
concerning support for social insurance suggests that most 
Americans agree. 
The attack on social insurance has therefore often taken a 
different form.  It has not confronted issues of fairness, 
uninsurable risks and market failures directly.  It has instead 
asserted the unaffordability or ungovernability of the social 
insurance programs that we currently have. Without confronting 
the issue of desirability directly, we have been urged to believe 
that collective provision for economic security cannot be 
organized successfully.  (Marmor and Mashaw, 1998: 5) 
1 Introduction 
In addition to suggesting that neoliberal pension reform provides benefits for capital 
markets, labour markets, and for the political system, the World Bank and others have 
based a critique of public pensions on demography and fiscal sustainability.  It is 
argued that generous public pensions are unsustainable due to aging, which is 
increasing dependency ratios in developed countries, leading purportedly to 
intolerable levels of taxation and/or public borrowing.  This concept has motivated the 
development of ‘generational accounting’ (discussed in chapter 3), which emphasises 
the degree of social transfer between generations due to demographic change. 
This chapter models the impact of demographic change on the fiscal sustainability of 
a simple, generous, universal, general revenue-funded pension system similar to New 
Zealand Superannuation (NZS).  The approach follows modelling by the World Bank 
(1994: 297) and Willmore and St John (2001). 
The analysis demonstrates that the incremental impact of demographic change on 
fiscal sustainability and the standard of living of workers and pensioners is marginal, 
and would be substantially outweighed by the positive effect of economic growth. 
New Zealand Superannuation is discussed in section 2.  The approach to modelling 
the impact of demography on financial sustainability is discussed in section 3.  Model 
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output is discussed in section 4.  Conclusions and implications of the analysis are 
summarised in section 5. 
2 New Zealand Superannuation (NZS) 
In New Zealand, as in Australia and Denmark, the prime public pension system is a 
non-contributory PAYGO system.  It is publicly administered and benefits are 
financed from general revenue, including personal and business income tax and a 
value-added consumption tax.  The system is called New Zealand Superannuation 
(NZS).   
NZS provides a relatively high replacement rate compared to other non-contributory 
public systems - often described as 'safety net' systems.  The level of benefits has been 
subject to change in recent years, but was set in April 2000 at 67.4 per cent of net 
average male wages for couples.  Single people receive two-thirds of that amount, or 
45 per cent of average net wages  (Willmore and St John, 2001: 1294).  This is above 
the 50 per cent of median income poverty line.  It is a level of income in between the 
level of public benefits provided in Australia and the US (particularly for low income 
people) and that of the generally more generous social security of the European 
Community countries. 
NZS is universal and non-means-tested.  The only eligibility criteria are age and 
residency: 65/62 for men/women and five consecutive years residency during the ten 
years before retirement.  This has important implications for both retirement decisions 
and administration.  The level of benefits enables those who wish to retire at the age 
of eligibility to do so.  However, there is no compulsion to do so.  People can continue 
to work without foregoing public benefits.  NZS payments are added to taxable 
income from other sources.  Administration is also simplified in parallel with the 
simplicity of the benefit structure.  The lack of a means-test may be critical to the 
political popularity of the scheme.  High income earners do receive a lower net 
pension as the pension is fully taxable at marginal rates. 
Another strength of the system is that it does not discriminate against those with 
broken work patterns, particularly parents.  NZS implicitly recognises the contribution 
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of those who have engaged in unpaid work as equal to those who have had paid 
work.42 
3 Modelling sustainability  
The first step, following work by the World Bank and Willmore and St John, is to 
derive a formula for the tax rate necessary to fund public pension commitments in a 
PAYGO system with a balanced budget.  The formula expresses the pension-specific 
tax rate ‘t’ as a function of aged dependency levels, ‘d’, and the pension replacement 
rate, ‘r’.  All formula are on a ‘per capita’ basis rather than an aggregate basis.  
We begin with the pension, ‘p’, which is average income, ‘y’, times the replacement 
rate ‘r’. 
 p = ry (1) 
If average income was $40,000 and the replacement rate was 50%, the pension would 
be $20,000. 
The tax rate, ‘t’, necessary to pay for this pension is determined by the relative 
numbers of workers and pensioners – the dependency rate, ‘d’.  If there were the same 
number of workers and pensioners (dependency of 100%) the tax rate would be the 
same as the pension.  From the above example (replacement rate 50%), each worker 
would have to contribute 50% of their wages to cover pensions.  If there were four 
times as many workers as pensioners (dependency of 25%), the tax rate would be 25% 
of the pension: 12.5% in the above example.  Algebraically, 
 t = dr (2) 
Assuming that a policy aim is to keep pensions at the same replacement rate, ‘r’ 
becomes a constant.   
This formula describes the direct relationship between dependency and tax levels.  It 
is a function which expresses the reality that in a PAYGO pension system, an increase 
 
42 As in other countries, pension reform has been a serious political issue in New Zealand during recent 
years.  In 2001, the Government began creating a fund to partially prefund future pensions, intending to 
‘smooth’ the burden of future pension obligations (Treasury NZ, 2001).  This system has been added to 
the existing public unfunded system. 
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in dependency results in an increase in taxation and a fall in net (after-tax) incomes.  It 
is this concept which underlies neoliberal notions of fiscal pension system crisis, as 
workers are predicted to resist government attempts to increase taxes in order to fund 
growing pension commitments.   
However, framing the problem like this does not provide a measure of the incremental 
impact of demographic change on pension financing, and ignores the greater impact 
of economic growth on income.   
The second step in the approach is to establish a rule for policy success; a measure of 
the political and fiscal sustainability of the pension policy which takes into account 
economic growth.  I assume a minimal rule for policy success is that average real net 
(after-tax) incomes increase in an average year.  The intention is that the rule 
expresses expectations of material improvement in standard of living over the medium 
to long term, which may be achieved with relatively small annual changes.  The rule 
is expressed in terms of economic growth; that is, the objective of the exercise is a 
formula which specifies the minimum amount of economic growth necessary for net 
average income to rise, after accounting for tax increases required by increased 
dependency. 
Net income, ‘x’, is equal to income, ‘y’, times 1 minus the tax rate ‘t’. 
 x = y (1 - t) (3) 
Net income can also be expressed in terms of the dependency and replacement rates, 
by substituting for t from (2): 
 x = y (1 - dr) (4) 
Our condition for policy success is that post tax incomes increase over time.  Where 
time is represented by subscript t, this can be written as: 
 xt  > xt-1 (5) 
By substitution, from (5) 
 yt (1 - dtrt) > y t-1 (1 - d t-1r t-1) (6) 
As the replacement rate, r,  is being kept constant, this can be written 
 yt (1 - dtr) > y t-1 (1 - d t-1r) (7) 
and reorganised 
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 yt/ y t-1 > (1 - d t-1r)/ (1 - dtr) (8) 
Next, by subtracting 1 from each side of the inequality we can put (yt-y t-1)/ y t-1 on the 
left hand side.   
 (yt-y t-1)/ y t-1 > (1 - d t-1r)/ (1 - dtr) -1 (9) 
(yt-y t-1)/ y t-1 is the percentage growth rate, ‘g’, in a given period: 
 g = (yt-y t-1)/y t-1 (10) 
So, by substitution, the condition for policy success, becomes 
 g > [(1 - dt-1r)/ (1 - dtr)] - 1 (11) 
This formula provides a method of calculating the amount of annual per capita 
economic growth required to ensure that average net incomes rise, given an increase 
in dependency from dt-1 to  dt, for a given replacement rate. 
4 Applying the model 
4.1 Australian demographic conditions 
The Australian aged dependency ratio (proportion of the adult population over 60) 
was around 18 per cent in 2000, and is predicted to rise to 28 per cent by 2030.  An 
illustrative income level is put in for the year 2000: $40,000.  Figure 7.1 shows the 
model applied to Australian demographic conditions.   
The table shows that as dependency rises from 18 to 28 per cent, the pension-specific 
tax rate necessary to balance the budget rises from 8.1 to 12.6 per cent.  In order that 
net income rises, growth in income of 18.27 per cent is required over the thirty year 
period.  As growth is compounding, this is equivalent to 0.56 per cent real annual per 
capita growth. 
Predicting growth levels is intrinsically difficult.  The past is not necessarily any 
guide to the future; however, historical rates of change may be used as a starting point.  
In Australia, rates of real annual economic growth per capita averaged 2.1 per cent 
between 1961 and 1998 (World Bank, 2001).  Rates in 22 of the 38 years were 
between 2 per cent and 5 per cent.  I use 2 per cent as a base case, with one per cent as 
a pessimistic forecast and 3 per cent as an optimistic forecast.   
Chapter 7 Demography and fiscal sustainability 187 
 
Figure 7.1 A model of sustainability applied to Australian demographic predictions 
 2000 2030 
r 45% 45% 
d 18% 28% 
t 8.1% 12.6% 
  Required Predicted 
  (greater than) Low Average High 
 
g (total)  18.27% 35% 81% 143% 
g (annual)  0.56% 1% 2% 3% 
y 40000 47307 53914 72454 97090 
x 34960 34960 39842 53544 71750 
Source: ABS (2000e) and author's calculations. 
In all cases, the level of growth exceeds that required to maintain after tax incomes, 
despite increased tax due to increasing dependency.  The model predicts that after tax 
incomes, initially $34,960, increase to between $39,842 and $71,750 in constant 
currency, a real increase of 14% to 105%. 
4.2 Other OECD countries 
Figure 7.2 shows tax implications and growth requirements for OECD countries.  The 
countries are ordered according to dependency in year 2030.  Annual growth is in 
bold type if over 0.75 per cent p.a..  These countries are worthy of note as this level is 
approaching the 1 per cent p.a. growth level.  If actual per capita economic growth is 
at (or lower) than the specified level then workers will receive zero (or negative) 
benefit from productivity improvement and economic growth. 
The level of growth necessary to ensure improving net incomes is significantly lower 
than historical averages. 
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Figure 7.2 The NZS-style model applied to other OECD countries 
 Dependency Tax Required real per 
capita growth 
 2000 2030 2000 2030 Total Annual 
Germany 0.40 0.80 0.18 0.36 28.32% 0.83% 
Italy 0.42 0.77 0.19 0.34 24.03% 0.72% 
Switzerland 0.34 0.77 0.15 0.34 28.90% 0.85% 
Austria 0.36 0.75 0.16 0.34 26.79% 0.79% 
Japan 0.41 0.75 0.18 0.34 23.06% 0.69% 
Belgium 0.39 0.70 0.18 0.31 20.14% 0.61% 
Netherlands 0.32 0.70 0.14 0.31 24.81% 0.74% 
Sweden 0.41 0.68 0.19 0.31 17.56% 0.54% 
Canada 0.29 0.67 0.13 0.30 24.62% 0.74% 
Finland 0.35 0.67 0.16 0.30 20.51% 0.62% 
Greece 0.43 0.67 0.20 0.30 15.57% 0.48% 
Spain 0.37 0.67 0.17 0.30 19.15% 0.59% 
United Kingdom 0.39 0.63 0.17 0.28 15.54% 0.48% 
France 0.37 0.62 0.17 0.28 15.68% 0.49% 
Norway 0.36 0.62 0.16 0.28 16.46% 0.51% 
Denmark 0.34 0.61 0.15 0.28 16.63% 0.51% 
Luxembourg 0.34 0.61 0.15 0.28 17.03% 0.53% 
Portugal 0.38 0.60 0.17 0.27 13.41% 0.42% 
Australia 0.29 0.58 0.13 0.26 17.61% 0.54% 
United States 0.30 0.58 0.13 0.26 17.45% 0.54% 
New Zealand 0.28 0.52 0.13 0.23 14.09% 0.44% 
Iceland 0.28 0.50 0.13 0.23 12.91% 0.41% 
Ireland 0.29 0.42 0.13 0.19 7.40% 0.24% 
Source: For dependency data World Bank (2001) and author's calculations. 
5 Conclusions 
Considering demographic change in the context of economic growth emphasises the 
extent to which economic variables are interconnected.  Demography cannot be 
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considered in isolation from other factors which determine economic dependency, 
particularly levels of employment.  Demographic determinism distracts from the 
fundamental concerns of economic policy, including low unemployment. 
The model suggests that the incremental impact of demographic change on the 
financing requirements for generous universal public pensions is relatively low.  Real 
per capita economic growth of around 0.5% would ensure that after tax incomes 
remained at a constant level in most OECD countries.  Economic growth above this 
level would provide increasing after tax incomes. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
Neoliberal pension reform (NPR) consists of changes to a nation’s retirement income 
system that increase reliance on private, funded, concessionally-taxed pension 
systems, and/or reduce reliance on public pensions.  The dissertation has examined a 
number of economic arguments used by the World Bank and others to support NPR.  
Namely:  
• NPR increases savings;  
• NPR improves the quality of investment and provides higher returns for 
members;  
• NPR results in efficient and innovative pension administration;  
• NPR reduces the labour market distortions associated with the (purportedly 
regressive) redistribution of public pensions;  
• NPR insulates pensions from the state and vice versa; and  
• NPR is necessary because generous universal public pensions are 
unsustainable due to demographic change. 
This chapter summarises the findings and draws general conclusions. 
1 Summary of findings 
1.1 Saving 
The argument that NPR increases saving is based on applications of the neoclassical 
lifecycle theory of saving (LCT) to pension systems (notably Feldstein, 1974).  The 
LCT, which emerged between 1930 and 1960, supposes that individuals save in order 
to smooth consumption – effectively saving during working life and dissaving during 
retirement.  As well as being consistent with neoclassical notions of utility 
maximisation, the LCT gained credence from the then current interpretation of the 
hump-shaped asset-age profile, which shows that assets by age peak at around 60.  
The asset-age profile has since been shown to demonstrate that younger cohorts enjoy 
greater wealth than older cohorts, due to generally increasing incomes (Miller, 1965; 
Shorrocks, 1975; Irvine, 1981).  Longitudinal analyses of specific cohorts in several 
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countries have shown that saving continues during retirement, even increasing in 
some cases. 
That people continue to save in retirement is consistent with the perspective of J.M. 
Keynes that the motivation to save is multifaceted, and with Adam Smith’s belief that 
saving is instinctive.  The main determinant of saving is ability, not motivation – 
saving is essentially a function of income.  Some people will have earned enough and 
saved (or inherited) more than enough assets at retirement to fund consumption in old 
age; many others will have been unable to save enough to avoid poverty. 
Enough fundamental questions regarding the LCT have been raised to highlight that 
the search for an effect of NPR on saving has been treated as an empirical question.  
Some researchers (eg. Poterba et al, 1996) claim to have found evidence that private 
pension tax incentives do increase saving.  However, as Engen et al (1996) have 
shown, these findings are based on a selection bias common to all program evaluation: 
participants exhibit a predilection for the tested behaviour.  In essence, while those 
participating in voluntary concessionally-taxed pension programs in the US save more 
than the average individual, it is unclear whether the program has increased their 
saving, or whether they are participating in the program because they save.  The best 
research indicates that voluntary saving incentives have no effect on levels of private 
saving; that, in effect, private pension programs result in a redirection rather than an 
increase in savings to take advantage of tax concessions (Gale, 1995).   
There is also evidence that saving in systems with a compulsory element, such as the 
Australian system, follow similar patterns.  Around two thirds of contributions to the 
Australian superannuation system is voluntary.  The area of most rapid growth in the 
super system is in very small funds designed as tax effective vehicles for the assets of 
wealthy families.  Even within the compulsory element (the ‘superannuation 
guarantee’), savings are disproportionately made by those on higher incomes and 
those approaching retirement, as would be the case without a system of incentives.  
Those on lower incomes – the working poor – who spend upwards of 50 per cent of 
income on housing (whether renting or paying mortgages) might well be reducing 
those payments, due to reduced disposable income caused by super contributions.  
This represents another form of redirection of savings.  Modelling by government 
officials that suggests the Australian pension system will increase saving is based on 
offset assumptions that demonstrate a selective view of the international literature, 
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and on optimistic assumptions regarding the degree of additional savings likely to be 
generated by the superannuation guarantee population. 
While the quantity of private saving appears to be largely unaffected by incentives, 
public saving is reduced by the amount of tax concessions on pension contributions, 
earnings and distributions.  In the Anglo-American countries with established private 
pension programs, the cost in tax revenue foregone is one of the largest elements of 
social spending, at well over 1 per cent of GDP and growing.  The combined impact 
on private and public savings of additional support for private pensions through 
beneficial tax treatment appears to be a reduction in the level of national saving. 
The outcome is similar when NPR involves a direct shift from public to private 
pensions such as when some fraction of contributions to social security are diverted 
into private accounts and invested on capital markets.  While this action creates a pool 
of funds for investment, pensions for those who had contributed to the PAYGO 
system must then be funded from another source, typically involving public 
borrowing.  The only circumstance in which this transition increases the saving level 
is if public pensions are reduced.  World Bank technical papers recognise that the 
transition will only generate savings at the expense of the ‘transition generation’.  
This has not altered the official stance of the World Bank, which continues to educate 
client governments on the macroeconomic benefits of NPR. 
The picture emerging from consideration of microeconomic factors is confirmed at 
the macro level.  A review of national pension assets and savings data, and national 
public pension spending and savings data, shows that there is no clear relationship 
between the structure of pension policies and saving.  Several countries with generous 
public PAYGO pensions are among the highest savers.  Conversely, most of the 
countries with high levels of private pension assets have low levels of saving.  There 
is also no clear relationship between the age of a country’s population and its level of 
saving.  Many ‘older’ countries have relatively high rates of saving, and vice versa. 
1.2 Investment 
There is no evidence that NPR increases savings.  However, NPR does cause a rapid 
build-up of assets in private pension funds.  This begs the following questions: How 
are private pension funds invested?  Do members receive better returns in private 
schemes than in public schemes?   
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As Award-based and then compulsory private pensions were introduced in Australia 
during the 1980s and 1990s, there was much hope that these newly formed or 
enlarged financial institutions – being repositories for pooled long-term investment – 
would address funding gaps such as risk finance or venture capital.  These hopes have 
not been realised.  Over 95 per cent of pension funds in Australia, as in other 
countries, are invested in deposits and marketable securities, such as equities and 
bonds.  Investment in venture capital is at a trivial level of less than one per cent of 
assets.   
In terms of corporate debt holdings, these institutions operate in a manner largely 
undifferentiated from other financial institutions.  Pension fund investment in deposits, 
bonds, and other debt adds no value to the previously existing financial system, and 
therefore brings into question the additional costs of the system in terms of 
administration and tax revenue foregone.   
In contrast to other financial institutions, pension funds in Anglo-American countries 
(with ‘prudent man’ non-prescriptive regulations) invest up to 60 per cent of assets in 
equities.  This investment is differentiated from that of previously existing financial 
institutions, but it also poses a number of problems for the economy.   
It was hoped that having a plural administrative structure with many fund managers 
would encourage diversity and innovation.  However, fund managers tend to herd, 
with investment focussed on the shares of very large corporations.  This investment 
focus is necessary to avoid acquiring large holdings in companies which cannot be 
liquidated without adversely affecting the value of holdings.  ‘Herding’ is perceived 
as a driver of inflated share values during the recent share market boom, particularly 
of large firms which are heavily weighted in share market indices, which much 
pension fund capital passively tracks.  While it was hoped by proponents of NPR, 
such as Hans Bloomestein (2001a; 2001b), that professional fund management would 
lead to more accurate pricing of capital market assets, pension funds have 
demonstrably followed investment cycles and fads, into and out of tech stocks, and 
into and out of overseas holdings.  By following investment trends, pension fund 
investment amplifies rather than smooths market pricing fluctuation. 
According to the government officials who designed and implemented Australia’s 
compulsory superannuation, for private pension funds to finance improved retirement 
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income they must fund investment that adds to the capital stock.  In theory, addition to 
the capital stock will contribute to improved productivity, which is necessary to 
maintain standards of living as the population ages and the dependency ratio increases.  
If no addition to the capital stock is made, the resources available to pay retirement 
incomes are unchanged.  In fact, it is plausible that only a small portion of pension 
fund investment in equities actually funds new investment.  The majority of shares 
acquired are existing securities rather than new issues.  Moreover, a significant 
proportion of issues of new equity in Australia and the UK fund corporate and 
financial restructures such as privatisation, demutualisation and mergers and 
acquisitions.  These transactions do not fund new physical investment.  In the case of 
demutualisations, capital is returned to ‘members’.  In the case of privatisation, capital 
is returned to the government, enabling retirement of debt. 
The US has the most mature capital market with the most large corporations listed.  It 
is a destination for most overseas investment by pension funds in other countries.  In 
the US, net issues have been negative for the last twenty years, even including issues 
related to financial restructure.  This is because IPOs and other new issues of equity 
are dwarfed by the return of capital in the form of share buy-back programs operated 
by most large corporations.  These large corporations, on aggregate, fund investment 
from internal sources.  The flow of capital is from corporations back to shareholders, 
emphasising the limited extent to which pension fund investment in securities issued 
by the largest corporations actually funds new investment in the ‘capital stock’. 
Hopes that institutional investment would improve corporate governance have also 
been disappointed.  Highly diversified holdings make strategic guidance impractical, 
and, according to pension fund trustees in the US, have even failed to provide 
oversight of accounting and management practices.  Pension funds were unable to 
prevent, or even to evaluate and avoid, fraudulent behaviour by executives during the 
late 1990s.  The management tools of the institutional investor are to buy or sell (or 
the threat to do so), and attempts to influence management are focussed on cost 
control.  Pension funds have institutionalised rather than ameliorated short-termism 
among capital market investors. 
Proponents of NPR argue that returns for members are higher in private funded 
pensions than in public PAYGO pensions because the former receive capital market 
returns, and the latter receive returns that are at best equal to the rate of real economic 
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growth, and may also be adversely affected by demographic change and redistribution.  
In an argument linked closely to neoliberal perceptions of the political economy of 
pensions, proponents of NPR assert that public PAYGO pensions enable an 
irresistible windfall gain for the first generation of retirees who can live in retirement 
on the contributions of other workers, though they themselves may have contributed 
little to the system.   
The reality is altogether different.  Detailed actuarial analysis of public PAYGO 
pensions, such as Canadian and US social security, finds near constant internal rates 
of return and no evidence of windfall gains.  Returns in public pensions are positive, 
and benefits are secure – in comparison with private funded pensions.  The value of 
security appears to be undervalued by proponents of NPR, who ignore the early 
lessons of funded pensions.  Corporate funded pensions date back to the late 19th 
century in the US, but many were wiped out during the Depression. 
Instead, many economists who support NPR assert that capital markets have provided 
‘historical’ returns of around 7 per cent, and that these can be expected in perpetuity.  
As critics point out, these analyses include a number of biases, most clumsily through 
selection of convenient markets and periods.  Real returns have been estimated at as 
low as 1.5 per cent, when all markets, including those affected by financial collapse, 
are included.  Even ignoring instances of market collapse, the tendency of years with 
high and low returns to be grouped together in bull and bear runs has profound 
consequences for retirement income from private pensions invested in corporate 
securities.  Based on the performance of the benchmark US index, the S&P500, a 
difference of only three years in the timing of conversion of retirement savings into an 
annuity could reduce retirement income by up to 40 per cent.   
Less diversified funds can produce more extreme transitions.  Employees of bankrupt 
US corporations with 401k pensions invested predominantly in own company stock 
(such as Enron) have paid the heaviest price for misguided pension policy, losing both 
employment and their private pensions.  Proponents of NPR in the US would gladly 
also have diverted public pensions into the stock market, undermining the remaining 
safety net. 
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1.3 Administration 
Private pensions in the Anglo-American countries (and most developing and 
transition countries assisted by the World Bank) are delivered by private entities 
operating in a consumer market setting.  This structure is completely inappropriate for 
several reasons.  In a consumer market, discipline on price and quality can come only 
from efficient competition, but there is no evidence of this pressure on suppliers.  
Products and pricing are highly complex and non-transparent and are consequently 
not understood by most consumers.  Consumers are often misled by advertising and 
commission-based agents (‘financial planners’). 
A consumer market also involves higher costs than is necessary, due to lower 
economies of scale and additional selling and marketing costs.  Close to two per cent 
of the total value of assets are spent annually on administration cost, with fees higher 
than average in retail funds and slightly lower in industry funds.  Administration cost 
in a consumer market is also regressively distributed, due to a range of fixed charges 
which cause fee ratios to be higher for smaller account balances.  A plural 
administration structure – especially combined with rules related to employment 
governing membership – contributes to account proliferation.  Members in Australia 
hold an average of around three accounts.  Assets spread across several accounts 
attract higher total fees.  Millions of accounts are now considered lost, with lost 
balances estimated to represent around $A 7 billion (over one per cent of total asset 
value).  
More efficient administrative structures are possible within private funded pension 
systems.  Small numbers of fixed-period fund administration licences can be issued 
with exclusive client bases and auctioned as in Bolivia, which has only two private 
pension providers.  Alternately, administration can be kept public, and fund 
management services purchased by the government on a wholesale basis on behalf of 
individual members as is the case in Sweden.  Such a structure maximises 
administrative economies of scale, puts price pressure on fund managers, prevents 
wasteful consumer advertising and sales, and prevents account proliferation.   
Even within the context of a plural consumer market, simple reforms would have a 
dramatic effect on administration cost and accumulation.  Obvious reforms include: 
transparent, simplified fee structures, centralised account registration, and making 
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employers (who ‘purchase’ most employment based funds) pay for administration 
costs over and above contributions made on behalf of employees. 
1.4 Labour market distortion and inequality 
While NPR places the responsibility for retirement income provision on the individual, 
the capacity to save for retirement varies greatly.  Many people, including those with 
broken work patterns (disproportionately women) reach retirement with little or no 
financial assets.  It follows that public pensions offering a level of income above the 
poverty line are necessary to prevent elderly poverty, particularly among women.  
Data analysed in chapter 5 suggest that the relationship between public pension 
spending and elderly poverty in the OECD is strong and negative.  The countries with 
the lowest spending – Australia and the US – have very high levels of elderly poverty, 
particularly among women.  Countries with low levels of poverty among the elderly 
have at least medium and generally high levels of public pension expenditure.  This 
appears to contradict the World Bank’s assertion that redistribution within public 
pension programs is invariably regressive, favouring privileged workers and not 
providing income for the poorer among the elderly.  In contrast to private pensions, 
real benefits are shared with those who cannot provide for their own retirement.  It is 
notable that NPR, presented as a solution for aging, adds to financial disincentives to 
have children by basing retirement income only on paid work, and therefore not 
recognising the essential contribution parents make to society. 
That public pensions should be universal rather than means-tested is advisable for a 
number of practical reasons: universal programs are invariably well-supported 
politically; non-means-tested programs do not create incentives to leave the labour 
force; and they are also the most efficient to run. 
Critics of public PAYGO pensions argue that they introduce labour market distortions, 
which lowers demand for and supply of labour, reducing competitiveness and 
employment.  Opinions of this kind include crude references to apparent growth 
differentials between Anglo-American and Western European countries.  However, 
these arguments do not stand up to examination.  They ignore periods of rapid growth 
in countries with socio-economic models very different to the Anglo-American 
nominally ‘free market’ model, such as in East and South East Asia, and also in 
Europe.  They also ignore profound regional differences in growth rates within both 
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groups of countries, such as between Northern California and the mid-West.  As 
Michael Cichon of the ILO argues, high labour costs (including generous social 
security contributions) are entirely compatible with capital intensive and productive 
enterprise.  To the extent that the Anglo-American and Western European countries 
do represent different socio-economic models, they are both consistent with capitalist 
development, although in the latter case with generally lower levels of poverty. 
Labour market distorting aspects of public pension systems may be reduced without 
resorting to radical neoliberal reform.  Early retirement can be allowed on an 
actuarially fair basis, reducing the so called ‘implicit tax on labour’.  One obvious 
way to do this is to remove means tests on pensions, so that individuals can continue 
to work and pay taxes on earned income while receiving pension entitlements.   
The World Bank points to other problematic responses to high social security 
contributions, including the under-reporting of income and the development of 
informal labour markets.  These are essentially administrative enforcement matters, 
though dependent on political will.  Examples of successful public PAYGO pension 
systems operating in both developed and developing countries emphasise that these 
are not inevitably terminal problems, as is asserted by the World Bank. 
1.5 Political economy 
An important branch of arguments raised by the World Bank in support of neoliberal 
pension reform relates to political economy.  It is claimed that public involvement in 
pension administration leads inevitably to crisis because politicians cannot resist the 
temptation to implement retirement policy which is not sustainable in the long term 
for short-term political gain.  Private administration purportedly ensures that pensions 
are managed exclusively in members’ interests by quarantining benefits from the 
political process.  Private pensions are purportedly also protected from state financial 
crisis, and, reciprocally, should not compromise state finances due to demographic 
change or other shocks.   
A brief international review of public pension systems provides no evidence that the 
political economy of pensions inherently and inevitably causes crisis.  Public systems 
in both developed and developing countries are generally very popular and 
demonstrate the capacity for sustainable incremental reform.  Several instances of 
crisis used by the World Bank to illustrate that this outcome is inevitable were in 
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countries that experienced profound economic collapse (and in some cases were 
crippled by war and disease).  Under these circumstances private funded pensions 
would certainly also have failed.  The notion that private pension systems may be 
quarantined either from government policy or fiscal crisis is absurd.  Pension systems 
– public and private – are brought into being by government and may be rapidly, 
radically and retrospectively changed with potentially dramatic effects for system 
members.  Private pensions are within reach of government if emergency funding is 
required, as the Argentinean crisis demonstrates.  They are subject to financial crisis 
just like other private financial institutions. 
The World Bank’s ‘political economy’ argument is highly ideological, stemming 
ultimately from mistrust of government intervention in the economy, particularly 
universal programs which redistribute income and invest capital.  World Bank 
researchers such as Brooks and James (1999) assert that, while scientific assessment 
shows the necessary path of reform, local vested interests can obstruct progress.  The 
notion of objective research confronted with vested interests is curious.  Public 
pensions are funded by workers, who are also the main beneficiaries, and most 
programs of this kind enjoy majority support.  By contrast, private pensions benefit 
contributors in proportion to income, and more importantly, elements of the financial 
community involved in provision.  The latter group is the source of much supposedly 
objective research into pensions asserting the need for higher tax concessions and 
higher levels of compulsory provision.  Substantial resources are made available by 
international financial institutions to developing and transition governments to win 
public support for NPR.  In Kazakhstan, for example, the public relations efforts 
funded by USAID and the entry of American investment banks to the private pension 
market appear to be closely coordinated. 
1.6 Sustainability 
Critics of public PAYGO pensions question the financial sustainability of such 
systems due to aging.  An increasing dependency ratio does require that contributions 
(as a proportion of wages) increase if pensions (as a proportion of wages) are to 
remain constant.  However, this does not necessarily mean that workers will lose out, 
as economic growth brings higher productivity and higher incomes.   
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Modelling in chapter 7 suggests that the annual impact of demographic change on the 
financing requirements for relatively generous universal public pensions is quite low.  
Real per capita economic growth of around 0.5% would ensure that after tax incomes 
remained at a constant level in most OECD countries.  Economic growth above this 
level would provide increasing after tax incomes. 
2 Some implications of the findings 
The dissertation has presented evidence that refutes the economic arguments used by 
the World Bank and others to support NPR.  The sources used in the analysis are all 
publicly available, and include work by World Bank researchers.  How is it, then, that 
these arguments remain so prominent and influential?  It appears that, along with 
much thorough research on pensions, including by researchers working for and 
published by the World Bank, there is also a considerable weight of ‘soft research’ 
and deliberate misinformation produced by the IFIs and interested parties. 
In particular, the public debate in many countries is strongly influenced by finance 
industry associations whose primary objective is to increase the flow of capital to their 
members.  The economic arguments criticised in this thesis give these organisations a 
set of tools to shape opinion amongst the public and policy-makers. 
The IFIs also recognise that pension policy has subtle but powerful ideological effects.  
Pension privatisation necessitates and facilitates a range of other neoliberal policies, 
especially privatisation of state assets, and financial market deregulation.  The change 
also contributes to a significant increase in the role and profile of equity markets, and 
directly links the interests of workers (especially well-paid workers) with those of 
capital.  The difference in identification implied by a private funded system is 
significant, compared to a public unfunded ‘solidarity’ system in which retirement 
income is drawn directly from the current contributions of other workers. 
The thesis provides much information which would be useful for informing sound 
pension policy.  The most important finding is that, to avoid a substantial portion of 
the elderly (especially women) living in poverty, it is necessary to have generous 
public pensions with universal coverage.  The World Bank’s contention that pensions 
(at least in developing countries) generally cover only privileged workers is salient, 
but it does not provide a rationale for NPR.  The issues in these countries are coverage 
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and redistribution, neither of which is addressed by a shift from public to private 
pensions, such as that experienced in the Latin American and transition economies. 
Tunisia or Mauritius offer a better path of reform for developing countries to follow, 
both having achieved close to universal pension coverage in contributory and non-
contributory schemes respectively. 
Private pensions are regressive and wasteful.  They offer a tax effective method of 
saving for people who would do so in any case, constrain the disposable income of the 
working poor, and offer no coverage for the unemployed of unpaid carers.  The level 
of waste could be reduced using the mechanisms summarised above; however 
concessionally-taxed employment-based schemes will inevitably be complex and 
rule-bound.   
There is as yet no answer to the larger question of how to usefully direct the river of 
capital which flows through pension funds.  Fund managers avoid investment in 
illiquid private equity, preferring liquid capital markets in which non-systematic risk 
(fluctuations in security or sectoral performance) can be dealt with through 
diversification.  Reliance on this form of investment provides no protection against 
crashes in value affecting the whole market, but this outcome is of less concern to 
fund managers, who are judged against the market.  More importantly, perhaps, much 
of this form of financial investment does not fund physical investment, and therefore 
does not add to the capital stock.  A continuation of such a policy will presumably 
lead to falling yields, after the speculative returns caused by frantic acquisition of 
scarce blue-chip securities subside, if this has not already happened. 
Appendix A
Appendix A. Detailed representation of Figure 5.6 
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The underlying spreadsheet includes a model of individual private pension accumulation based on the inputs in the top half of the table, and 
provides output as the value of an annuity purchased at retirement for estimated life expectancy relative to median income.  The value of the 
annuity relative to median income falls during retirement due to income growth.  Please contact the author on sachavidler@optusnet.com.au or 
sachavidler@hotmail.com for a copy of the model. 
Figure A.1 A model of self-provision for retirement in private pension funds for middle and low income people 
Case
Base
Lower contributions
Longer retirement
Much longer retirement
Shorter working life, 
longer retirementq
Lower nominal interest
American tax structure
Lower inflation
Optimistic
Pessimistic
Base
Lower contributions
Longer retirement
Much longer retirement
Shorter working life, 
longer retirementq
Lower nominal interest
American tax structure
Lower inflation
Optimistic
Pessimistic
INPUT
proportion of median 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67% 67%
inflation 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2%
working life 40 40 40 40 35 40 40 40 45 40 40 40 40 40 35 40 40 40 45 40
retirement 15 15 20 25 20 15 15 15 10 25 15 15 20 25 20 15 15 15 10 25
lifespan 75 75 80 85 75 75 75 75 75 85 75 75 80 85 75 75 75 75 75 85
tax 
contributions 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 0% 15% 0% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 0% 15% 0% 15%
earnings 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 0% 15% 0% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 0% 15% 0% 15%
benefits 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 25% 15% 25% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 25% 15% 25% 15%
contribution rate 9% 7% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 7% 9% 7% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 7%
interest rate (nom) 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 6% 5%
annuities rate (nom) 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3%
OUTPUT
Start ratio 36% 28% 36% 36% 30% 27% 43% 44% 70% 21% 24% 19% 24% 24% 20% 18% 29% 30% 47% 14%
End ratio 24% 18% 20% 18% 17% 18% 28% 34% 59% 10% 16% 12% 14% 12% 11% 12% 19% 23% 39% 7%
Average ratio 30% 23% 28% 26% 23% 22% 35% 39% 64% 15% 20% 15% 18% 17% 15% 15% 24% 26% 43% 10%
Better/worse than base -22% -7% -13% -24% -26% 19% 31% 118% -50% -22% -7% -13% -24% -26% 19% 31% 118% -50%  
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